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HomeMy WebLinkAbout09/17/98AGENDA SPECIAL MEETING HERMOSA BEACH CITY COUNCIL Thursday, September 17, 1998 - Council Chambers, City Hall 7:10 p.m. MAYOR Robert Benz MAYOR PRO TEM Julie Oakes COUNCIL MEMBERS ✓John Bowler ,/ Sam Y. Edgerton J. R. Reviczky CITY CLERK Elaine Doerfling CITY TREASURER John M. Workman CITY MANAGER Stephen R. Burrell CITY ATTORNEY Michael Jenkins All council meetings are open to the public. PLEASE ATTEND. CALL TO ORDER PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE ROLL CALL 1. REVIEW AND CONSIDERATION OF ASPEN REPORT RELATIVE TO MACPHERSON OIL PROJECT. Report is available for public review in the City Clerk's office, City Manager's office, Public Library, Police Department, and Fire Department. RECOMMENDATION: Receive report and public input on the report and provide direction to staff on how to proceed ADJOURNMENT NOTE: THIS MEETING WILL BE TELEVISED LIVE ON CENTURY CABLE 1 ;10 4' :WI, 1=1'7.ii 14:' 1'92 1 i': 4 .=11_14 /485)4 IAN CHATTEN-BROWN PRINCIPAL. KIMBERLY E. LEWAND DOUGLAS CARSTENS ASSOCIATES • DIA -MN -BROWN ANS ASSOCIATES 10951 WEST PICO Bt)ULEVARL) THIRD FLOOR LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90064 TELEPHONE:(3I0) 474-7793 FACSIMILE: (310)474-$504 &MALI.: JCHATTEN@EA MILINK.tvgf September 14, 1.998 By .facsimile Original t' folkow Honorable City Council City of Hermosa Beach Civic Center '131.5 Valley Drive Hermosa Beach, CA. 90254-3885 LESLIE V. WALTON LEGAL ASSISTANT Re: Recommendation for Denial of Building Permit for Macpherson Oil Drilling Project Honorable Councilmembers: On September 17, 1998, you are going to holdwhat may be the final public meeting before you decide whether the Macpherson Oil Project will be approved by you.. Your decision will be of momentous importance to thefuture of your City. You already well know the position of the majority of your residents, as expressed through Proposition E. In addition to the will of the voters, the Hermosa Beach Stop Oil Coalition ("HBSOC") believes there are compelling technical reasons, including the conclusions drawn in the Aspen Report, fir you to deny Macpherson its building permit. 1. R to 814.411+1,. .,► ®1+ 0 Id Present Serious Risks to the co}rinuni*y. Although a number of risks identified by the Aspen Report are listed as being in the "gray area," in fact the risks identified in the Report are unacceptably high. For example, the report anticipates two major releases and sone rupture over the life of the project. There is a 4% likelihood of an offsite flash fife with the potential for casualties; a 1 in 7000 chance of one or more fatalities; and a 1 in 700 chance of one or more serious injuries to members of the public. Do you really want:to be responsible for such deaths or injuries? SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION 11 14/ � 1 .: � 4_ 3104748504 City Council Page September 14, 1998 JAN J C:H TTEl J BFOWH • • The City has not established a standard regarding what is an unacceptable risk. Ilowever, other agencies have. For example, an exposure to carcinogens is "significant" if it is 1 in 100,000, assuming lifetime exposure. 22 CCR §12703(b). The City should not find a 1 in 7000 risk of fatalities or a 1 in 700 risk of injury acceptable. 2.Tech A512cn1 Re.port. 1t se hown i th Attached are comments upon the Aspen Report prepared by two prominent experts in risk man.agem.ent: Jim Tarr and. John Edwards. Copies of their resumes are also attached for your information. Their comments underscore the fact that the risks to the community may be even greater than those identified by Aspen. In addition to those points made by Jim Tarr and John Edwards, I would like to note that the entire Aspen Report is premised upon the assumption that the project would be "by a safe and reputable operator" with "industry standard safety and reliability provisions." See Aspen Executive Summary, p. iv. However, as HBSOC has noted on many prior occasions, Macpherson lacks experience in oil drilling in general, and urban oil drilling in particular. While they might have relied upon Windsor Energy for that expertise, Windsor is now in. bankruptcy. Furthermore, the Company's failure to provide relevant material when requested supports the conclusion that Macpherson would not be a reliable, responsible member of the Hermosa .Beach community. Large, well funded companies such as Chevron in Santa Barbara have had catastrophic releases of hydrogen sulfide, where death or serious injury was avoided only by shutting down Highway 1. It is not reasonable to assume that Macpherson could operate for 35 years without major mishap. HBSOC already has submitted a report to you by Dr. Kaye Kilbourn which supports the conclusion that low level exposures to hydrogen sulfide may result in adverse h.ealth effects. This issue has not been studied, except for a literature survey .conducted by Aspen. Nonetheless, the significance of exposure to air toxics, including carcinogens such as benzene, should not be ignored. 4. _[he Lease Has Fx it d jacishQuisilstsuatataidedi The Lease between Macpherson and the City has now expired. Macpherson has requested that it again be extended, We urge that the City deny the requested extension. Macpherson already has received several extensions. We appreciate that you are concerned 09/14/1998 17:43 3104748504 JAN CHATTEN BROWN PAGE 04 City Council Page 3 September I4, 1998 about whether Macpherson will sue the City if the lease is not extended. However, we believe such a suit would be without merit. Failure to complete required activities within specified time periods are only excused when they are beyond the control of the lessee. Macpherson repeatedly has been dilatory in providing information to agencies so that they could review his project. The delay was not an "enforced delay" as defined by ¶30 of the lease, which provides that performance shall not be deemed to be in default when delays are caused by acts such as war, strikes, or acts of God. Although performance is not in default when caused by litigation, these delays were not so caused as at no time was the processing of the applications enjoined by any court. 5. R" .:.! . 1.11 %ll '.n� ..%lr , , . . i, . e I!. i • • HBSOC has previously challenged Macpherson's projections of revenue from drilling. Even if oil is found, HBSOC believes the revenue to the City, most of which can only be used for very limited purposes, would be far less than the economic loss to the City. There should be little question but that the property value of homes in close proximity to the drilling will be reduced. rHowever, 50% of the homes in Hermosa Beach will be able to see the 135 foot industrial drilling rig that would be up for 55 months, and the 110 foot work over rig which could be up for 35 years (even though it could only operate 90 days per year). The industrial eyesore that would be created by this project would diminish property values throughout Hermosa Beach. Because of the expiration of the Lease, you have an opportunity to put an end to the City's embroilment in this issue with minimal exposure to liability and move forward with. land uses compatible with a popular, attractive coastal community. If you fail to do so, the City will no doubt continue to be involved in litigation and the outcome of this Project will not be known for years. 6. r .� ;��: .a`n •' .� :' ' • d Not We have been advised that the 'Coastal Commission will require an amendment to the coastal permit if this project goes forward because the redesigned project will be within 60 rather than 75 feet of a public street. This fact was obscured by Macpherson during the Coastal Commission application process because appropriate site plans were not included. Even if the City Council is unwilling, at this juncture, to deny a permit, it should not issue a permit until after the Coastal Commission permit is issued. During the interitn,`the City should study the issue of low level exposure to various air toxics emitted by oil drilling operations, and conduct a study of the problems of other urban oil drilling project in close proximity to homes. 09/14/1995 17: 43 3i0 $504 City Council Page 4 September 14, 1998 Conelusiozl TAN CHATTEeR0I4N PAGE 05 For all of the reasons stated above, and because:of the undeniable adverse. environmental impacts of the project, we urge you to ruse to extend the Lease, and to deny the requested Building Permit. Yours truly, C -f -0421 - JAN CHATTEN-BROWN cc: HBSOC CC?UNCIL.914 • • DRAFT COMMENTS "An oil field is a dirty, smelly, messy place. A 12 -foot wall will not keep an oil field from being a dirty, smelly, messy place." Jim Tarr, Stone Lions Inc. 1. CONCLUSIONS OF REPORT THAT SUPPORT THAT RISK IS TOO HIGH Two results leap out. One is the "4% likelihood of an offsite flash fire with potential for casualties." The other is a 1 in 700 chance of one or more serious injuries of members of the public. Both of these seem very high, especially considering that there is no reward for the risk being taken, at least not for those at risk here. 2. COMMENTS ON REPORT - STONE LIONS ENVIRONMENTAL a. p. iii) "The principal requirement to reduce the risks for the Production Phase from the unacceptable region to the grey region was..." While this sentence refers to a specific circumstance, it also seems to summarize the attitude of the project. The goal should not be to move to a level of risk that is in the "grey" region (especially considering it is someone else's definition of a grey region), but rather the goal should be to be at a level of risk that is acceptable to all involved, or at least as close as possible. b. Section 2.6) The acute damage criteria used for the different acute disaster scenarios seem to be chosen somewhat arbitrarily. This is important because the probability values of fatalities or injuries chosen here directly affect the ultimate level of risk which is the purpose of this report . Submitted by Hermosa Beach Stop 00310/379-5698 September 14, 1998 1 • • c. p. 2.28) Bercha claims the odor threshold for H2S is approximately 0.1 ppm. This number is substantially higher than the 0.0081. ppm value that we found or the 0.025 value given by Dr. Kilburn of USC. This is important because in section 4.7 which addresses low level H2S emissions, modeling indicated that the 0.1 ppm isopleth could extend up to 600 feet downwind from the source. Since the odor threshold for H2S is much lower than 0.1 ppm, the modeling should indicate the downwind distance that the correct odor threshold is exceeded. d. Section 7.1) The method of mitigating the production phase risk is the construction of the 12 foot high reinforced concrete block wall around the perimeter of the facility. This wall is what reduces the risk from the "unacceptable" region to the "grey" region. The problem here is that the level of mitigation attributed to the wall is questionable. The report does not explain how this has been quantified (or at least I can't see how they did it) nor does it back it up with testing or references that show the influence of such a wall in similar situations. Also, the Jvake effects of the wall which affect dispersion were ignored. This is especially important considering the wall is what makes this project OK. e. A final comment here is the report is difficult to digest and follow, especially for a non-technical person. This is disturbing considering that many non-technical people may be using the report to make decisions regarding the fate of this oil -drilling project. 3. COMMENTS - JOHN EDWARDS - USAF Environmental Scientist a. Before giving you my concerns, I would like to mention that my neighbor, Dr. Gene Dockins1, mentioned before that the same company, McPherson Oil had a very messy and ugly oil yard in Long Beach. I mentioned this to Rosamond who did not know about it. My wife talked to him and he said they just cleaned it up, as we were considering taking a look and some pictures. Suggest that maybe some see if there are others who have pictures or the company be asked for any pictures and memos about ' Dockins holds a Doctorate of Judiciary, MAI, is an Environmental Managements Specialist Submitted by Hermosa Beach Stop 0i1310/379-5698 September 14, 1998 2 • • . cleaning it up in preparation for this council meeting. 1 agree with your bottom line, that an oil site will be an ugly sight no matter where it is. b. Regarding the report - I have several important issues and differences with the report. I think that there are a great deal of assumptions made in the report which are incorrect and will lead to less potential risk than people will actually be exposed to. c. One of the greatest is the omission of terrain effects in the model. mentioned this in my comments to the EIR in 1989, comment 43. This was based on my experience with modeling the effects of plumes related to the space shuttle, where terrain effects make a large difference from a "flat earth" assumption used in Florida vs the hills of California. Years of modeling and validation have gone into that effort, because it and other factors do make a difference. d. The assumption on plume rise can be mistaken on twio counts. One is that the plume will rise. An expanding gas will not head up, it will cool -- hot gas rises, not cool. Also, H2S is a heavy gas and, depending on many factors, could sink rather than rise. If that occurs, and the wind carries the effluent east it will go into the greenbelt channel where it may concentrate. e. The risks do not appear to account for synergistic effects with other constituents in the ambient air. If we had perfectly clean air, the risks would be lower (as this report assumes) than the real air in the region. The earliest air pollution laws were instigated due to just such effects of SOx with fog in London which killed hundreds of people. Fog, which Hermosa has plenty of, and other air contaminants will likely increase the risk of the emissions, especially of SOx and H2S. f. I did not see special receptors addressed. If that is the case, they should be, because some segments of the population are at higher risk than others due to age and other conditions, e.g. respiratory disease. Again, this would increase the actual risks to the surrounding population. g. Assumptions about people in homes is not a good one. In Hermosa, Submitted by Hermosa Beach Stop 0i1310/379-5698 September 14, 1998 3 • • many people do not have air conditioning and leave their windows open. In general, exposure indoors will be delayed, but can reach same levels as outside, depending on the vent system. Risks should include people indoors also, again increasing the risk. h. I think wind direction will make a difference in the area, because the topography and layout of homes vs businesses in the area are important to the result. Again, this is an important source of error, but the risk could go in either direction depending on results. i. Overall I think that this assessment needs some sense of the error, which is not given. If we put error bars on each assumption and add them together, the risk is likely to be very much higher than given in the Aspen report. The error can be reduced by checking the assumptions, but instead, the contractor has been limited in depth of data collection, and hence the results reflect this lack of validity. If one were to try to put probability clouds around these results, -- for example, the Aspen report results may deserve about a 10 % probability of being correct. If we were to seek a more reasonable 80 to 90 % confidence, it is highly likely that the risks will be in unacceptable ranges, and the project considered unsafe for the location. A few approaches to these concerns would be to plot risk vs assumption and put error bars for each of the factors. This should involve more modeling, e.g. having the plume remain at ground level for example, then seeing the effects, also having all the population effected, not just those indoors. Also run with increased risk from synergistic effects and the other factors mentioned above. Submitted by Hermosa Beach Stop 0i1310/379-5698 September 14, 1998 4 • • k. Another approach would be to run the program backwards, e.g. give concentration isopleths which are unacceptable in the neighborhoods and the scenarios which could lead to such concentrations. If they are feasible, even if improbable, this identifies key problem areas. Although a project engineer says a release of over 40 ppm of H2S is not possible, there may be mechanisms the engineer has not encountered as occurred in the nuclear industry and the Titanic. I. A list of preparers and what part they played in the report preparation is missing. It is important to know the background and qualifications of people making engineering judgments and assumptions for the report. For example, who made the engineering determination that it was impossible for over 40 ppm of H2S to be released. m. In the "Risk Communication" area, communication was more of a "spin" than clarification. There are Voluntary and Involuntary risks. This project is an Involuntary Risk and should be clearly indicated as such. If the risk of death is 1 in 1 million, it is the same as McPherson asking each of us to play Russian Roulette with a gun with 1 million chambers and only one bullet. But why would we play? Do we need the project to get to work or take the kids to school? No. n. Overall, I think the contractor did as well as they could do given the limited resources. However, in order to get a meaningful evaluation of risk, a more work is needed to make the- analysis specific to the site conditions. This means taking wind and air quality data, doing tracer releases, using a model that takes terrain into effect, considering synergistic effects, and related issues. The analysis is at best inconclusive, but I think grossly underestimates some factors which will make the project unacceptable. Submitted by Hermosa Beach Stop 0i1310/379-5698 September 14, 1998 5 • • o. A last consideration, if the city and proponent are very certain of the analysis and conclusions, is to have them put in escrow, large sums of money to compensate for any loss of life, disease or damage to homes or property values as a result of the project. John Edwards Submitted by Hermosa Beach Stop 011310/379-5698 September 14, 1998 6 Ethics, Threshold Limit Values, and Community Air tion Exposures 1111 • http://www.stonelions.com/article.htm ETHICS, THRESHOLD LIMIT VALUES, AND COMMUNITY AIR POLLUTION EXPOSURES By Jim Tarr INTRODUCTION One of the most significant problems in the field of air pollution control involves the task of deciding what level of toxic chemical exposure is acceptable in a community setting. The task is made daunting by the need to make judgements about literally thousands of different chemical substances. Often there is a dearth of human health effects information related to a particular chemical. If information is available, it is often contradictory, sketchy, difficult to interpret, or derived by an entity with a vested interest in the economic aspects of the chemical in question. Given the need to act, a number of regulatory agencies have chosen to rely on so-called threshold limit values (TLVs) to develop acceptable community exposures that result from toxic chemical emissions. The purpose of this discussion is to examine the technical basis for that kind of approach, to review the uses of TLVs in state air pollution control programs, and to consider some of the ethical considerations that are inherent in the use of TLVs in assessing community air pollution exposures. Practices of the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission (TNRCC) will be given particular attention. AIR POLLUTION AND HEALTH The year 1962 marked a watershed in the environmental movement in the United States. Henceforth, the environment, human health, and exposure to toxic chemicals were inextricably linked. Rachel Carson catalyzed that new perspective when she presented eloquent and persuasive arguments based on the premise that for the first time in history all people were subjected to contact with toxic chemicals from the moment of their conception to the time of their death (1). Historically, air pollution control at the state level derived from the legal concepts of trespass and common law nuisance. In the wake of Carson's teachings, the emphasis for controlling air pollution was sharpened. In 1967, the U.S. Congress passed legislation to provide financial assistance to states to establish comprehensive air pollution control programs. By 1970, all fifty states had adopted laws to control air pollution (2). The primary thrust of those various state laws was protection of public health from the adverse effects of exposure to air pollution, that is, toxic chemical substances. That message was articulated in language like that found in the Declaration of Policy of the Health and Safety Code of the State of California as amended by the Pure Air Act of 1968 and by Laws of 1969 which in essence declared that the health, safety, welfare, and sense of well-being of ordinary people were the primary concerns in the field of air pollution control (3). THRESHOLD LIMIT VALUES TLVs are numbers which refer to airborne concentrations of substances. Those numbers were first introduced into the lexicon in 1942 by a group called the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) (4). TLVs define exposure levels related to people employed in the industrial workplace. They are said to represent maximum average concentrations of contaminants to which workers may be exposed for an 8 -hour work shift, day after day, without injury to health. Ethics, Threshold Limit Values, and Community Air tion Exposures • http://www.stonelions.com/article.htm The TLV concept is seriously flawed in a number of respects. Concurrent with the first publication of a list of TLVs, the idea that a given value represented a safe concentration was specifically rejected. On the contrary, the use of TLVs was simply meant to provide guidance for the control of health hazards in the workplace. Some ten years later, the idea that a TLV was equivalent to a level of safe exposure to a chemical substance was introduced by the ACGIH with little or no scientific justification (5). Three decades passed before that particular misconception was corrected in the scientific literature. It was shown that TLVs were, in general, poorly supported by scientific evidence, but were developed with a great deal of consideration given to the cost of controlling exposure (6). TLVs were developed with inadequate medical input, lack of scientific rigor, and by advocates with important financial conflicts of interest (7). The process of selecting a particular value for a TLV for a specific chemical was done in a setting in which technological and economic feasibility was an integral consideration (8). Recently, the recognition that TLVs are not thresholds at all has come full circle. It has been shown that adverse health effects occur in people at or below the level of exposure defined by the TLV for a number of chemical substances (9). The designation TLV has even been judged to be meaningless because the very concept is no longer in accordance with what is known about the relationship between occupational exposure and human health risk (10). Most importantly from an environmental protection perspective, the use of TLV in a community air pollution setting is completely contrary to recommended practice. The document which lists values for workplace TLVs explicitly states that said values are not intended for use or for modification for use in assessing community air pollution exposures or for estimating the toxic potential of continuous, uninterrupted exposure to chemical substances (11). AIR POLLUTION CONTROL AND TLVS A number of state and local air pollution control agencies use TLVs as a basis for controlling community air pollution exposures. That usage became more popular in the mid-1980s when the EPA began to delegate the responsibility of controlling toxic air emissions to various state agencies. The shift from federal to state control was begun in the wake of many years of failure on the part of the EPA to effectively regulate toxic chemical emissions under Section 112 of the federal Clean Air Act.To make matters worse, this new scheme was initiated by the EPA with a minimum of effective financial and technical support (12). In spite of obvious difficulties, for a number of air pollution control agencies, the idea of using TLVs, or some modification of those numbers, apparently was an irresistible solution to a very difficult problem. In 1989, almost one-half of all states incorporated the use of TLVs in their air pollution control efforts to limit public exposure to toxic chemical emissions. Among those states were some of the most populous in the U.S. including California, Connecticut, Florida, Michigan, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas (13). The Texas methodology will be reviewed in detail in the next section of this paper. HEALTH EFFECTS REVIEW AT THE TNRCC The TNRCC is the government agency in Texas charged with controlling air pollution. One of its predecessor agencies, the Texas Air Control Board (TACB) actually created the system that is used to pass judgement on community toxic chemical exposures in the state. Initiated in the mid 1970s, the TACB approach to regulating community toxic chemical exposure was the Ethics, Threshold Limit Values, and Community Air tion Exposures http://www.stonelions.com/article.htm development of the "effects screening level" (ESL) system. The original system was based almost entirely on fractional TLVs. Acute health effects screening levels were judged on the basis of comparing a predicted ambient air concentration to 1/100th of the TLV (30 -minute average). Chronic health effects screening levels were based on a comparison of predicted concentrations with one/1000th of the TLV (annual average) for a toxic chemical of interest (14). At least two of the important premises on which the TACB's ESL system was based were deeply flawed. One of those premises was that if predicted ambient air concentrations of a toxic chemical did not exceed the ESL for that chemical, then no adverse health effects would occur. There was no valid scientific basis for that claim when it was made, and there is certainly none now. A second flawed premise was that if a permit applicant proposed to control air emissions with "best available control technology," and if the applicant designed the proposed facility to protect his workers from hazards, then residual public exposure to the toxic chemical air emissions from that facility would be acceptably low (15). This claim was made in spite of the fact that the TACB was statutorily prohibited from evaluating and regulating industrial hygiene matters in facilities. Furthermore, there was not then, and there is not now any direct connection between engineered pollution control devices and the response of nearby biological systems. A confounding difficulty soon became apparent. The ESL system could only be employed in conjunction with those toxic chemicals for which a TLV existed. There are currently published TLVs for approximately 750 toxic substances. By 1987, the TACB had applied the ESL system to more than 2,000 different chemicals (16). This feat was made possible by the creation of numbers\that, in candor, must be called pseudo-TLVs. A pseudo -TLV is a number that is not derived from human experience in the industrial workplace, but instead, is derived from a comparison of chemical structures and the toxic effects of other chemicals (17). In 1987, the TACB had apparently made health effects decisions on fully two-thirds of all chemicals they considered using pseudo-TLVs. To paraphrase their own description of the method, the derivation of pseudo-TLVs didn't represent a pure science approach, but it allowed the permit review process to proceed at a reasonable rate (18). Experience demonstrates that the ESL system at the TNRCC exists primarily for the convenience of the agency and to some degree for the economic purposes of the corporations that the agency is charged with regulating. The TACB has flatly stated that the system provides major advantages for the regulated community. For example, the acceptable levels of community exposure to toxic chemicals are said to be readily achievable. They also point out that the system does not prohibit modernization and industrial growth in the state. Furthermore, companies are not burdened with the need to provide extensive toxicity testing results for those dangerous chemicals they may want to emit into the environment (19). Another stated advantage for industry is that the ESL guidelines are flexible. They are also said to bring consistency to the review process (20). And in one of the more telling statements of the TACB, it is pointed out that the regulatory agency can explain the meaning of the ESLs to the public, indicating that the TLVs upon which the numbers are based represent concentrations to which industrial workers may be exposed over a lifetime without adverse effect (21). Stated another way, one goal of the ESL system is to use the presumed prestige of the omniscient regulatory agency as a means to mollify public concern about the emission of toxic chemicals into the environment. Also, of most practical value to those who emit toxic chemicals into the atmosphere, it is clear that predicted ambient air concentrations greater than an ESL will not cause serious difficulty for a permit applicant. The TACB has declared that an exceedence of an ESL doesn't necessarily mean that a proposed project won't be approved (22). In fact, said finding may not represent a problem at all (23). Exceedences of ESLs are routinely considered acceptable (24). Taken as a whole, the record reflects that Ethics, Threshold Limit Values, and Community Air etion Exposures • http://www.stonelions.com/article.htm the agency will acquiesce to avoid prohibiting the emission of toxic chemicals into the atmosphere whether or not that action threatens the health of ordinary people. In the final analysis then, the ESL or fractional TLV system is based on mendacity and bureaucratic arrogance. The agency purports to conduct health effects reviews with thoroughness, fairness, and flexibility (25). Clearly, their real concerns about fairness fail to include those who breathe the toxic chemical emissions that are allowed under the auspices of a discredited system. They also categorically state that if their ESLs are not exceeded then no adverse health effects will occur (26). That all encompassing claim is made with the certain knowledge that the agency has failed to conduct the research needed to document that kind of sweeping generalization (27). Current TNRCC procedures explicitly include a premise that an ESL can be exceeded without creating an unacceptable increase of adverse human health or welfare effects (28). Those increases may be acceptable to the agency and the regulated entities, but the interests of the people who must bear the subsequent risks remain unspoken and unrepresented in any meaningful way. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS There are at least two systems of ethical thought which are of interest in the present context. One system involves a utilitarian approach to ethical reasoning based on the idea of doing the greatest good for the greatest number. Another relevant ethical system flows from the concept of deontology, or an approach based on duties and obligations (29). Both of these systems share a number of basic principles. Five of those principles will be discussed, with an effort made to briefly define the ethical term, and then relate it to the idea of using TLVs as an integral part of an air pollution health effects review system. The TNRCC's ESL system will again provide the focal point of this part of the discussion. Non -malfeasance This idea requires the practitioner to refrain from doing harm. It is a familiar concept, and it is perhaps best stated in the physician's ethical charge: "First Do No Harm." In an air pollution control setting, the concept of non -malfeasance places a substantial burden on an agency charged with protecting human health. The clear implication is that such an agency would have to have a lot of information about a toxic chemical and its possible effects on people prior to allowing the release of that chemical into populated areas. Definitive, incontrovertible evidence concerning the toxic properties of the chemical in question would have to be readily at hand. The information would have to be exactly relevant to the subject population. Unbiased evaluations by highly trained, skillful practitioners with the authority to make unpopular decisions would be normal operating procedure. None of those principles is an integral part of the health effects review system at the TNRCC. The best thing that can be said about their system is that they usually don't know if the toxic chemical emissions they allow will actually harm anyone. There is certainly no demonstration that those emissions will do no harm. In spite of that lack of knowledge, they routinely permit toxic chemical emissions from many sources. Clearly, this ethical standard is not met most of the time at the TNRCC. Autonomy Simply stated, this ethical principle requires respect for persons, all persons. In this context, respect for persons must be maintained in a situation where the interests of one group are in actual or potential conflict with the interests of another group. The entities which the TNRCC regulates tend to be corporations with an overriding need to make as large a profit as possible. Controlling, or perhaps completely eliminating, the emission of a toxic chemical may well represent a cost, and make profit difficult or impossible. The regulatory agency must respect that need, and balance the profit motive against the needs of the broader community. The community needs include the need for a healthy Ethics, Threshold Limit Values, and Community Air Illtion Exposures • http://www.stonelions.com/article.htm environment. In fact, the very laws which created the TNRCC mandated the protection of human health and welfare as the concern of primary interest. Respect for the broader community must therefore command the highest priority if this ethical principle is to have meaning. At the TNRCC, respect for the broader community is not reflected in the day to day workings of the health effects review system. The agency operates in such a manner as to subjugate the interests of the broader community to the interests of corporations. In fact, from reading the agency descriptions of their intent with respect to the ESL system, it is clear that they intend to place themselves in the position of advocates in regard to convincing the community that a given toxic chemical exposure is harmless in spite of the fact that their methods of review are scientifically invalid, superficial, and oftentimes applied in a manner best characterized as slipshod. This ethical standard is therefore not met by the reality of the workings of the health effects review system at the TNRCC. Justice This ethical principle speaks to the equal administration of policy and to the equitable allocation of resources to all segments of society. In -an air pollution regulatory context, the implication is that all segments of the community are approached in an evenhanded way and treated in a fair and equitable manner with regard to the resource of clean air. The TNRCC health effects review system is unjust for a number of reasons. The burden of toxic chemical exposure falls predominately on that segment of the community that resides in close proximity to industrial facilities. In Texas, that often means the poor, the undereducated, and minorities. It is also clear that the workings of the agency are significantly tilted toward meeting the needs of the corporations responsible for emitting toxic chemicals into the environment. Since 1972, when the construction permit system was begun, the TACB and the TNRCC have issued tens of thousands of permits for new or modified industrial facilities. During the same period, those agencies denied permit applications for a very small number of proposed operations. The minimal number of permit denials that occurred generally resulted from considerations other than health effects concerns. Fidelity To be consistent with this ethical concept requires faithfulness and the keeping of promises. Implicit in the duties of the TNRCC is the promise that the health and welfare of the public will be given primary consideration in all agency actions. That promise must presuppose that whatever methods are employed in the quest to protect health and welfare will be firmly grounded in valid scientific principles. The ESL system at the TNRCC is the foundation of the agency's means to protect health and welfare. It is a system that forms the basis for hundreds of decisions each year concerning the kind and quantity of toxic chemicals to which thousands of men, women, and children will be exposed. As explained in the preceding section of this discussion, the ESL procedures are based on discredited, invalid information, false premises, and plain nonsense. As a result, the promise of fidelity is breached, and this ethical principle is not met. Veracity This is the simplest ethical principle to articulate and to understand. To practice veracity is to tell the truth, to be candid, to be open and honest. The practice of veracity is the opposite of lying, hypocrisy, and prevarication. The health effects review system at the TNRCC is not based on veracity. In the strictest sense, the TNRCC doesn't often lie about the health effects review system. But the agency often fails to tell the whole truth. The use of TLVs to assess the impact of toxic chemical exposures on community health is at Ethics, Threshold Limit Values, and Community Air P tion Exposures 01 • http://www.stonelions.com/article.htm best a questionable methodology. The use of pseudo-TLVs for the same purpose is not questionable methodology, it is plainly grasping at straws in the name of economic development. It is one thing to conduct a regulatory policy for that purpose, it is quite another to pretend that you don't. The pretense creates a condition of a falsehood. The ESL system is therefore unethical in light of the principle of veracity. CONCLUSION TLVs were developed for use in controlling health hazards in an industrial setting. They were not intended to be used in evaluating the potential harm of toxic chemical emissions into neighborhoods surrounding industrial facilities. There are reasons to doubt that TLVs are valid for any human health effects evaluation. In spite of those difficulties, the use of TLVs in air pollution control agencies has become widespread. The TNRCC relies heavily upon air pollution evaluations based on TLVs. As implemented, the system works primarily for the benefit of the agency, and to some extent, for the benefit of the corporations which the agency regulates. The TNRCC can point to a "health effects review system" and make exaggerated claims about its effectiveness. The corporations can receive their permits to emit toxic chemicals into the atmosphere and continue business as usual. In the meantime, the public is left to suffer the unknown consequences of a scientifically meaningless, bureaucratic endeavor. One consequence of this unethical behavior needs to be emphasized. The potential for harm done by the actions of the TNRCC in the realm of health effects review is magnified by the fact that many of the communities that are subjected to the toxic chemical emissions thus allowed are populated by low-income, relatively uneducated people. That segment of our society often lacks the expertise to understand what is happening as a result of the decisions made by the TNRCC. They are therefore unable to protect themselves and their families. Click here to see the references. DReturn to Stone Lions Environmental Corporation Home Page. Resume - Jim Tarr • • JIM TARR President STONE LIONS ENVIRONMENTAL CORPORATION SUMMARY OF QUALIFICATIONS: http://www.stonelions.com/jtresume.htm Twenty-five years experience as an environmental engineer in the areas of air pollution evaluation and control; hazardous waste evaluation, management, and remediation; and toxic chemical exposure assessment. PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE: Stone Lions Environmental Corporation, (1993 -Present) - President Simon Hydro -Search, (1990-1992) - Vice President Toxcon Engineering Company, Inc., (1978-1990) - President Texas Air Control Board, (1972-1978) - Engineer Monsanto Company, (1969-1972) - Process Engineer EDUCATION: Master of Chemical Engineering, University of Houston, Houston, TX - 1976 B.S., Chemical Engineering, University of Texas, Austin, TX - 1969 REGISTRATION: Professional Engineer, Texas - Number 35507 CERTIFICATION: Diplomate, American Academy of Environmental Engineers Certified Hazardous Material Manager at the Masters Level (inactive) AWARDS: Recipient of the 1977 Ecology Award presented by the San Jacinto Lung Association for "Outstanding Leadership in the Field of Environmental Health." PROJECT EXPERIENCE: Resume - Jim Tarr • • http://www.stonelions.com/jtresume.htm Performed technical evaluations of proposed commercial incinerator facilities for the cities of Corpus Christi, Texas City, La Porte, and Houston, Texas. Conducted air quality evaluations for proposed municipal landfills in Garland, College Station, and Houston, Texas; Pindall, Arkansas; and Santa Clarita, California. Conducted a complete environmental engineering evaluation of a commercial industrial waste incineration facility in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Conducted air emission evaluations of commercial municipal landfills in West Covina and Granada Hills, California; New Orleans, Louisiana; and Sinton, Texas. Prepared construction and PSD permit applications for new process industry facilities and modifications of existing facilities. Conducted environmental audits at industrial sites in Texas, Louisiana, Colorado, California, Illinois, New Mexico, and North Dakota. Designed and implemented PCB and hazardous waste site remediation projects in Texas, California, Missouri, New Mexico, Colorado, and North Dakota. Developed an air emission inventory for approximately fifty maquiladora facilities in Matamoros, Mexico. Conducted air dispersion modeling studies for refining operations, chemical manufacturing facilities, and industrial waste disposal sites. Worked on behalf of citizens' groups in Texas, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Louisiana, New Mexico, Michigan, Hawaii and California. PUBLICATIONS & PRESENTATIONS: Jim Tarr, "Ethics, Threshold Limit Values, and Community Air Pollution Exposures," in Sacrificing Science for Convenience: A Technical and Ethical Evaluation of Texas' Risk Assessment Process, Downwinders at Risk Education Fund, Cedar Hill, Texas, October 1996. Jim Tarr, "The Practical Aspects of Assessing Community Air Pollution Exposures with Air Dispersion Modeling Techniques," National Bar Association, 69th Annual Convention, Seattle, Washington, August 1994. Jim Tarr, "Siting Criteria for Industrial Waste Incinerators - An Air Pollution Perspective," The 1989 Incineration Conference sponsored by the University of California, Irvine, CA, at Knoxville, Tennessee, 1989. Jim Tarr and J.R. McMurry, "The Control of Vinyl Chloride Emissions in Texas," 71st Annual Meeting of the Air Pollution Control Association, Houston, Texas, 1978. Jim Tarr and Catherine Damme, "Toxicology, Toxic Substances, and the Chemical Engineer: The Special Relevance of Cancer," Chemical Engineering, p. 86, 1978. Resume - Jim Tarr • • http://www.stonelions.comitresume.htm J.R. McMurry and Jim Tan, "Vinyl Chloride in Texas Ambient Air," 24th Annual Meeting of the Institute of Environmental Sciences, Ft. Worth, Texas, 1978. August 1997 Return to Stone Lions Environmental Corporation Home Page. • • CV and other credentials of John Edwards will be forwarded when available. AFA salutes SMC at annual awards luncheon The following individual waw selected from more than 3,000 men and women assigned to the Space and Missile Systems Center for the 1997 General Bernard Schriever Los Angeles Chapter 147 Air Force Association awards. John Edwards, chief, Environmental Management Branch, Directorate of Systems Acquisition, led a team of 43 scientists and engineers striving to solve the ozone depletion problem for future launch systems. His team has already developed and successfully tested a new generation of non -chlorine solid rockets with performance characteristics that meet current and future launch needs. As a result, he was awarded the White House Environmental Innovation Award for the enhancement of space access by future launch system programs, while greatly reducing risks to the earth's environment. John Edwards, SMC/CEV, COMM: ()- - , DSN: 833-6200 SEP -15-98 03:33 AM ./len.nwia. Reach STOP O�L 610 Sixth Street Hermosa Beach, CA 90254 Telephone.: 310-379-5698 Facsimile: 310-376-1298 Email: hmyd37a(4prodigy.com Fair Political Practice: IDI 8919340 HB -STOP -OIL 13103761298 P.01 • • September 15, 1998 MEMORANDUM VIA FAX TO: City Clerk FR: Rosamond Fogg PH: 310-379-5698 FX: 310-376-1298 DT: September 15, 1998 RE: Aspen Report Comments Submitted September 14, 1998 PGS: To follow is John Edwards' bio. Please see that it is attached to the above document. I am sorry for the inconvenience to you; I did not receive it until 3:00 am today. Thank you. Website. hnp.//homes_qte.net/brosed/helping/oil/stopoil.him SEP -15-98 03:34 AM HB -STOP -OIL • El: fax from Edwards John P.O.B. 3516 Redondo Beach, CA 90277 fax number 310/376-2761 voice number 310/318-1820 13103761298 P.03 • subject number of pages date & time to note <Fogg> Rosamond Dear Rosamond, here is my official USAF Bio. I don't have a Resume ( maybe 1 should make one). Then I could add work at Ralph M. Parsons Eng before USAF and also key player in US/Russian Federation bilateral environillental exchange on space matters. je 9/15/98 12:40 AM SEP -15-98 03:33 AM HB -STOP -OIL 915 )B 12,10A USAF Biography John R. Edwards 13103761298 P.02 John R. Edwards is Chief of Environmental Management for the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC/AXFV). His is responsible for environmental compliance with environmental laws of Air Force Space systems acquis tion worldwide, focusing particularly on National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) analysis, identifying and implementing research into impact areas associated with space for which there is no current information, and space -related environmental technology Mr. Edwards and his people have provided the environmental analysis for every major Air Force space program. Despite challenges, his unit has not had any Air Force space program stopped or seriously delayed for environmental reasons This accomplishment is possible since the public and regulatory agencies understand that his unit proactively explores important environmental issues, develops solutions and openly shares that information with them. He and his wife Faro have a daughter. Roxanna and a son, Darwin. EDUCATION 1973 Bachelor of arts degree in zoology. University of California, Los Angeles 1976 Masters of science degree in environmental engineering, University of Southern California 1991 Seminar on Leadership and Ethics for the 1990s, University of Southern California ASSIGNMENTS: 1979-1990, member of the Environmental Planning Division. Los Angeles Air Force Station, CA 1990 - 1994, chief, Environmental Planning Division, Los Angeles Air Force Base, CA 1994- present. chief, Environmental Management Branch. Los Angeles Air Force Base. CA AWARDS AND HONORS: 1986 Engineering Project Achievement Award for the Space Shuttle Waste Management 1988 Federal Environmental Engineer of the Year Award, HQ AFSC nominee 1994 Los Angeles Magazine Environmental Pride Award, Publisher's Award 1997 White House Closing the Circle Award for Environmental Innovation 1997 Air Force Association Award of Excellence, General Bernard A. Schriever Los Angeles Chapter 147, Salute to Space and Missile Systems Center P CJ_ SEP -17-98 THU 11:31 LAF I To PRODUCT I ONS 9/17/98 FAX NO. 2139 1226 P. 01 Dear Mayor Oaks & Councilmembers Bowler & Edgerton, I'm sorry I can not attend the meeting to discuss the Oil drilling issue this evening but X want you to know that as a long time Hermosa Beach resident I am absolutely opposed to any drilling in the area. I voted against drilling in 1995 as the majority of residents did and I am appalled to know that Macpherson Oil Company is planning on drilling despite this. Let's face it, Macphearson is only interested in their pocketbooks, not the supposed revenue to our schools or the health of Heri osa Beach residents or the undoubted unsightliness their project will bring to our city, Personally, I am very concerned as to the negative effects their greed at all costs will have on our environment. I urge you to do what you can to end this travesty_ Sincerely, Carlyn Montes De Oca 2037 Manhattan Avenue Hermosa Beach, Ca 90254 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION • Dear Hermosa Beach City Council, Sept 17, 1998 I thank you for the opportunity to review the risk assessment report and for the load of the Final EIR for the Macpherson Oil project from the City manager. I would also like to thank the City Engineer who provided me with copies of some of the city maps. I would also like to thank Mr. Frank Bercha, who took the time to explain several aspects of the analysis to me, and clarify some of the assumptions some of which I had initially thought were in error. Ounlifications So you know my qualifications, I have a M.S. in Environmental Engineering from USC, where I helped develop validation methods for sampling Hazardous Wast Landfills for the California Department of Health Services. I worked as an environmental engineer for Ralph M. Parsons Engineering for 3 years on environmental impact analysis and permits for the Space Shuttle program and several overseas projects. I have worked for the U.S. Air Force as and environmental scientist and engineer on most of our space programs and ground support facilities worldwide and developed, designed and fielded toxic control systems and hazardous waste treatment and storage facilities. I was in charge of risk assessments for the first SDIO facility, the Beryllium Rocket Test Facility at Edwards AFB, and did analysis and air model validation work for the Titan test facilities. I was on the Hermosa Beach Planning Commission for 1 year. I am currently the Chief of Environmental Management for the AF Space and Missile Systems Center and led the first three delegations on U.S. and Russian environmental cooperation for military space systems. Last year I received the White House Closing the Circle Environmental Innovation Award for leading a team of 43 scientists and engineers to model stratospheric impacts from rockets and develop new, less - polluting rocket propellants. Although I work for the Air Force, I am speaking for myself as a resident of Hermosa Beach, and for my family only. My wife also holds a MS in Environmental Engineering also from USC. Involvement During the Environmental Impact Report Phase of the project in 1989 I asked that a risk assessment be conducted. I am pleased to see that one has been produced, and that the city is seriously seeking to understand the safety issues engendered by this project. In general, I think the risk analysis is very helpful and identified several scenarios which I did not foresee. I think the report has provided the basis upon which to judge the safety of the project, given just a few modifications. My areas of concern are with higher concentration Hydrogen Sulfide scenarios than those analyzed, with potential for very great errors in the analysis, and with some of the conclusions about significance. Analysis of the Risk Assessment I will limit my statements to those I believe will be of interest to the City Council, and not digress into several other areas where I still have questions about assumptions. I will make my comments in reverse order, because I think on the first two points alone one may conclude that the project is unsafe for the proposed site. Significance of Risks 1. First, with respect to conclusions of significance, EPA, under certain conditions considers the risk of 1 death per million people to be an acceptable risk level. I do not believe that use of any other criteria is relevant for this project. The report uses a Canadian recommendation that 1 in 100,000 be used in medium density areas. Hermosa Beach is not a medium density area, although some parts of the city plan show them that way. Hermosa Beach as a whole has a population density higher than Hong Kong, China. School children use the sidewalk next to the proposed project and on the Greenbelt immediately east of the project area to walk to school every weekday, and they would certainly consider this involuntary risk. It is hardly a medium density area. I think the use of that Canadian criteria for golf courses and warehouses is misapplied here. Error potential is known to be very large 2. Second, I think that the results of the report could easily be an order of magnitude off, and the author may even agree with me on this point. For example, the receptors of the stresses are assumed to be the general population. Because some segments of the population are at higher risk than others due to age and other conditions, e.g. respiratory disease, it is customary practice to assign a tenfold increase in impact for such sensitive receptors as children, the elderly and the infirm. Although the results are hard to quantify without further data collection and analysis, based on this generally used factor, the entire project falls into the unacceptable risk zone (provided one uses 1 in 1 million as an upper limit). NOTE (The qualification statements made in the report indicate to me that the contractor is fully aware of the potential changes to predicted risks based on changes in assumptions. I presume that if the city or proponent or the contractor were very certain of the analysis and conclusions, without modifications, they would readily indemnify the city and residents for any errors, cleanups, injuries, deaths or other harm caused by reliance on this study in which actual risks differed from predicted risks.) Introduction of a very dangerous gas to the neighborhood 3. Based on testimony during the Coastal Commission hearing and actual data from nearby wells, concentrations of 5,000 ppm have been experienced. Although a project engineer says a release of over 40 Pam of hydrogen sulfide (H2S) is not possible, there may be mechanisms the engineer has not encountered, even if not common, which may cause releases of H2S far greater than the 40 ppm. Accidents in other industries have occurred which were predicted to be impossible. I am not convinced that such an event is impossible. If one considers that H2S has nearly identical concentration limits and toxic effects as Hydrogen Cyanide, which is used in gas chambers to execute prisoners (at concentrations above 600 ppm), the level of concern for such a chemical in a residential area is warranted if comparable concentrations can be reached. No fatalities in the risk analysis were based on hydrogen sulfide exposure, although models were run for low concentration releases. Lacking a model run at higher concentrations, a look at the Department of Transportation 1987 Emergency Response Guidebook for Hazardous Material Incidents gives some indication of range of impact areas. In the event of a leak from a drum or small tank you immediately evacuate 150 feet from upwind and for a large tank 300 feet. Then evacuate downwind an area 0.8 miles wide by 1.5 miles long downwind for the first half hour. After that, models are required. Hydrogen Cyanide has the same recommended evacuation distances. The Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH) level is 300 ppm for Hydrogen Sulfide, which means a healthy adult male can withstand exposure for up to 30 minutes without permanent damage, but that also means "conditions that pose an immediate threat to life and health..." from OSHA and NIOSH. Concentrations of 5,000 will immediately kill anyone in the area, including people indoors with windows open. A model can be run to see the extent of the fatalities, but there is no doubt that such a release would have catastrophic effects emanating from the project site into the local neighborhood. In my view, the first two points are sufficient to determine the project unsafe at the specific location at Valley and 6th Street. Even a remote possibility of a high concentration H2S release and the resulting loss of life, greatly increases confidence in that conclusion. Conclusions A more quantitative understanding of the risks of the project with fewer simplifying assumptions is possible, by providing the contractor with sufficient scope and resources. The report has provided me with enough information together with my own analysis to convince me that the project is not safe for the proposed location. Further study would probably refine this conclusion, but is unlikely to change it. I want you to know that I am not against Mr. Macpherson personally nor against oil exploration in general. However, there are more suitable places to locate this type of operation than in a residential area. I strongly recommend that the City Council exercise leadership for the people and protect us now, when we are vulnerable. I request that the City Council deny a building permit for the proposed oil project in the Hermosa Beach residential location. ohn Edwards Hermosa Beach, CA (310) 318-1820 • 7/9.32 Some Observations About a Proposed Oilfield Project Presented to the Hermosa Beach City Council On Behalf of Rosamond Fogg and the Stop Oil Coalition September 17, 1998 STONE ION ENVISRONMENTAL CORPORATION Preface What I wish to do: 1. Introduce myself and provide a bit of information related to my background, training, and experience. 2. Reduce to simple terms the technical -historical background against which this decision making process is being carried out. 3. Characterize the activity known as "integrated risk management" both in a general sense and as it relates to the proposed project specifically. 4. Attempt to answer any questions you may have about industrial operations, toxic chemical emissions from those operations, and related environmental degradation. • • Page One 1. My name is Jim Tarr. I am the president of Stone Lions Environmental Corporation, an environmental consulting company located in Manhattan Beach. 2. I have two degrees in chemical engineering, and I am a member of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers and a diplomate of the American Academy of Environmental Engineers. 3. I have more than twenty-five years of experience in the field of air pollution control and hazardous waste management. 4. Most of my professional work relates to the study of toxic chemical emissions and the impact of those emissions on people who live around industrial facilities. • • Page Two 1. We are here to talk about the oilfield, or more specifically, a proposal to bring the oilfield to Hermosa Beach. 2. Given the matter at hand, I can talk to you in the language of chemical engineering, or I can talk to you as one human being to another. I believe the best choice is to talk to you as a human being. I wish to briefly explain that choice. 3. The language of the oilfield is the language of chemical engineering. The language of chemical engineering is the language of concepts like physical separation equipment, chemical reactions, stochastic probability, and most of all, the minimization of costs and the maximization of profits. The language of chemical engineering comes to us from a group of people driven by the need to conceive of, design, build, and operate inanimate equipment and bloodless machines. The language of chemical engineering is almost bereft of the concepts of innocent children, concern about our neighbors, protection of public health, attention to quality of life, and an enlightened approach to protection of the environment. • • Page Three 1. I grew up in the oilfield. My grandfather was a welder and gauger for virtually all of his life. My father earned part of his living as a roughneck. One of my uncles spent his career as an operator in a cat cracking unit of an oil refinery. 2. My forebearers and the other men I grew up around, that is, men whose skulls had been caved in, men whose limbs had been broken and twisted, and men who no longer had all of their fingers, would insist that I convey one message above all others: The oilfield is a stinking, dirty, and dangerous place. To believe otherwise is to ignore 100 years of history. To believe otherwise is to ignore the lessons learned at Denver City and Odessa, Texas Grande Bois and Shreveport, Louisiana Manistee County, Michigan Valdez, Alaska Avila Beach and Huntington Beach, California All of these are places where unvarnished environmental and public health disasters came to us as a result of oilfield related activity. • • Page Four 1. Risk analysis, hazard assessment, quantitative risk assessment, risk mitigation --- these and similar methodologies have come into the technical lexicon within the last one or two decades. 2. The widespread use of these techniques can be dated from December 1984. That was the month in which a disastrous release of methyl isocyanate emanated from a Union Carbide Corporation plant in Bhopal, India and caused the deaths of more than two thousand people. 3. To a normal person, dealing with these new methods and the associated mathematical concepts, computer models, and related technical jargon represents a daunting task. 4. But there is a context which lends itself to at least a conceptual understanding of what it is that is actually going on here. That concept is best understood in terms of Greek mythology and the story of the Greek Oracles. 5. Quoting from Robert Graves' book, The Greek Myths - The Complete Edition: "Some Oracles are not so easily consulted as others When fit to consult the Oracle, the (supplicant) is led down to the • river and there bathed and annoited. Next he drinks from a spring which will help him to forget his past; also from another which will help him to remember what he has seen and heard Dressed in country boots and a linen tunic, and wearing a (bandana) like a sacrificial victim, he then approaches the Oracular chasm. This resembles a hugh (pit), eight yards deep, and after descending by a ladder, he finds a narrow opening at the bottom thru which he thrusts his legs A sudden tug at his ankles, and he is pulled thru as if by the swirl of a swift river, and in the darkness, a blow falls on his skull, so that he seems to die, and an invisible speaker then reveals the future to him, besides many mysterious secrets Finally, still in a dazed condition, he returns to the house of the good genius, where he regains his senses and the power to laugh." 6. That is as good an introduction to the exercise of "quantitative risk assessment" as I can provide. For a real world example see page 5.1, paragraph 5.1.1 and page 5.7, the middle paragraph on that page, of the Aspen - Bercha Group report. • • Page Five There are a number of excerpts from the Aspen - Bercha Group report that are worthy of particular attention. 1. On page iii: "As may be seen, the unmitigated risk spectrum extends into the unacceptable region" That statement is sufficient reason to deny the request to built the proposed project. 2. On page iii again: During the expected life of the project, the following may be anticipated: • 31 leaks, 2 major releases, and 1 rupture • resulting in offsite hazards, including 2 jet fires, and a 4% likelihood of an offsite flash fire with casualities • a one in 700 chance of one of more fatalities • • 3. Page iv: "This level (of risk) is deemed acceptable for public, commercial, and residential medium -density landuse." Deemed acceptable by whom? 4. Page 1.10: "Recommendations on risk acceptability by comparison to Santa Barbara risk spectral thresholds for societal risk and "international standards" for individual risk." Which so-called international authorities decided what is an acceptable individual level of risk? Most likely, that was the chemical industry in one of its many forms. 5. Page 2.18: "Risk is a combined measure of the probability and magnitude of adverse effect." Nothing is measured in a quantitative risk assessment exercise. Again, nothing is measured. What the exercise amounts to is a complex mathematical speculation about the future based on the rate of failure, disaster, and the resulting tribulations caused by past industrial operations. • • 6. Page 5.20/5.22: These graphs purport to show the different levels of risk of the proposed situation versus the existing situation. Note that the existing situation presents essentially insignificant risk, while the proposed situation represents a much greater level of potential harm. 7. Page 6.1: "The objective of risk mitigation of safety measures is to reduce risks from a system while still permitting it to operate in a productive and cost effective manner." This is the most telling statement in this entire report. In the bleak language of chemical engineering, this translates to the following: minimize costs, and maximize profits. Note that those who fail to live by that principle don't last long in the oilfield. 8. Page 6.9: "Experienced operators normally on duty working to proven management system (sic) in accordance (with) a state -of -the-art operating plan for all aspects of operations." Who among us is going to insure that this state of ideality will ever manifest itself? • • 9. Page 9.4: "In general, it can be said that the proposed project by a safe and reputable operator contains industry standard safety and reliability provisions, which will make it as safe as any comparable modern operation." That is truly a small comfort. I am quite sure that the same could have been said of the Exxon Valdez just before it ran aground on Bligh Reef. o • Conclusion 1. Quoting from the report, page 9.3: " the high level of unmitigated risk demonstrates that an industrial project in an urban setting can pose unacceptable risks if not appropriately mitigated. The mitigated risk spectrum for the production phase is largely in the grey area, indicating that all practical means to reduce the risks should be utilized." 2. The oilfield is a stinking, dirty, and dangerous place. 3. Building a twelve foot high fence around the oilfield will not change that. One hundred years of history teaches us that the oilfield will still be a stinking, dirty, and dangerous place. 4. The most practical and certain way to mitigate the risk associated with the proposed project is to decline to build it. 5. Thank you for your time and attention. May I answer any questions? 1 a 1 1 40 ASPEN ELCIIIA GROUP • HERMOSA BEACH PROJECT INTEGRATED RISK ANALYSIS DRAFT FINAL REPORT For CITY OF HERMOSA BEACH By Aspen Environmental Group Agoura Hills, U.S.A. and Bercha International Inc. Calgary, Canada August, 1998 11r7Fir a • l ow ow MN i .11111 0 Hermosa Beach Project Ind Risk Analysis i • P9804 - Final Report EXECUTIVE SUMMARY A. General Description of the Work Completed An integrated risk assessment of the proposed MacPherson Oil Company Hermosa Beach Oil Project has been conducted. This assessment was conducted in response to the City of Hermosa Beach generic request for an integrated risk assessment as well as to specific requirements requested as a result of a stakeholder meeting conducted with the presentation of preliminary results from the project. The scope of work consisted of the following principal tasks: • Data acquisition • Hazard scenario development • Frequency analysis • Consequence analysis • Unmitigated risk assessment • Risk mitigation• • Mitigated risk assessment • Integrated risk assessment • Conclusions and recommendations The work spanned both the proposed Test Phase and the Production Phase of the project. Utilizing state -of -art techniques of risk analysis, including the Bercha Risk Software (BRISK) and a current multi-purpose consequence model (TRACE), both mitigated and unmitigated component and integrated Test and Production Phase risks for the project were determined. Results included annual individual and collective risks, as well as cumulated risks over the project life. Table 1 summarizes the salient results of the work, and Figure 1 summarizes the risk profiles, while a discussion of the principal assumptions and approximations and a systematic reporting of the conclusions for each phase follows. B. Principal Assumptions and Approximations Made in the Work B.1 Conservative Assumptions Made in the Work Certain significant conservative assumptions and approximations were made, resulting in the tendency to overestimate the risks associated with the project. The principal ones among these may be summarized as follows: ASPEN • Test and Production Phase process release frequencies were based on the entire process facility releasing as one segment • Leak and hole releases were assumed to continue to blowdown until atmospheric pressure is reached within the segment • Modelling of ground level releases rather than elevated releases as a basis for hazard assessment 31/8/98 BERCIIA GROUP Hermosa Beach Project Aerated Risk Analysis ii 1111 P9804 - Final Report • All releases in horizontal direction • Test Phase jet fires penetrate sound attenuation wall B.2 Non -Conservative Assumptions Made in the Work Certain non -conservative assumptions to simplify and facilitate the work were made, which can result in an understatement of the risks. It is believed that these understatements are not significant, but these assumptions are nevertheless summarized, as follows: • Topography was not explicitly considered in consequence modelling • Any outdoor receptors were considered at risk; indoor receptors were considered safe • Population distributions were considered as remaining constant over the 35 year project life • Wake effect of the perimeter wall was not modelled explicitly B.3 Simplifying Assumptions and Approximation Certain other simplifying assumptions and approximations were made during the conduct of the work in order to make its completion practicable while still providing meaningful results. These simplifying assumptions and approximations may have the effect of either overestimating or underestimating the risk, but to a negligible degree within the context of the present work. Such simplifying assumptions and approximations may be summarized as follows: • Redondo Beach weather was considered representative of the Hermosa Beach site location • Subdivision of release sizes into leak, hole, rupture, and double rupture for pipeline was considered representative of all release sizes • 20% extra volume allowance was added to allow for flow during the isolation of each segment • The injury likelihood was assessed as ten times more likely than the fatality likelihood • Mitigating effects of the Test Phase sound attenuation wall and Production Phase structural wall were modelled only in terms of their reduction of flammable vapour cloud ignition probabilities • Cumulative risk was based on the integrated Production Phase mitigated annual risk C. Test Phase Annual Risks The Test Phase risks extend over a period of one year, and both the mitigated and unmitigated risks are largely in the insignificant risk region. The maximum individual specific risk to the public associated with the Test Phase is chances of a fatality of 1 in one million per year. Figure 1 shows the Test Phase risk spectra for both the mitigated Asuts 31/8/98 BERCIIA GROUP Hermosa Beach Project ted Risk Analysis iii • 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 P9804 - Final Report and unmitigated case. Reduction in the risks from the unmitigated level results from the following risk mitigation measures: • Installation of a 30 -foot high perimeter sound attenuation wall for the duration of the Test Phase D. Production Phase Annual Risks Individual specific and collective risks for the Production Phase have been assessed. The maximum individual specific risk to the public from the Production Phase is approximately a 1 in 100,000 chance of fatality per year. Figure 1 shows the unmitigated risk and mitigated risk spectra for the Production Phase. As may be seen, the unmitigated risk spectrum extends into the unacceptable region. Although the basis for the risk estimates is quite conservative, the high level of unmitigated risk demonstrates that an industrial project in an urban setting can pose unacceptable risks if not appropriately mitigated. The mitigated risk spectrum for the Production Phase is largely in the grey area, indicating that all practicable means to reduce the risks should be utilized. In particular, the chance of 10 or more fatalities per year is 1 in one million. The principal requirement to reduce the risks for the Production Phase from the unacceptable region to the grey region was as follows: • Installation of a perimeter structural wall to remain in place for the entire life of the project In general, every effort should be made to further reduce associated with the Production Phase. Risk mitigation measures which have generally been proposed by MOC, but for which engineering details were not available during the course of this assessment, include the following: • Emergency shutdown valves to reduce the frequencies and volumes of releases associated with the process components • Automatic gas detection, shutdown, isolation, and depressurization equipment for the process segment E. Integrated and Cumulative Risks The following hazardous events and associated ultimate risk expectations are projected over the 35 year life of the project: • 31 leaks, 2 major releases, and 1 rupture within the process segment • Resulting offsite hazards including 2 jet fires, and a 4% likelihood of an offsite flash fire with potential for casualties • A 1 in 7000 chance of 1 of more fatalities, 1 in 30,000 of 10 or more, and a 1 in 700 chance of 1 or more serious injuries of members of the public Asurs 31/8/98 BERCf1A GROUP Hermosa Beach Project Integrated Risk Analysis iv P9804 - Final Report F. Existing Facility Risks Figure 1 also shows the risk spectrum estimated for the existing use of the site as a City yard. As may be seen, the existing risk spectrum was somewhat lower than the Test Phase risk spectrum for fatalities in excess of 2, but is at a similar level for the Test Phase risk spectrum for at least 1 or 2 fatalities. This segment of both the Test Phase risk spectrum and the Existing Facilities risk spectrum is attributable primarily to vehicle traffic hazards. G. Acceptability of Risks The acceptability of the annual individual and collective risks can be assessed utilizing standards adopted by other jurisdictions. The highest annual individual specific risks for the Test Phase and the Production Phase are a maximum of 1 in 100,000. This level is deemed acceptable for public, commercial, and residential medium -density land use. The annual collective risks for the Test Phase are primarily in the insignificant region of the risk profile for both the mitigated and unmitigated case. Therefore, they may be deemed acceptable relative to the risk thresholds indicated on the risk profile. The integrated annual collective risks for the Production Phase extend into the intolerable (unacceptable) region for the unmitigated case, necessitating risk reduction to the acceptable region. Such a risk reduction can be achieved by specific risk mitigation measures, the perimeter walls, and further risk mitigation should be implemented including some of the provisions detailed above. Inclusion of the perimeter wall risk mitigation effects in the consequence evolution modelling results in collective risks in the acceptable but grey region. Every effort should be made to reduce the risks for the Production Phase to a level as low as reasonably practicable. The cumulative risks over the life of the project have also been estimated, but their acceptability must be assessed primarily in the light of the City of Hermosa Beach Council and residents' risk tolerance criteria. Naturally, although criteria for acceptability of the annual risks have been presented, the same City of Hermosa Beach sense of risk acceptability should be the overriding arbiter of what goes on within its jurisdiction in terms of annual risks as well. In general, it can be said that the proposed project by a safe and reputable operator contains industry standard safety and reliability provisions, which will make it as safe as any comparable modern operation. Yet, because of its setting in a medium -density urban, commercial, and residential location, it poses risks. These risks have been quantified and presented, with an explanation of the approximations implicit in this quantification, and compared to standards and other measuring sticks that are available. The ultimate decision on the acceptability of the risks rests with the City of Hermosa Beach. 31/8/98 BERCN,A GROUP OM MO IMO 10111 IOC MI — M SIN allt O M S Oa 1111111 — 0,3 13 'e, Table 1 Summary of Hermosa Beach Oil Project Mitigated Risks COMPONENT TYPE OF RISK MAXIMUM VALUE ACCEPTABILITY MITIGATION INCLUDED PROJECT Annual individual specific risk or fatality 1/100,000 per year Acceptable • • Perimeter wall Industry standard measures Annual group risk of 1 or more fatalities 1/50,000 per year Grey -Acceptable but mitigation recommended Cumulative (35 year) individual risk of fatality• 1/3000 for project• Up to City Cumulative (35 year) group risk of 1 or more fatalities 1/7000 for project Up to City Cumulative (35 year) group risk of 1 or more injuries 1/700 for project Up to City TEST PHASE Annual individual specific risk of fatality 1/1,000,000 per year Acceptable • • Perimeter wall Industry standard measures Annual group risk of 1 or more fatalities 1/50,000 per year Acceptable Annual group risk of 10 or more fatalities 1/30,000,000 per year Acceptable Cumulative individual risk of fatality 1/1,000,000 for phase Acceptable Cumulative group risk of 1 or more fatalities 1/50000 for phase Acceptable Cumulative (35 year) group risk of 1 or more injuries 1/5000 for phase Up to City Hermosa Beach Project ted Risk Analysis uodad lvld - fO 6d z e� en r - Table 1 (cont.) Summary of Hermosa Beach Oil Project Mitigated Risks COMPONENT TYPE OF RISK MAXIMUM VALUE ACCEPTABILITY MITIGATION INCLUDED PRODUCTION PHASE Annual individual specific risk of fatality 1/100,000 per year Acceptable • • Perimeter wall Industry standard measures Annual group risk of 1 or more fatalities 1/250,000 per year Acceptable Annual group risk of 10 or more fatalities 1/1000000 per year ,, Grey -Acceptable but ' • mitigation recommended Cumulative 35 year individual risk of fatality 1/3000 for project Up to City Cumulative 35 year group risk of one or more fatalities 1/7000 for project Up to City Cumulative 35 year group risk of one or more injuries 1/700 for project • • Up to City EXISTING FACILITY Annual individual specific risk of fatality 1/1,000,000 per year Acceptable • As is Annual group risk of 1 or more fatalities 1/50,000 Acceptable Annual group risk of 10 or more fatalities 0 Acceptable MR M NM MIN M-- — I A M ;I MO! I M all 1 M • Hermosa Beach Project Integrated Risk Analysis vii P9804 - Final Report 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.E-02 1.E 03 1.E-04 Tow u_ O 0 Z 1.E-05 O 4) O co L U To z 1.E-06 1.E-07 1.E-08 - - - - Test Phase Unmitigated --is-- Test Phase Mitigated o - - Production Unmitigated o Production Phase Mitigated e Existing Facilities Intolerable e lnsignifican 114 10 100 Number of Fatalities (N) 1000 ASPEN Figure 1 Project Mitigated and Unmitigated Risk Profiles 28/8/98 1.11trIPCIIIA GROUP NW WM 11110 Wit 11W all NW 11W ,11W1 MIN Mt MO 11111 WIP 11•1 NW i • Hermosa Beach Project rated Risk Analysis viii P9804 - Final Report TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE Executive Summary i Table of Contents viii List of Tables xi List of Figures xii Glossary of Terms and Acronyms iv 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 General Introduction 1.1 1.2 General Project Description 1.1 1.3 Objectives of the Present Work 1.3 1.4 Risk Analysis Methodology 1.3 1.5 Scope of Work 1.8 1.6 Outline of Report 1.11 2 PROJECT INFORMATION AND BACKGROUND 2.1 Project Information Requirements for Integrated Risk Assessment 2.2 Site Description 2.3 Engineering Information 2.3.1 Phase 1 - Test Phase 2.3.2 Phase 2 - Production Phase 2.3.3 Existing Facilities 2.4 Population Distributions 2.5 Environmental Data 2.6 Acute Damage Criteria 2.6.1 General Description of Damage Criteria 2.6.2 Thermal Effects 2.6.3 Explosion Effects 2.6.4 Acute H2S Damage Criteria 2.6.5 Injury Damage Criteria 2.7 Risk Thresholds 2.7.1 Individual Risk Thresholds 2.7.2 Risk Matrix Thresholds 2.7.3 Risk Spectra 2.8 Background on Chronic Risks from H2S 3 HAZARD AND FREQUENCY ANALYSIS 3.1 General Description of Hazard and Frequency Analysis 3.1 3.2 Release Sizes 3.2 3.3 Gas Composition 3.2 3.4 Hazard Scenario Nomenclature 3.2 28/8/98 BFRCI-1A GROUP imp Hermosa Beach Project Inteated Risk Analysis ix P9804 - Final Report 1 3.5 Test Phase Hazard and Frequency Analysis 3.4 3.6 Production Phase Hazard and Frequency Analysis 3.4 3.7 Existing Facilities 3.11 4 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS 4.1 General Description of Consequence and Risk Analysis 4.1 4.1.1 Consequence Event Overview 4.1 4.1.2 Analysis of Consequence Evolution Using Event Trees 4.3 4.1.3 Damage Criteria 4.3 4.1.4 Consequence Modelling Process 4.3 4.1.5 Consequence Model Results 4.5 4.2 Selection of Representative Atmospheric Conditions 4.6 4.3 Effects of Topography and Buoyancy 4.10 4.4 Test Phase Consequence Analysis 4.10 4.4.1 Test Phase Consequence Evolution Event Trees 4.10 4.4.2 Consequence Model Results 4.15 4.5 Production Phase Consequence Model Results 4.15 4.5.1 Production Phase Consequence Evolution Event Trees 4.15 4.5.2 Production Phase Consequence Model Results 4.24 4.6 Existing Facilities 4.24 4.7 Low -Level H2S Ground Level Concentrations 4.24 5 UNMITIGATED RISK 5.1 Risk Assessment Process 5.1 5.1.1 Summary of Risk Assessment Process 5.1 5.1.2 Individual Risk Process 5.1 5.1.3 Societal Risk Calculations 5.7 5.1.4 Unmitigated and Mitigated Risks 5.7 5.2 Test Phase - Unmitigated Risks 5.9 5.2.1 Individual Risk Assessment 5.9 5.2.2 Societal Risk Assessment 5.9 5.3 Production Phase Unmitigated Risks 5.9 5.3.1 Individual Risk Assessment 5.9 5.3.2 Societal Risk Assessment 5.19 5.4 Existing Facilities 5.19 5.4.1 Individual Risk Assessment 5.19 5.4.2 Group Risk Assessment 5.19 7 MITIGATED RISKS 7.1 Approaches to Mitigated Risk Assessment 7.1 7.2 Test Phase Mitigated Risk 7.1 7.3 Production Phase Mitigated Risks 7.1 7.4 Existing Facilities Resultant Risks 7.11 28/8198 BERCIIA GROUP 1 1 1 1 1 1 r 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Hermosa Beach Project fated Risk Analysis x iiiii • P9804 - Final Report 8 INTEGRATED RISK ANALYSIS 8.1 General Discussion of Integrated Risk Analysis 8.1 8.2 Test and Production Phase Annual Public Fatality and Injury Risks 8.1 8.3 Cumulative Risk Over Project Life 8.1 9 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 9.1 General Description of the Work Completed 9.1 9.2 Principle Assumptions and Approximations Made in the Work 9.1 9.2.1 Conservative Assumptions Made in the Work 9.1 9.2.2 Non -Conservative Assumptions Made in the Work 9.2 9.2.3 Simplifying Assumptions and Approximations 9.2 9.3 Test Phase Annual Risks 9.3 9.4 Production Phase Annual Risks 9.3 9.5 Integrated and Cumulative Risks 9.3 9.6 Existing Facility Risks 9.4 9.7 Acceptability of Risks 9.4 REFERENCES R.1 2818/98 BFRCIIA GROUP Hermosa Beach Project Intated Risk Analysis xi SP9804 - Final Report LIST OF TABLES TABLE PAGE 3.1 Release Size Characterization 3.3 3.2 Typical Gas Composition 3.3 3.3 Test Phase Hazard Scenarios 3.5 3.4 Test Phase Major Equipment Inventory 3.6 3.5 Summary of Equipment Failure Frequencies 3.7 3.6 Test Phase Failure Frequency Estimates for Process Equipment 3.9 3.7 Test Phase Hazard Scenarios and Frequencies 3.10 3.8 Production Phase Hazard Scenarios 3.12 3.9 Production Phase Major Equipment Inventory 3.13 3.10 Production Phase Failure Frequency Estimates for Process Equipment 3.14 3.11 Production Phase Hazard Scenarios and Frequencies 3.15 3.12 Existing Facilities Hazard Scenarios and Frequencies 3.16 4.1 Summary of Meteorology Sensitivity Study 4.7 4.2 ?? 4.19 4.3 Summary of Consequence Modelling Results 4.20 4.4 Summary of Consequence Modelling Results for Existing Facilities 4.25 4.5 Summary of H2S Low Level GLC 4.26 5.1 Example of IR Calculation for Point Source 5.3 5.2 Example of IR Calculation for Linear Sources 5.6 6.1 Hydrocarbon Processing Facilities Risk Mitigation Measures 6.4 6.2 Pipeline Failure Risk Mitigation Measures 6.11 6.3 Operator Strategic Rupture Risk Mitigation Measures 6.16 6.4 Pipeline Failure Consequence Risk Mitigation Measures 6.18 6.5 Trucking Risk Mitigation Measures 6.23 8.1 Expected Incidents During Life of Project 8.8 8.2 Common Individual Risks of Casualty 8.9 9.1 Summary of Hermosa Beach Oil Project Mitigated Risks 9.6 Asrts 28/8/98 BERCIIA GROUP 1 1 r 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Hermosa Beach Project Ied Risk Analysis xii • P9804 - Final Report LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE PAGE 1.1 Hermosa Beach Location Map 1.2 1.2 Aerial Photograph of Site 1.4 1.3 Project Components 1.5 1.4 Risk Analysis Process 1.7 1.5 Work Flow Diagram 1.9 4.1 Potential Consequence Scenarios 4.2 4.2 Typical Event Tree 4.4 4.3 Examples of TRACE Program Output 4.8 4.4 Wind Velocity CDF for Class G Stability 4.9 4.5 Elevated and Ground Level Release Profiles for Leak 4.11 4.6 Elevated and Ground Level Release Profiles for Hole 4.12 4.7 Elevated and Ground Level Release Profiles for Rupture 4.13 4.8 Event Tree - Process - Test Phase 4.14 4.9 Mass Tank Blowdown .Graph 4.16 4.10 Thermal Radiation Isopleths for Jet Fire 4.17 4.11 Typical TRACE Tabulation 4.18 4.12 Isopleth Plot for HB -P -P -H -D 4.22 4.13 Event Tree - Gas Pipeline - Using Point Source Method 4.23 4.14 H2S Concentration Plan and Profile for Process Leak 4.27 4.15 H2S Concentration Plan and Profile for Process Hole 4.28 4.16 H2S Concentration Plan and Profile for Process Rupture 4.29 5.1 Example of Individual Risk Transects for Point Source 5.4 5.2 Example of Individual Risk Contours 5.5 5.3 Example of Risk Transect for Linear Source 5.8 5.4 IR Contours for Test Phase - Day 5.10 5.5 IR Contours for Test Phase - Night 5.11 5.6 IR Contours for Test Phase - Worst 5.12 5.7 Public Risk Spectrum - Test Phase - Process and Trucking - Unmitigated 5.13 5.8 IR Contours for Production Phase - Day 5.14 5.9 IR Contours for Production Phase - Night 5.15 5.10 IR Contours for Production Phase - Worst 5.16 5.11 Gas Pipeline - Left Transect 5.17 5.12 Gas Pipeline - Right Transect 5.18 5.13 Public Risk Spectrum- Production Phase - Process and Gas Pipeline - Unmitigated 5.20 5.14 IR Contours for Existing Facilities 5.21 5.15 Public Risk Spectrum - Existing Facilities 5.22 6.1 Schematic of Risk Mitigation Measures 6.2 7.1 Event Tree - Test Phase - Process - Mitigated 7.2 7.2 IR Contours for Test Phase - Day - Mitigated 7.3 7.3 IR Contours for Test Phase - Night - Mitigated 7.4 7.4 IR Contours for Test Phase - Worst - Mitigated 7.5 7.5 Public Risk Spectrum - Test Phase - Process and Trucking - Mitigated 7.6 28/8/98 BERCI IA GROUP Hermosa Beach Project Incited Risk Analysis xiii III P9804 - Final Report 7.6 Event Tree - Production Phase - Process - Mitigated 7.7 7.7 IR Contours for Production Phase - Day - Mitigated 7.8 7.8 IR Contours for Production Phase - Night - Mitigated 7.9 7.9 IR Contours for Production Phase - Worst - Mitigated 7.10 7.10 Explosion Overpressure Profile 7.12 7.11 Public Risk Spectrum - Production Phase - Process Gas Pipeline - Mitigated7.13 7.12 Public Risk Spectrum - Existing Facilities 7.14 8.1 Individual Specific Risk Contours - Test Phase 8.2 8.2 Individual Specific Risk Contours - Production Phase 8.3 8.3 Public Risk Spectrum - Fatality 8.4 8.4 Public Risk Spectrum - Injuries 8.5 8.5 Public Risk Spectrum - Fatalities - Cumulative for 35 Years 8.10 8.5 Public Risk Spectrum - Injuries - Cumulative for 35 Years 8.11 9.1 Project Mitigated and Unmitigated Collective Risk Profiles 9.8 Asucs 28/8/98 BERCIIA GROUP 01 Hermosa Beach Project Id Risk Analysis xiv • P9804 - Final Report GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS Acute Risk = Risk that has an immediate adverse effect due to a single exposure to an accident such as exposure to a gas explosion AIChE = American Institute of Chemical Engineers ARCHIE = Automated Resource for Chemical Hazard Incident Evaluation, a multi-purpose consequence modelling system developed by the EPA BRISK = Bercha Risk assessment software system Chronic Risk = Risk that has adverse effect due to a long-term series of exposures CBA = Cost Benefit Analysis EPA = U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ESD = Emergency Shutdown ESDV = Emergency Shutdown Valve Hazard = A condition with a potential to create risks such as accidental leakage of natural gas from a pressurized vessel IR ISR = Individual Risk, annual risk to an individual located at a specific location continuously for one year (24 hrs/day, 365 days/yr) as a result from a nearby project or facility = Individual Specific Risk, the actual risk per year to an individual resulting from a specific facility or project considering the actual time and exposure by the individual in the zone of influence of the project MIACC = Major Industrial Accident Council of Canada MOP = Maximum Operating Pressure, the pressure at which a pipeline or vessel can be operated considering design conditions NACE = National Association of Corrosion Engineers Natural Gas = Hydrocarbons which are used as a source of energy and normally are in a gas phase at standard conditions of pressure and temperature NGL = Natural Gas Liquids Asursi 28/8/98 BFRCIIA. GROUP Hermosa Beach Project Meted Risk Analysis xv Ill P9804 - Final Report OISR = Outdoor Individual Specific Risk P&ID = Piping & Instrumentation Diagram PFD = Process Flow Diagram PRV = Pressure Relief Valve Public Safety = Protection of the general public from acute, immediate effects caused by a single exposure to an accident resulting in severe injury or fatality. Public safety as used in this report does not extend to occupational safety or public health, which covers the chronic effects from prolonged exposures to a hazardous substance Risk = A compound measure of the probability and magnitude of adverse effect ROO = Ratio of Occurrence SOEP = Sable Offshore Energy Project Sour Gas = Natural gas containing significant amounts of hydrogen sulphide Sweet Gas = Natural gas with no significant amounts of hydrogen sulphide TRACE = A multi-purpose consequence analysis software modelling system developed by DuPont and sold by Safer Systems ASPEN 28/8/98 BERCIIA GROUP III Hermosa Beach Project led Risk Analysis 1.1 P9804 - Final Report CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 General Introduction The proposed MacPherson Oil Company Hermosa Beach Oil Project consists of an oil and gas drilling, testing, and production system located in the City of Hermosa Beach. Figure 1.1 shows the location of Hermosa Beach with respect to key landmarks on the coast of Southern California. The project consists of a two-phase oil and gas production development consisting of a one year test phase to be followed by the production phase expected to last approximately 30 additional years. In the test phase, a maximum of 3 wells will be drilled with a temporary production facility established on the site. A maximum of 27 additional wells will be drilled utilizing slant -reach technology to tap offshore and onshore reservoirs to produce approximately 8000 barrels per day of crude oil and 2.5 million standard cubic feet per day of natural gas. The production phase, in additional to wells, will have onsite production equipment and a production tank farm. The crude oil and natural gas pipelines, each approximately '/z mile long will transport the produced oil and gas to its sales destination. The oil and gas development project is proposed for a site located within a medium density commercial and residential beach community in Hermosa Beach. The close proximity of a relatively complex industrial development to a medium density commercial and residential neighborhood thus accentuated the critical importance of the safety interface between the project and members of the public. The safety of the project was assessed by a number of studies [4, 7, 41, 42]1 conducted throughout 1997 and 1998. Because of concerns by the city over the generality of some of these studies, Aspen was invited to review them, and its resulting recommendation [7] to conduct an integrated risk assessment of the project based on up-to-date information was accepted by the city. Accordingly, Aspen and Bercha were retained by the city to conduct an integrated risk assessment of the project. The preliminary results [5] of the risk assessment were presented at a stakeholder meeting on July 7, 1998, resulting in requests for a number of refinements and additional investigations. The current report presents the background, methodology, and results associated with both the original scope of work and the additional investigations. 1.2 General Project Description The project is proposed to be located at the current Hermosa Beach Public Works i Numbers in square brackets refer to items listed under References 28/8/98 BERCIIA GROUP Hermosa Beach Project Inttld Risk Analysis 1.2 P9804 - Final Report LOS ANGELES Pacific Coast Hwy. Santa Monica Lo Angel.. We national Marina A pert Del Rey PACIFIC OCEAN 0 v Manhattan Beach L 0 Hermosa Beach SITE Redondo Beach Palos Verdes Estates Arl.ila Blvd. Torrance Long Beach 0 2.5 5.0 1 I 1 1 miles SAN PEDRO BAY Asurs Figure 1.1 Hermosa Beach Location Map 28/8/98 BIERCIIA GROUP Hermosa Beach Project Ined Risk Analysis 1.3 III P9804 - Final Report department site at 555 6th Street, known as the "city yard." Figure 1.2 [24] shows an aerial photograph of this site and its surroundings. The project itself will consist of two phases as follows: • Phase 1 Test Phase • Phase 2 Production Phase The test phase will consist of the following principal components: • Exploration/production wells • Water injection well • Temporary production facilities • Temporary storage facilities • Trucking operation The production phase will consist of the following principal components: • Production wells • Water injection wells • Production facility • Storage facilities • Oil and gas pipelines The block diagram in Figure 1.3 shows these components for each of the two phases. 1.3 Objectives of the Present Work The objectives of the present work may be summarized as follows: • To quantify the acute risk to the public from the test and production phases of the proposed Hermosa Beach MacPherson Oil Project • To consider the effect of proposed mitigation measures and quantify the risk with the mitigation measures in place • To recommend any additional mitigation measures which may be feasible to reduce the risk to As Low As Reasonably Practicable • To quantify the expected low-level H2S emissions and to present a summary of the scientific literature available on risks associated with low-level H2S emissions 1.4 Risk Analysis Methodology What is risk? Risk is a compound measure of the probability and magnitude of adverse effect [36]. That is, risk is a description of the chances of something bad happening and how bad it will be. It is important to keep in mind that there are always these two elements of risk; namely, the probability or likelihood and the size or magnitude of the 28/8/98 I3H CI1A GROUP Hermosa Beach Project In1ated Risk Analysis 1.4 P9804 - Final Report ASPEN Figure 1.2 Aerial Photograph of Site 27/8/98 BERCf1A GROUP Hermosa Beach Project Id Risk Analysis 1.5 411) P9804 - Final Report WELLS (3 MAX) WELLS (27 MAX) ASPEN PRODUCTION FACILITY WATER REINJECTION (1 WELL) GAS INCINERATION Test Phase Schematic PRODUCTION FACILITY STORAGE OIL TRUCKING OIL PIPELINE WATER REINJECTION (3 WELLS) STORAGE GAS PIPELINE Production Phase Schematic Figure 1.3 Project Components 27/8/98 BERCIIA GROUP Hermosa Beach Project InSted Risk Analysis 1.6 lb P9804 - Final Report associated damage or loss. Risk analysis is an orderly process through which one can quantify risk as well as methods of reducing the risk. Methods of risk reduction are termed "risk mitigation". The risk analysis process consists of three principal steps and various sub -steps illustrated in Figure 1.4. The three principal steps are hazard analysis, consequence analysis, and risk assessment. In hazard analysis, essentially one determines the characteristics of the situation (System Data) which can pose a danger to the public, and how often it is likely to occur. This is called Hazard Scenario Development and Frequency Analysis. For example, for the case of a propane tank, in hazard analysis one would assess the ways in which the tank can fail, how much hazardous material could be released, and how often this is likely to happen. In Consequence Analysis, one then models the evolution of consequences. First one finds the relative likelihood of different outcomes of the release, using event trees. This is called Consequence Evolution. That is, for the propane release what is the relative likelihood of ignition and non -ignition, and if. there is ignition how likely is a jet fire, flash fire, or explosion? And if these happen, what are the Damage Criteria, or Effect Footprints. Next, our maps the zones in which damage to people could occur if they were present. In the risk assessment, the results of the hazard analysis and the consequence analysis are melded, by considering the actual number of people expected (Receptors) in areas where they could be damaged and at the times when such damaging events could occur. The results are then integrated into Risk Assessment to provide measures of risk. Measures of risk to people are primarily individual risk and collective risk. Individual risk describes the risk to an individual from a given project, while collective or societal risk is the likelihood of different numbers of people being affected by a project. Both individual and collective risks are generally given as an annual or per annum number of casualties. Finally, the proactive portion of the risk analysis is performed through the definition of ways of reducing the risks and assessing just how much risk reduction can be achieved if these different Risk Mitigation measures are applied. Following the definition of risk mitigation measures, and their effect on the unmitigated risk, the resultant or mitigated risk results for both individual and collective risk can be presented. The risk analysis process described above typifies the steps in assessing acute risk; assessment of chronic or long-term cumulative risks follows a similar pattern but employs somewhat different terminology within a toxicological framework. ASPEN 28/8/98 BERCI-IA GROUP 1111 NMI 1111 1E1 11111 11111 1101 11111 1111 1111 MS UM Ell On 11111 Figure 1.4 Risk Analysis Process • 1aodad JvuId - f7086d HAZARD ANALYSIS CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS RISK ASSESSMENT STEP SYSTEM DATA SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT FREQUENCY ANALYSIS CONSEQUENCE EVOLUTION DAMAGE CRITERIA EFFECT FOOTPRINTS RECEPTORS RISK ASSESSMENT RISK MITIGATION EXAMPLE Cr ) �, L 1/10 H 1/100 R 1/1000 e....... 10 kW/min-fit f e / �.-. -----.7.. 1 ( I // l'-- C( , /t PROPANE 1 % / 1 rr 1 i WALL .- WIND \ J) / 6 �• 0 Ino r �P YY> I/100 JET PROPANE PROPANE PROPANE' 1 1 Illi FLASH —NON IGNITION . "-...1.--17--. «7.« ANALYSIS PROCESS SYSTEM PARAMETERS HAZARDDAMAGE SCENARIO ANNUAL FREQUENCY STATISTICS EVENT TREES CRITERION ' MATH OR PHYSICAL MODEL POPULATION RESOURCE DATA MAP COMBINE RESULT OF ALL PREVIOUS STEPS REPEAT RISK ANALYSIS FOR MITIGATED CONFIG. RESULT PROBLEM QUANTIFICATION SIZE, TIME DESCRIPTION FREQUENCY MAGNITUDE RELATION CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY OF OUTCOMES TIME MAGNITUDE EFFECT SPECTRUM MAP OF HAZARDOUS EFFECTS POPULATION TIMFJSPACE DISTRIBUTION INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE MITIGATED RISK RESULT EXAMPLE V=500 gal. p 200psi T= 80 F -10 Q lb/min P ROO IOkW/mi-fl2 60sec. 5% fatality___ II T .t- 3P A ' 6P 1 1 OISR = .10 P P — 3 10 / \ JET 0.2 FLASH 0.3 NON IG. 0.5 . N N Q T 10 Figure 1.4 Risk Analysis Process • 1aodad JvuId - f7086d Hermosa Beach Project Intted Risk Analysis 1.8 lb P9804 - Final Report 1.5 Scope of Work The scope of work has been subdivided into seven principal tasks, related as shown in Figure 1.5, and associated sub -tasks as follows pertaining to Project Test and Production Phases and to a limited degree for the existing facilities: Task 1 Data Acquisition a) Project data b) Environmental and population data c) Site visit data assimilation d) Detailed review of previous studies and background information e) Review of literature on sour gas chronic risks Task 2 Hazard Scenario Development a) Definition of project components b) Detailed definition of hazard scenarios for each project component c) Quantification of release conditions (volume, pressure duration) associated with hazard scenarios Task 3 Frequency Analysis a) Probability assessment for each hazard scenario b) Frequency distribution for leak, hole, and rupture c) Additional consideration of specific conditions at facilities, eg pipeline route, Test Phase temporary systems, and Production Phase facilities d) Evaluation of effect on frequencies of specific conditions identified above Task 4 Consequence Analysis a) Quantification of release rates for all scenarios b) Selection of representative (day and night) atmospheric conditions, and identification, by sensitivity studies, of worst case conditions for leak, hole, and rupture c) Qualitative evaluation of dispersion effects considering buoyant plume behavior and topography d) Modelling of atmospheric concentrations and spill characteristic distributions for characteristic locations and release sizes for all scenarios for representative and worst case atmospheric conditions e) Selection of damage criteria for thermal, toxic, overpressure, and nuisance effects f) Modelling of thermal, toxic, overpressure, and nuisance hazard zones for all scenarios g) Modelling of low-level sour gas ground level concentrations for representative releases 28/8/98 BERCf1A GROUP iiiHermosa Beach Project Ied Risk Analysis 1.9 III P9804 - Final Report FREQUENCY ANALYSIS TASK 3 NOT ACCEPTABLE DATA ASSIMILATION & SYSTEM DEFINITION TASK 1 y HAZARD IDENTIFICATION TASK 2 CONSEQUENCE MODELLING TASK 4 RISK ASSESSMENT TASK 6 RISK MITIGATION TASK 6 V MITIGATED RISK TASK 7 V INTEGRATED RISK ASSESSMENT TASK 8 V sirs RISK ACCEPTABILITY W.R.T. THRESHOLDS AND ALARP TASK 8 V REPORTING TASK 9 Figure 1.5 Work Flow Diagram 27/8/98 BFRCIIA GROUP Hermosa Beach Project Innated Risk Analysis 1.11 P9804 - Final Report 1.6 Outline of Report The organization of the report generally follows the principal steps of the risk analysis process. Accordingly, following this brief introduction, the report is organized as follows: • Chapter 2 - Project Information and Background • Chapter 3 - Hazard and Frequency Analysis • Chapter 4 - Consequence Analysis • Chapter 5 - Unmitigated Risk • Chapter 6 - Risk Mitigation • Chapter 7 - Mitigated Risks • Chapter 8 - Integrated Risk Analysis • Chapter 9 - Conclusions and Recommendations In addition, at the outset of the report, is given an Executive Summary, giving the salient details and results of the work, while the references are given following Chapter 9. A Glossary of Terms is given immediately after the Tables of Contents. 27/8/98 BERCIIA GROUP Hermosa Beach Project "lied Risk Analysis 1.10 III P9804 - Final Report Task 5 Unmitigated Risk Assessment a) Evaluation of individual risk in vicinity of facilities and presentation of results as hazard footprints b) Evaluation of individual risk along pipeline route and presentation of individual risk in the form of risk transects c) Definition of population distribution and location and characteristic of sensitive population foci within the IR isopleths for the facilities and transects for the pipeline. Consideration of future population forecasts for Production Phase d) Evaluation of collective risk for estimated population distribution and population foci and presentation of collective risk as individual specific risks (ISR) and risk spectra e) Assessment of acceptability of risks identified in Task 4 based on ISR and risk spectrum. Consideration of appropriate adjustments for Test Phase short term and Production Phase long term exposure. Task 6 Risk Mitigation a) Review of proposed and industry standard risk mitigation measures and their effect on the risks assessed. b) Identification of any areas requiring further risk mitigation, and recommendation of associated risk mitigation measures. c) Recommendation of optimal set of new risk mitigation measures Task 7 Mitigated Risk Assessment a) Estimation of resultant risk with risk mitigation measures in place b) Presentation of resultant risks as individual risk spectrum. Task 8 Integrated Risk Assessment a) Integration of component risks of each phase b) Presentation of resultant (mitigated) risks as individual risk, and risk spectrum for fatalities and injuries c) Recommendations on risk acceptability by comparison to Santa Barbara risk spectral thresholds for societal risks and international standards for individual risk d) Presentation of cumulative risks over project lifetime for project Task 9 Reporting a) Progress Report b) Final Report 2818198 BERCI-IA GROUP 11111 11111 NE NS GE— i — I i n NM MI In— ND NS r i • • Hermosa Beach Project luted Risk Analysis 2.1 • Final Report CHAPTER 2 PROJECT INFORMATION AND BACKGROUND 2.1 Project Information Requirements for Integrated Risk Assessment The following general categories of information on the project and its setting are required to conduct the integrated risk assessment: • Site characteristics • Engineering information • Environmental data • Public population distributions In addition, criteria for damage to people (from explosions, fires, and toxicity) and standards for acceptable levels of risk should be selected in order to provide meaningful outputs from the analysis. Specifically, damage criteria give quantitative values for limits on dosages which can cause serious injuries or death to people. Acceptability criteria, on the other hand, give quantitative thresholds for risk levels which may be deemed acceptable in certain jurisdictions. For example, the U.K. Health & Safety Executive [32] considers an individual specific risk level of 1 in 10 million chances of a fatality per year to be insignificant. 2.2 Site Description The subject site is a 1.3 acre site located at the northwest quadrant of the intersection of Valley Drive and 6`h Street. It is currently used as the city yard, and accommodates several industrial buildings, subterranean gasoline and diesel tanks, diesel and automobile gas pumps, and an above grade propane tank. The authors conducted several site visits, assimilating site specific data and conducting various types of inventories both on population and traffic patterns. Figure 2.1 shows an aerial photograph of the site while Figures 2.2 to 2.5 show characteristics of the immediate vicinity of the site. The site is relatively flat, sloping slightly from east to west in consonance with the prevailing gradient in the area. To the east, directly across from Valley Road is a park area, a former railway right-of-way and following Ardmore Avenue, there is a gradual ascent of the terrain to the Pacific Highway. To the west, the gradient is downwards, to Loma Road, and then gradually rises westwards to a ridge followed by a continuous slope to the seashore. For the purposes of the present investigation, the north -south gradient across the site and its neighborhood may be considered negligible. Surrounding land use is commercial and residential, as described subsequently in Section 2.4. 28/8/98 BERCIIA GROUP Hermosa Beach Project Inted Risk Analysis 2.2 0 a Final Report Asurs Figure 2.1 Aerial Photograph of Site 28/8/98 ilDltIERCIIA. i-.. GPOIJP Hermosa Beach Project Int ted Risk Analysis 2.3 • Final Report Figure 2.2 View East from Site Asurs Figure 2.3 View West from Site 28/8/98 I3"' A GROUP Hermosa Beach Project Int rated Risk Analysis 2.4 • Final Report Figure 2.4 Commercial Buildings on North Side of Site ,ASPEN Figure 2.5 Commercial Buildings South of Side 28/8/98 BECCUA GROUP Hermosa Beach Project I ted Risk Analysis 2.5 • Final Report 2.3 Engineering Information The engineering information was obtained primarily from MacPherson [29, 30, 39, 47] and supporting reports [18, 22, 37, 42]. Data on existing facilities was obtained from the city of Hermosa Beach [15, 24]. As was indicated in the general project description in Chapter 1, the proposed project is subdivided into two principal phases, namely, Phase 1, the Test Phase; and Phase 2, the Production Phase. These two phases, and the existing facilities at the site are described in the balance of this section. 2.3.1 Phase 1 - Test Phase Phase 1 will last approximately one year. During this time, MacPherson proposes to drill up to three exploratory wells to prove the commercial value of the development. The drill rig onsite for the one year exploratory phase will stand approximately 135 feet above grade and will operate continuously during Phase 1. Prior to drilling, MacPherson will demolish all existing maintenance yard facilities (except for a metal building located on the northeast corner of the property), and remove all paving, concrete slabs, retaining walls and debris. Phase 1 preliminary construction will include re -grading of the site (3,000 cubic yards of cut; 1,000 cubic yards of fill), installation of a 9 -foot concrete block retaining wall on the west side of the parcel, a 6 -foot chainlink fence topped by three -strand barbed wire on the remaining three sides of the project (these sides are separated from other development by a street's width), and a 30 -foot -above - grade sound attenuation wall, a concrete well cellar, new electrical service equipment, and temporary treatment and production facilities. Figure 2.6 shows the Test Phase general layout. If Phase 1 is unsuccessful, MacPherson Oil will remove all above -ground facilities, abandon the test well in accordance with the requirements of the State Division of Oil, Gas and Geothermal Resources, and otherwise restore the site to its pre -project condition. MacPherson must also seek a new coastal development permit for post -Phase 1 abandonment. During Phase 1, the produced emulsion (oil and water mixture) will be processed onsite using portable equipment. All produced water will be re -injected; produced water will not be disposed via the public sewer or storm drain systems. Oil will be stored onsite in portable tanks, and the oil will be trucked offsite to a refinery via three to four tanker truck trips per day, each carrying 175 barrels of oil. Trucks will not deviate from the designated route. MacPherson proposes to flare the produced gas during Phase 1 and has obtained the necessary approvals for flaring from the South Coast Air Quality Management District. MacPherson also agrees that permissible concentrations of hydrogen Asuts 28/8/98 BIERCIIA. GROUP RESIDENTIAL AREA DAY OISR = (0.45)(0.1) = 0.045 NIGHT OISR = (0.45)(0.25) = 011 RESIDENTIAL AREA RESIDENTIAL AREA 2P\ 2P \ 2P\ 2P \ 2P\ 2P\ 2P 2P Ardmore Av. Day 2P Night OP Valley Drive 2P 2P 2P 2P 2P 2P 2P DAY OISR NIGHT OISR (0.45)(0)=0 0.45 RESIDENTIAL AREA GREEN SPACE 000000000P C=3 PARKING OISR (0.45)(0.9 NIG141 OISR *Note: For Small Business DAY DISR=(0.45)(1.5/12)(6/7)=0.048 NIGHT OISR=(0.45)(0)=0 5P 5P 5P 5P 5P BUSINESS TEST PHASE 0 5P 50 100 Plant North p 12'r 11 I Figure 2.6 4111 an 11011 Nest%Era' !mut am NE am No mu Ns r Hermosa Beach Project 1ted Risk Analysis 2.7 0 • Final Report sulfide in raw gas (that is, gas in an untreated state as it is drawn into the well casing) will be restricted to a maximum of 40 parts per million (ppm) in any well, during both phases of the project. MacPherson agrees to stop production of any well that exceeds the hydrogen sulfide threshold authorized by this permit. MacPherson estimates that Phase 1 crude oil production from the (up to) three test wells will be a maximum of approximately 600 barrels per day and natural gas production will be approximately 125,000 standard cubic feet per day. 2.3.2 Phase 2 - Production Phase Phase 2 includes the installation of up to 27 additional oil and gas wells, three waste water disposal wells, a tank farm with five oil storage tanks, permanent processing equipment (to separate oil, natural gas, and water), additional fencing and landscape elements, electrical transformers and switches, and other ancillary structures. Figure 2.7 shows a schematic of the layout of the production site. The drill rig for Phase 2 will be of the same height as the drill rig proposed for use during Phase 1 (approximately 135 feet above grade) and will be onsite continuously for up to three years during well completion. Workover rigs of approximately 110 feet in height will be used for well maintenance up to three months of every year thereafter for the life of the project. Thus, drilling and workover rigs of this general scale would be onsite for a cumulative total of approximately twelve years during the project's 35 -year projected economic life. The sound attenuation wall constructed during Phase 1 will be augmented during Phase 2 by a 12 -foot decorative masonry perimeter wall, installation of permanent landscape plantings, and the removal of the chain link fencing. During Phase 2, MacPherson will install two new pipelines - a 6 -inch crude oil line and a 4 -inch gas - each approximately V2 mile (2,500 feet) long. The pipelines will connect to crude oil and natural gas transportation systems owned by Southern California Edison. MacPherson proposes to transport all produced oil and gas offsite via these pipelines during Phase 2. MacPherson does not propose to continue truck transportation of oil or gas, or the non -emergency flaring of gas during Phase 2. The crude oil delivered via pipeline to the Southern California Edison (SCE) Redondo Beach storage facility and pipeline system. MacPherson proposes to construct onsite oil storage facilities of sufficient capacity to contain produced oil onsite during routine or emergency interruptions of the pipeline. 2.3.3 Existing Facilities Figure 2.8 shows the site as currently used by the City of Hermosa Beach as a maintenance operation facility. The operations include a variety of activities 28/8/98 BERCf1A GROUP z aoao RESIDENTIAL AREA DAY ❑ISR = (0.45)(0.1) = 0.045 RESIDENTIAL AREA NIGHT OISR = (0.45)(0.25) = 011 2P\ 2P\ 2P \ 2P \ 2P\ 2P\ 2P \2P Ardmore Av. a W a a Day 2P Night OP VaUey Drive 2P RESIDENTIAL AREA 2P 2P 2P 2P 2P DAY OISR = (0.45)(1) = 0.45 NIGHT OISR = (0.45)(0)=0 2P RESIDENTIAL AREA GREEN SPACE PARK O 0..0.0 0 9.. • PAROIQ5 (0.1) = 0'0 45 DAY 0152 (0.4045 (0.45)(0.1) NIGHT p 10P *Note: For Small Business 3P DAY ❑ISR=(0.45)(1.5/12)(6/7)=0.040 NIGHT ❑ISR=(0.45)(0)=0 5P 5P 5P GYPres' Av. 5P 5PS SMALL 8US1MES 5P PRODUCTION PHASE 5P 0 5P 50 100 200 C= 1 Figure 2.7 ! SR ' MN MB P1111111-tlll11.11ACP1111111erallanlltIM MB MIION MO WI all Nil E E= i i i E NM M M ! M i E MO i M OM MN tird C= RESIDENTIAL AREA DAY OISR = (0.45)(0,1) = 0045 NIGHT DISR = (0.45)(0.25) = 0.11 RESIDENTIAL AREA 2P\ 2P\ 2P\ 2P \ 2P 1 2P\ 2P 1 2P Ardmore Av. 4 lr� 4 Day 2P Night OP Valley Drive 2P RESIDENTIAL AREA RESIDENTIAL AREA 2P 2P 2P 2P 2P 2P DAY OISR = (0.45)(1) = 0.45 NIGHT OISR = (0.45)(0)=0 GREEN SPACE PARK rn PARKING 0.0a5 OISR = (0.45 (0. 0.1) = O5 DAY AQ1SR CO. IOP 5P * 5, OS INF SS *Note: For Small Business 3P DAY ❑ISR=<0.45)(l.5/12)(6/7)=0.048 NIGHT ❑ISR=(0.45)(0)=0 5P 5P CYPre55 Av. 5P 5P 5PSMALL Bust's' 5P EXISTING PHASE 5P 0 50 Figure 2.8 Existing Facilities Layout • Hermosa Beach Project Inited Risk Analysis 2.10 Final Report such as repair and maintenance of vehicles, storage of materials, supplies, and equipment; a workplace for city workers who repair and maintain facilities and equipment in the city; and for storage and painting of signs. The following materials and activities are associated with potential hazards [151: • 50 vehicle round trips per day • 500 gallon above -grade storage tank for propane with a maximum operating pressure of 200 psi • 8000 gallon subterranean gasoline storage tank • 2000 gallon subterranean diesel storage tank • Propane, gasoline, and diesel surface vehicle loading pumps • Acetone • Paint Thinner • Various solvents and paints 2.4 Population Distributions The population distributions were obtained from the City of Hermosa Beach [ 16] as well as from direct census for some of the transient population distribution such as the railway right-of-way utilization as well as the park utilization. Figure 2.8 used earlier, to describe the existing facilities shows the population distribution in the vicinity of the site. As may be seen, the site is surrounded on all four sides by areas utilized by the public for residential, commercial, or recreational purposes. Immediately to the east, across Valley Road is a green space which is routinely used by joggers and walkers. Further east, across Ardmore Avenue, is a medium density residential area, in which residential units have been characterized by an average occupancy of 2 persons, in accordance with advice from the City of Hermosa Beach [ 16]. To the west, across the fence is a parking area, followed by a small business area in which occupancy has been characterized by 5 persons per business unit. A similar business or commercial occupancy appears on the west side of Cypress Avenue. To the north, again are small businesses, in this case characterized by 3 persons per business unit. To the south, across 6th Street, are a number of medium sized enterprises, with occupancy varying from a maximum of 30 to 1 person as noted in the schematic. Other areas are characterized by appropriate population distributions obtained during the population analysis. Table 2.1 summarizes the population numbers described above, together with the associated parameters describing the amount of time spent at the location and the percentage of that time that people are outdoors and therefore more vulnerable to possible hazards from the proposed project. Specifically, Table 2.1 gives the type of population as residential, commercial, and transient. The table gives the amount of time spent at the location and outside as a proportion of the total possible time The right hand column gives the product of the dwell time and outdoor time ratios to give the outdoor individual specific risk (OISR) factor. The total possible exposure time for 1 year is multiplied by this factor to give the expected time that an individual in the vicinity Asurs 31/8/98 BERCIIA GROUP In i— ai■i OM I 1 M— — —— r i r 1— 4 I z Table 2.1 Population Distribution Around Proposed Site POPULATION TYPE DAYS PER WEEK DAYTIME NIGHTTIME HOURS OUTSIDE FRACTION OISR FACTOR HOURS OUTSIDE FRACTION OISR FACTOR Residential 7 12 0.1 0.05 12 0.25 0.125 Commercial 6 12 0.125 0.054 0 - 0.0 Transient 7 12 1.0 0.50 , 0 - 0.0 tr. 1 Hermosa Beach Project Ited Risk Analysis • Hermosa Beach Project Inated Risk Analysis 2.12 Final Report of the project would be exposed to hazards to which she/he would be vulnerable only while they are outdoors. 2.5 Environmental Data Environmental data required for the conduct of the integrated risk assessment includes atmospheric conditions, wind intensities and directions, air parameters including temperature, quality, density, and general physical geographical data. Data on atmospheric conditions and wind directions was obtained from the National Weather Service data for the nearest weather station located at Redondo Beach. The data give the distribution of wind directions for 16 compass directions, for each of 7 stability classes as well as summaries for the representative unstable (A, B, C) and stable (E, F, G) atmospheric stability classes. Wind intensities are also given for intensity intervals of 1 cm/s, from 0 to 6 m/s. Analysis of these data for representative stable and unstable conditions is shown in Table 2.2, while their reduction to 8 directions for the two representative classes is shown in Table 2.3. Further studies, to be described in the chapter on consequence modelling, were conducted !on these data to establish the worst case atmosphere which was found to be in the wind intensity category between 0 and 1 m/s. However, the establishment of the worst case situation required the application of consequence dispersion modelling through a series of sensitivity studies to isolate the atmospheric conditions giving the largest hazard footprints for releases characterized by leaks, holes, and ruptures in the process and piping equipment. 2.6 Acute Damage Criteria 2.6.1 General Description of Damage Criteria Damage criteria are used to quantify the dosage or effect level for which lethality or severe injury will occur to most exposed people. In the conduct of risk analysis, zones delineating the extremities of areas in which individuals who are exposed are likely to be injured or killed are defined in accordance with certain dosages or damage effect levels. For example, in a location where an explosion overpressure reaches a level of 15 psi, 99%, or virtually all persons who are unprotected outdoors are likely to be killed due to direct blast effects. The damage criteria, then, give the probability of lethality or injury for average individuals exposed to a single incident of a specific effect such as blast overpressure. It should be noted that the damage criteria given in this section pertain to acute or immediate effects as opposed to long-term cumulative effects from continued or repeated exposure. The latter effects are termed chronic; the ones largely studied in the present risk assessment are acute effects. A discussion of chronic effects is given in Section 2.8. ASPEN 28/8/98 BERCHA GROUP E 1 OM i E- H E- N! 1!= MN -! i NM e 191z na 1 co Table 2.2 Wind Frequency Distribution Redondo Beach 81-01-01 to 81-12-31 PASQUILL STABILITY CLASS FREQUENCY OF OCCURRENCE FOR WIND TRAVELLING IN THIS DIRECTION (percent) SSW SW WSW W WNW NW NNW N NNE NE ENE E ESE SE SSE S A,B,C 0.13 0.18 0.61 1.02 1.14 0.57 0.17 0.34 1.08 6.30 8.65 3.33 0.74 0.19 0.05 0.17 E,F,G 0.64 0.79 3.42 5.71 2.48 0.86 0.39 0.73 3.62 6.29 5.94 4.67 1.48 0.43 0.26 0.74 Hermosa Beach Project Ied Risk Analysis N w • 1 Hermosa Beach Project Meted Risk Analysis 2.14 Final Report Table 2.3 Summary of Wind Frequencies ASPEN 28/8/98 BERCIIA GROUP I I I A I I I I I I I I I I I I I I TIME OF DAY (CLASS) DIRECTION WIND TRAVELLING DIRECTIONAL PROBABILITY, Pd DAY (A, B, C) N 0.04 NE 0.46 E 0.32 SE 0.02 S 0.01 SW 0.02 W 0.08 NW 0.05 NIGHT (E, F, G) N 0.06 NE - 0.26 E 0.22 SE 0.06 S 0.07 SW 0.07 W 0.22 NW 0.04 ASPEN 28/8/98 BERCIIA GROUP I I I A I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Hermosa Beach Project I ted Risk Analysis 2.15 • Final Report 2.6.2 Thermal Effects Following the ignition of a hydrocarbon release from equipment, fires and explosions which could potentially injure either the public or a worker may occur. For the purposes of the present risk analysis, fire effects for people were considered for either direct contact with the flame or exposure to injurious levels of thermal radiation. Direct contact with a fire, for example inside a vapour cloud, will often result in fatality. The vapour cloud lower flammability limit was used to define the fatality location. A probability of fatality of 50% was used for locations within a flash fire. Thermal radiation hazards are not significant outside of the boundary of a short duration burning vapour cloud, but they are significant near a jet fire or a pool fire. A summary of selected effects of thermal radiation on both equipment and people is given in Table 2.4. Experimental data on thermal radiation hazards show that a thermal radiation level of 37.5 kW/m2 is sufficient to cause damage to process equipment and 50% fatality within 20 seconds. A 10% fatality criterion of 12.5 kW/m2 was used for the present risk analysis. 2.6.3 Explosion Effects Explosion effects on people involve either direct exposure to overpressures or impact by missiles or collapsing objects resulting from the explosion. Empirical data on blast overpressure damage is used to estimate human effect criteria for vapour cloud or vessel overpressure explosions. A summary of effects for explosion overpressures on both equipment and people is given in Table 2.5. 99% fatality may be expected from direct human exposure to 15 psi blast overpressures. Buildings, however, will be seriously damaged if exposed to 2.8 psi overpressures and therefore people inside such buildings could die as a result of structural collapse as well as suffering from direct physiological overpressure injury. An overpressure criterion of 3.5 psi causing a 5% likelihood of fatality for exposed people was utilized for the present risk analysis. 2.6.4 Acute H2S Damage Criteria Hydrogen Sulphide gas is known to be physiologically damaging to humans when ingested by breathing. Quantitative assessments of the 2, 3, 26, 27, 28, 44] are restricted to acute or immediate effects; long-term or chronic effects are not unambiguously understood and continue to be a subject of controversy worldwide. The current investigation is restricted to the analysis of acute effects of H2S. The nature of the damage due to exposure to a toxic gas depends on the concentration and exposure time and condition of the receptor. Many useful measures are available to use as benchmarks for predicting the likelihood that a release event would result in serious injury or death. Some of the established [2] toxicologic criteria and methods to assess the magnitude of 28/8/98 BERCIIA GROUP Hermosa Beach Project Inited Risk Analysis 2.16 • Final Report Table 2.4 Effect of Thermal Radiation Table 2.5 Effects from Explosion Overpressures OVERPRESSURE RADIATION INTENSITY OBSERVED EFFECT (kW/m2) (BTU/ft2hr) 1 2 .3 37.5 11887 Sufficient to cause damage to process equipment. 50% fatality after 20 1 Partial demolition of houses; made uninhabitable seconds. 25 7925 Minimum energy required to ignite wood. 50% fatality after 60 seconds. 12.5 3960 Melting of plastic tubing. 10% fatality after 60 seconds. 19.5 3000 Pain threshold reached after 8 s; second degree burns after 20 s; 1% 1 Wooden utility poles snapped; buildings destroyed (10% fatality) lethality after 60 seconds. 6.3 2000 Sufficient to cause pain to personnel if unable to reach cover within 20 s; however blistering of the skin (second degree burns) is likely; 0% lethality. 1.9 600 Will cause no discomfort for long exposure. Table 2.5 Effects from Explosion Overpressures OVERPRESSURE OBSERVED EFFECT (Bars) (kPa) (psi) .02 2 .3 Typical pressure for 10% glass failure. Safe distance. .07 7 1.0 Partial demolition of houses; made uninhabitable .2 20 2.8 Non -reinforced concrete or cinder block walls destroyed. (1% fatality) .25 25 3.5 Steel buildings collapse (90% eardrum rupture) (5% fatality) .35 35 5.0 Wooden utility poles snapped; buildings destroyed (10% fatality) 1.0 100 15.0 Range for 99% fatalities among exposed populations due to direct blast effects. 28/8/98 KERMA GROUP 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 e 1 1 1 1 v 1 1 Hermosa Beach Project liked Risk Analysis 2.17 • Final Report damage to humans from exposure to toxic gases such as H2S include the following: • Emergency Response Planning Guidelines for Air Contaminants (ERPGs) issued by the American Industrial Hygiene Association (AIHA) • Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH) Levels established by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) • Emergency Exposure Guidance Levels (EEGLs) and Short -Term Public Emergency Guidance Levels (SPEGLs) issued by the National Academy of Sciences/National Research Council • Threshold Limit Values (TLVs) established by the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) including Short -Term Exposure Limits (STELs) and ceiling concentrations • Permissible Exposure Limits (PELs) promulgated by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) • Alberta Energy Resource Conservation Board (AERCB) L50 Toxic Load • Probit functions In the present study, a combination of some of the above guidelines together with probit functions to assess the likelihood of lethality have been utilized. For a number of commonly known toxic substances, there exists information on dose -response relationships that can be applied to quantify the number of fatalities that are likely occur with a given exposure. Finally, probit relationships for specific substances are based on experimental animal data, resulting in some uncertainty around risk estimates in applications to human populations. Once an adequate dispersion model has been applied to give time -concentration zones, it is possible to apply a probit function to obtain additional information on the lethality of the release for substances which have been documented in the form for application to the probit method. The probit method uses a logarithmic expression to obtain a probit value, P„ in the form: Pr = a+bloge (CO (2.1) where, a, b, and n are constants given in Table 2.6, C is the gas concentration in ppm, and t is the exposure time in minutes. With this expression, the toxic dose for a percentage of fatalities of the exposed population can be determined using standard probit tables. Specifically, the necessary inputs for the probit analysis for H2S are shown in Table 2.6, showing the probit constants for a number of substances including H2S, and the transformation of the probit value to a percentage of lethality can be obtained ,ASPEN 28/8/98 BFR GROUUPP Hermosa Beach Project InIt ted Risk Analysis 2.18 Final Report from Table 2.7. For the purposes of the present risk analysis, certain established toxicological criteria from among those cited above were chosen, and the probit function was used to assess associated probabilities of lethality for input into the risk model. Specifically, the following three dosage criteria were chosen: • IDHL (new) 100 ppm, 30 minutes • ERPG-3, 100 ppm, 60 minutes • IDLH (old), 300 ppm, 30 minutes • ERCB L50, 700-1000 ppm, 5 minutes Application of the probit equation with appropriate constants for H2S gave probabilities of lethality of 0%, 1%, 5%, and 50%, respectively for these criteria. Table 2.8 summarizes these criteria together with the above-cited results. 2.6.5 Injury Damage Criteria Although in most industrial accidents, more injuries than fatalities usually occur, injury damage criteria are not as readily available as fatality criteria. The American Institute -of Chemical Engineers [3] suggests a ratio of fatalities to injuries ranging from 1 to 5 to 1 to 15: In the instance where large numbers of individuals are exposed to partially fatal effects, it is suggested that 10 injuries per fatality be utilized. Reports on recent grim events in Kenya and Ireland generally confirm the rates of 1 fatality to 10 injuries. In a situation where a limited number of individuals is exposed, it is suggested that injuries be considered 10 times as likely as fatalities. 2.7 Risk Thresholds Risk is a combined measure of the probability and magnitude of adverse effect. Risk thresholds are a term generally used to designate the levels of risk which are acceptable in certain situations. Possible measures of risk include individual risk, risk expectations, and risk spectra. Individual risk is simply the probability that a given individual will become a casualty as a result of the project over a period of exposure of 1 year. Risk expectation can be described by the use of a risk matrix which relates various discreet levels of likelihood of occurrence and severity of consequences. A risk spectrum gives a continuous relationship between the probability of occurrence and a quantitative measure of the severity of consequences, such as the number of people killed. All three of these measures will be utilized in the assessment of risk under the present study. 2.7.1 Individual Risk Thresholds Risk acceptability criteria are often based on the premise that the risk being evaluated should not make a substantial addition to the existing risk of everyday life. Table 2.9 lists risk levels associated with a variety of common activities. It should be noted that these activities are also distinguished according to voluntary and involuntary participation. Clearly, people are prepared to accept a higher level Asuts 28/8/98 Pt* GROUP 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 r f 1 1 Hermosa Beach Project 1 ted Risk Analysis 2.19 • Final Report Table 2.6 Constants for Lethal Toxicity Probit Equation SUBSTANCE a (ppm) b (ppm) n (min) Ammonia -35.9 1.85 2.00 Benzene -109.78 5.3 2.00 Carbon Monoxide -37.98 3.7 1.00 Chlorine -8.29 0.92 2.00 Hydrogen cyanide -29.42 3.008 1.43 Hydrogen Sulphide -31.42 3.008 1.43 Methyl isocyanate -5.642 1.637 0.653 Sulphur dioxide -15.67 2.10 1.00 Table 2.7 Transformation of Probits to Lethality Percentages % 0 2 4 6 8 0 -- 2.95 3.25 3.45 3.59 10 3.72 3.82 3.92 4.01 4.08 20 4.16 4.23 4.29 4.36 4.42 30 4.48 4.53 4.59 4.64 4.69 40 4.75 4.80 4.85 4.90 4.95 50 5.00 5.05 5.10 5.15 5.20 60 5.25 5.31 5.36 5.41 5.47 70 5.52 5.58 5.64 5.71 5.77 80 5.84 5.92 5.99 6.08 6.18 90 6.28 6.41 6.55 6.75 7.05 99 7.33 7.41 7.46 7.65 7.88 Table 2.8 Acute H2S Lethality Criteria DISCRIPTION C (ppm) DURATION (min) PROBABILITY OF LETHALITY IDLH (new) 100 30 0% ERPG-3 100 60 1% IDLH(old) 300 30 5% ERCB L50 700-1000 5 50% 28/8/98 BA ERCf1 GROUP Hermosa Beach Project In ted Risk Analysis 2.20 • Final Report Table 2.9 Common Individual Risks of Casualty CAUSE* INDIVIDUAL RISK PER MILLION (per year) Motor Vehicle Accidents (total) V 240.0 Home Accidents V 110.0 Falls V 62.0 Motor Vehicle Pedestrian Collisions V 42.0 Drowning V 36.0 Fires I 28.0 Inhalation and Ingestion of Objects I 15.0 Firearms V 10.0 Accidental Poisoning: Gases and Vapors Solids and Liquids (Not drugs or medicaments) I 7.7 6.0 Electrocution I 5.3 Tornadoes I 0.6 Floods I 0.6 Lightning I 0.5 Tropical Cyclones and Hurricanes I 0.3 Bites and Stings by Venomous Animals and Insects I 0.2 V denotes "Voluntary"; I, "Involuntary" 28/8/98 BFRCI-IA GROUP 1 r 1 1 1 t 1 1 1 1 1 r i 1 1 Hermosa Beach Project In ted Risk Analysis 2.21 • Final Report of risk from voluntary activities from which they derive a direct benefit (such as driving), and a lower level from involuntary risks such as living next to a gas plant, which give no immediately identifiable direct benefit. An increase of 1% or more in the individual risk of death, due to a specific hazardous activity, is the basis of many criteria of unacceptable or intolerable risk. Acceptable or tolerable risk criteria are a factor of 10 to 100 lower than those for unacceptable risks. In an area where risk lies between unacceptable and acceptable levels, risk reduction is desirable. Tolerable or acceptable risk levels will vary with the benefits and costs. In between the unacceptable risk level and the acceptable risk level is the area where risks may or may not be tolerable depending on the situation. Risk in the grey area is generally acceptable only if all reasonably practical measures have already been taken to reduce it. Individual risk is often expressed in terms of an annual probability of death for the exposed person or Individual Specific Risk (ISR). An annual probability (or chance) of death of 1 in 1,000,000 (or 106 per year) is often taken as a tolerable level. An annual .probability of death of 1 in 10,000 (or 104 per year) is considered unacceptable. In Canada, The Major Industrial Accident Council of Canada (MIACC) developed the risk acceptability criteria presented in Figure 2.9. Similar criteria are cited for the U.S. and several Western European countries [11, 52]. These criteria are reflected in terms of allowable land -uses for specified levels of individual risk. This approach implicitly provides a guideline for allowable societal risk in one simple statement. An annual individual fatality risk of 1 in 10,000 (or 104) from the presence of a facility is considered unacceptable for a member of the general public, and the area defined by this risk contour is called the exclusion zone. A risk of less than 1 in 1,000,000 (or 10"6) is considered negligible, and the use of land beyond this risk contour is not restricted by the presence of the facility. 2.7.2 Risk Matrix Thresholds Figure 2.10 illustrates the Santa Barbara risk matrix [45]. The risk matrix is a semi -quantitative display of the severity and frequency of different adverse consequences with the areas of increasing significance in terms of risk depicted on Figure 2.10. Events within the shaded area are considered significant and must be mitigated. Numerous forms of the risk matrix have been used worldwide, based on the same principles as the County of Santa Barbara risk matrix. Table 2.10 summarizes the criticality and frequency classifications that are given in the margins of the risk matrix given in Figure 2.10 together with a qualitative description for the frequency categories. ASPEN 28/8/98 BER GROUP z Risk source tti RI 100 in a million ((10-4)�) 10 in a million 1 in a million (10-5) (10-6) I I I I 1 1 I I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 No other land use Manufacturing, I Commercial, All other uses, including warehouses, offices, i institutions, open space I low-density residential I high-density residential, et (parkland, golt courses, etc.) 1 l Allowable Land Uses Figure 2.9 ISR Risk Acceptability Criteria a 111111 N Olt M la I M 111111 MN it M S U MK MB ;U 1111 a a MN e N p-- - MN M! I .- - MB O WI M• MN M 17i e➢ . SEVERITY OF CONSEQUENCE Negligible: No significant risk 10 the public. with no minor injuries; less Than 10 barrels spilled. • Minor: Small level of public risk, with al most a few minor Injuries; 10.238 barrels spilled. Major: Major level of public risk with up lo 10 severe Injuries; 238 • 2300 barrels spilled. Severe: Severe public risk with up 10 100 savers injuries or up 10 10 fatalities; 2380 10 357.142 barrels spilled. Dlsaslrous: Disastrous public risk involving more than 100 severe Injuries or more Ihan 10 fatalities; greater then 357.142 barrels spilled. 1 FREQUENCY OF OCCURRENCE Frequent: Greater than once a year. �{ y_ t♦ Y J`>4 Y rK� ixi ;L ;�f sLi> *`z ;z ?< y v= `�' s via yfi ♦2'i <"t♦9<N tiia } i. L £ f 2 # t `T♦ it . 32 a I 2• A;a ? < i 2 , 'a > . } ; <Sl S✓ `4".. Y . ,3 ,$it anti $tis Y,t: .f t rot >>Sii i` / 5 a 'Cr. • S K tY x \ >]' .S.,p.>..aix $tY Likely: between once a year and once h one/, hundred years. w zf is .; xrsiF pit `G� }``4;k� \�\��` _ , < isi ; !yr < <t.Y ; 2E « " = y> ..• ` SfO 1 191 k ♦i "gTire i .{Sk'�'i s'',v�'� <s j 'rfif;;< P`; ,}R 2�� '#st 'V i#1"N r' xf�'a < ,yw}>'R�{?yet } Y • {. tTj,.. f. •, - x ..KP bra P�Y> Uni�Cel Between r: once inahundred and once in len thousand yews. '\O \Pc,G ( O` �/`P \ V •.R \N S cr • J\v S # G ,> #,r£ � f T y > d <il ♦" 1 .....„:,:...4 y4 w3 > 2� y..4 :CA FR, } .Tt ; ;p hw t} > i T £ S z <> si Y,fQ .. ; "xs< as xT22 C i€• 3ryJ ♦ '+ �t 1 ,.T .. Ti Yf ,•Y♦ i } a ob > M4 i "£? £ 5_gL < os i i d s NFx �!#j f Yf 5d Ry {Lt�Z », ..'.4 $ w pX Y+ 9 15 f£ t 1a 4s TisR x { ai < ,iiy, ScT a ` �?S , <J , y 2: iYs T ♦ f "t. R b f xsi 4. '£? £ < ..oCt'T 4d<D f Rare: between once h len thousand yews and once h a million yews. b 4 t 6 r ac 1i ,� r" s ti�L; `K r4f<}a4't.'Sy's 1.;. •ly } •:�2•2'� £ Rid . lOO� 1 r,'4:': v: r`d .. iS SY K `f ,�' z 11 ri I ` i' `tYi`�^£�i.-£ !k2�4 yah ty rp�f }FJ#f ,t .SC.•% '.: Extraordinary: Less than once in one million years. Canty defined as significant impacts. Source: County of Santa Barbara Department of Resource Management, Environmental Thresholds & Guidelines Manual, Arnended 1990; Shell Hercules Platform EIR, 1903. Figure 2.10 Santa Barbara Risk Matrix Hermosa Beach Project lilted Risk Analysis N W • Hermosa Beach Project Inta ted Risk Analysis 2.24 • Final Report Table 2.10 Criticality and Frequency Classifications CLASSIFICATION DESCRIPTION OF PUBLIC SAFETY HAZARD Negligible No significant risk to the public, with no minor injuries. Minor Small level of public risk, with at most a few minor injuries. Major Major level of public risk with up to 10 severe injuries Severe Severe public risk with up to 100 severe injuries or up to 10 fatalities. Disastrous Disastrous public risk involving more than 100 severe injuries or more than 10 fatalities. TYPE FREQUENCY DESCRIPTION Extraordinary Less than once in one million years An event whose occurrence is extremely unlikely. Rare Between once in ten thousand years and once in one million years An event which almost certainly would not occur during the project lifetime. Unlikely Between once in a hundred and once in ten thousand years An event which is not expected during the project lifetime Likely Between once a year and once in one hundred years An event which probably would occur during the project lifetime. Frequent Greater than once a year An event which would occur more than once a year on average. ASPEN 28/8/98 BERCIIA GROUP A 1 r 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Hermosa Beach Project Int ed Risk Analysis 2.25 • Final Report The risk matrix is being phased out in favor of the risk spectrum or profile in the County of Santa Barbara. 2.7.3 Risk Spectra The discussion of risk spectra and choice of risk spectrum thresholds given herein is based on the Santa Barbara County Policy Report [45]. Risk spectrum thresholds [8, 11] employ quantitative measures of societal risk to indicate whether the annual probability of expected fatalities or serious injuries is significant of not. Both unmitigated risk estimates and the effectiveness of options to mitigate significant risk should be tested against the threshold. If a proposed project exposes the public to significantly high risks despite all feasible measures to mitigate the impact, then approval of the project requires a statement of overriding considerations, adopted by the approving authority and supported by substantial evidence in the record. Upon project approval, the risk estimates should be adjusted and charted on the thresholds to reflect the risk accurately, based on accepted mitigation, for future land -use planning and permitting purposes. As described below, these thresholds should not function as the sole determinants of significance for public safety impacts. Rather, they must be used in concert with applicable community policy, regulation, and guidelines to address other qualitative factors specific to the project which also help determine the significance of risk. For example, highly sensitive land uses (e.g., hospitals or schools) are generally given greater protection from hazardous situations overall. Also, long-term significant risks (e.g., natural gas production) generally are treated more conservatively than relatively short-term risks (e.g., natural gas exploration). The thresholds for public fatalities and injuries are given in Figures 2.11 and 2.12 respectively. They require quantitative risk analysis to determine the total societal risk attributable to the full set of possible accidents that can occur from the operation of a hazardous facility or undertaking of an activity that involves handling of hazardous materials. The analysis must consider both the significance of the risk and the beneficial effect of mitigation. It must also comply with community guidelines for risk assessment to ensure compatibility with the thresholds and consistency over time. When these thresholds are applied to proposed development in proximity to an existing hazardous operation, the risk measurement must be adjusted to reflect reductions in risk due to mitigation or to reflect societal risk from a newly proposed development. These thresholds refine previous, quantitative thresholds by employing the entire risk spectrum of a project and they refine the qualitative character of previous thresholds (risk matrices) by employing quantitative factors into the determination of significance. The thresholds provide three zones - Intolerable, Grey, and Insignificant - for guiding the determination of significance or insignificance ,4SIDEN 28/8/98 I3' 'A GROUP Hermosa Beach Project lnfited Risk Analysis 2.26 ill Final Report Annual Chance or N or More Fatalities 1.E-02 1.E-03 1.E-04 1.E-05 1.E-06 1.E-07 1.E-08 Public Risk Thresholds - Fatalities 1 6, Intolerable 1 Insignificant 1 10 100 Number of Fatalities (N) 1000 ASpEN Figure 2.11 Santa Barbara Public Fatality Risk Threshold 28/8/98 BIERCIIA GROUP Hermosa Beach Project 1rfeted Risk Analysis 2.27 • Final Report Annual Chance or N or More Fatalities 1.E-02 1.E-03 1.E-04 1.E-05 1.E-06 1.E-07 1.E-08 Grey Insignificant IIntolerable 1 10 100 Number of Fatalities (N) 1000 Figure 2.12 Santa Barbara Public Injury Risk Threshold 28/8/98 BERCHA GROUP Hermosa Beach Project !Hued Risk Analysis 2.28 Final Report based on the estimated probability and consequences of an accident. Risk analysis is based on best available data and modelling techniques but still requires informed assumptions to compensate for gaps in data, shortfalls in modelling, and our ability to predict future outcomes with 100% accuracy. Given the unavoidable margin of error associated with any projection, the grey zone represents an area where caution is recommended, particularly considering the presence or absence of relevant qualitative factors; meanwhile, the overall goal should remain focused on maximizing public safety, using feasible mitigation to achieve a risk spectrum that falls solely within the insignificant zone. 2.8 Background on Chronic Risks from H2S Twenty-one scientific studies were reviewed to identify the human health effects from exposure to low hydrogen sulphide (H2S) emissions. The results of these studies are summarized in Table 2.11. The majority of the scientific studies to date focus on the human health effects from acute exposure, which is high H2S concentrations over a short period of time (see Table 2.11). In general, these studies have concluded that H2S is toxic at very high exposure concentrations (greater than 500 ppm), depending on the exposure period. Death can result in humans exposed to H2S at concentrations greater than 1,000 ppm, when exposed to H2S for less than 1 hour. Ten of the 21 scientific studies reviewed provide some information on the human health effects from exposure to low H2S concentrations. Five of the studies found that H2S does not constitute an important hazard to human health from chronic exposure to very low H2S concentrations (<10 ppm) (see Table 2.11, Hosking, 1983; Smith; Milby; Young; National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 1977). The studies also found that repeated exposure to low concentrations of H2S does not result in any cumulative based health effects. In addition, there is no evidence that low levels of H2S can negatively effect a pregnant woman, or the development of the baby. The other five studies found conflicting public health information from exposure to low H2S concentrations (see Table 2.11, Haggard, 1925; Richardson, 1995; Skrjny; Reiffenstein; Sainsbury; Roth, 1996; Guidotti, 1994; Hannah, Roth, 1990). These studies identify a number of potential health effects from low H2S concentrations (20 to 100 ppm), such as: loss of sleep, potential headaches, nausea, blurred vision, reduced lung function, reduced brain function and cardiac arrhythmia. However, it should be noted that H2S concentrations in these studies were higher that the five previous studies that found no chronic effects from low H2S concentrations. With regard to odor, the odor thresholds for H2S is approximately 0.1 ppm, and therefore, concentrations below 3 ppm would be noticeable to any exposed individual. Concentrations as high as 3 ppm may be considered offensive and may result in a public nuisance. Asurs 28/8/98 BERCIIA GROUP ON MN —'. NM NM 8 a ON I S .ate r r— M— — — Table 2.11 Summary of Studies Regarding H2S Exposure # TITLE AUTHOR DATE DESCRIPTION CONCLUSIONS 1 A Search for the Scientific Literature for Evidence of the Effects of Low Concentrations of Hydrogen Sulphide on Human Populations David J. Hosking July, 1983 In 1982 a large area of Alberta, Canada recorded H2S concentrations of 3 ppm or less for a period of weeks. Many complaints were made by members of the public that they experienced adverse health effects. This study summarizes existing literature on the potential health effects from chronic exposure to low-level H2 The literature review can be summed up as follows: • The existence of a clinical syndrome of "chronic hydrogen sulfide poisoning" is uncertain • There is no evidence that H2S is a cumulative poison in man • There is very limited information on the effects of low dose exposure in the community setting. • Includes tables summarizing results of reviews previously conducted by other sources. 2 The Toxicology of Hydrogen Sulfide with Particular Reference to the Effects of Long- Term, Low- Level Exposure Roger P. Smith This study provides a brief history of the toxicology of hydrogen sulphide, including a summary of what is known about the human health effects of hydrogen sulphide largely as inferred from studies on laboratory animals. • The bulk of the evidence indicates that hydrogen sulfide is a gas of high acute toxicity, but one with no tendency to produce life - threatening cumulative or chronic effects. • The gas is well known to have a low persistence in the environment, do to the fact that it reacts rapidly with heavy metals in water and soil, and tends to be dissipated rapidly in the atmosphere where it is quickly oxidized to sulfate. 3 A Review of and Comments on Concerns Raised Regarding the Health Effects of Hydrogen Sulfide and the AMOCO Dome Brazeau Blowout Thomas H. Milby Study was conducted to explain the numerous complaints fielded from the public as a result of the Amoco Dome Brazeau Blowout, and subsequent ambient H2S concentrations • Among conclusions is the idea that, "... the role of the media as a stimulus to social contagion also may have been considerable. Certain members of the medical and media communities release public statements which create paranoia with the public". • The general perception among U.S. scientists is that H2S in very low concentrations (<3 ppm) does not constitute an important hazard to health. • Studies conducted on animals indicated that H2S is not toxic to the reproductive process in low doses. Humans exposed to lethal concentrations showed no adverse reproductive effects. • No evidence that low levels of H2S negatively affects a pregnant woman. 4 Study Trip to Murray R. Study of an area which is exposed • Studies of the area show that birth defect rates and illness rates • A 0 Table 2.11 Summary of Studies Regarding H2S Exposure # TITLE AUTHOR DATE DESCRIPTION CONCLUSIONS Rotorua, New Zealand Young to low level concentration of H2S. These levels are often higher than recommended occupational levels of H2S exposure in North America, yet the citizens have not shown any adverse health effects. are similar to those of an area with similar demographics, but without the constant presence of H2S. 5 Criteria for a Recommended Standard... Occupational Exposure to Hydrogen Sulfide National Institute for Occupatio nal Safety and Health May, 1977 This study describes the effects of acute exposure on humans and chronic occupational exposure to H2S • 70% of workers exposed to H2S in their daily work, often at 20 ppm or more, complained of fatigue, lack of initiative, decreased libido, loss of appetite, headache, irritability, poor memory, anxiety, etc. • Acute exposures to hydrogen sulfide at higher concentrations were associated with signs of cerebral and extrapyramidal damage, facial paralysis, prolonged reaction time, absent or abnormal reflexes at both cranial and spinal nerve levels, poor memory, depression, epiletic-like seizure. • No evidence of chronic or cumulative effects from H2S exposure. 6 Report on H2S Toxicity Ad Hoc Committee August, 1988 After well blow out and subsequent H2S release, an Ad Hoc Committee was developed to evaluate: 1. To assess the scientific evidence for low level acute, subacute, and chronic effects of H2S on humans in the range 0 to 100 ppm, and especially the 0 to 20 ppm range. 2. To clarify the issue of the effects of low levels of H2S on sensitive individuals. • Consists mainly of examples of acute exposure of humans to H2S, tests done on varying species of animals, and of effects olfactory • Factors other than H2S itself, may be responsible for hypersusceptibility of a small proportion of the population, including, mixed -exposure with other chemicals at the same time, pre -exposure to mixed medications, alcohol, or drugs, diseases and/or physiological conditions. • States that individuals who may he expected to show increased susceptibility to H2S exposure include: —Individuals with eye/respiratory problems —Individuals with severe enemia —Individuals with lower resistancc to bacterial infections 7 The Toxicology of Hydrogen Sulphide Dr. Howard W. March, 1925 This article provides a general background of the toxicology of H2S. • Hydrogen sulphide is both extremely toxic and also irritant. It causes severe local irritation of the eyes and may induce pulmonary edema. The more severe irritant effects are, however, usually obscured by the symptoms of acute systematic N w • — all all, Ms I s M w— —— 1111= all N NM M— M MIN M— MO 1 r— — — V M r MN N--- In n Table 2.11 Summary of Studies Regarding H2S Exposure # TITLE AUTHOR DATE DESCRIPTION CONCLUSIONS Haggard poisoning. • Prolonged exposure to low concentrations of hydrogen sulphide is generally believed to result in a chronic form of poisoning. This is characterized by local irritation of the eyes and the respiratory tract, cold sweats, digestive disturbances, headache, and in some cases, skin eruption. Although these symptoms are somewhat indefinite, there appears to be little question that the repeated and prolonged inhalation of H2S in concentration as low as 100 ppm may cause local irritation and depression of the nervous system. 8 The Influence of Hydrogen Sulphide Upon Respiration Dr. Howard W. Haggard July, 1922 A brief description of H2S influences the respiratory function • Sulphidesin small amounts in the blood stream are oxidized. • Hydrogensulphide causes systematic poisoning whenever the concentration inhaled is sufficient to maintain in the blood an amount of the unoxidized gas great enough to exert a pharmacologic action. 9 Technical Information for Problem Spills Environme ntal Canada - Environme ntal Protection Service July, 198' This report contains tables, listing results from experimental exposure of H2S on humans. In addition, it contains a brief section on the effects of H2S on humans. Hydrogen sulphide is an acute poison and acts as an enzyme inhibitor. At concentration in the range 500 to 1000 ppm, it acts primarily as a systematic poison, causing unconsciousness and death through respiratory paralysis. At concentrations below 500 ppm, it acts as an eye and respiratory irritant. No reports associating hydrogen sulphide in air with carcinogenesis, mutagenesis, or teratogenesis were found in the literature. Hermosa Beach Project lilted Risk Analysis • co rod Table 2.11 Summary of Studies Regarding H2S Exposure # co• TITLE AUTHOR DATE DESCRIPTION CONCLUSIONS 11 Gases in Agricultural Slurry Stores J.A. Groves and P.A. Ellwood Sept., 1990 The evaluation of gases during the handling of animal slurry was investigated at five sites. Particular attention was paid to the mixing and emptying operations since it is when performing these that personnel are most likely to be at risk of exposure to H2S. • The main hazard was found to be high transient concentrations of hydrogen sulphide presenting in some cases a serious acute toxicity problem. • Time -weighted average exposure did not generally indicate any long-term exposure risk. • High concentrations (up to 141 ppm) were found in slurry pits • Higher transient concentrations (up to 541 ppm) was a feature of the slatted system. 12 Concentration- Time Interactions in Hydrogen Sulphide Toxicity in Rats M. Prior, A. Sharma, S. Yong, and A. Lopez July, 1987 Concentration -time iterations were investigated in young male and female Sprague -Dawley, Long Evans and Fischer -344 rats exposed to hydrogen sulphide for two, four or six hours. • • Higher concentrations caused more rat deaths, with no significant difference in the duration of exposure. • Changes in rat weight were significant; increasing with concentration, higher in males than in females, different among strains, and affected by duration of exposure. • All rats of all strains dying had severe pulmonary edema. 13 Acute and Subchronic Toxicity Studies of Rats Exposed to Vapors of Methyl Mercaptan and Other Reduced - Sulfur Compounds M. Tansy, F. Kendall, J. Fantasia, W. Landin, R. Oberly, W. Sherman 1981 Acute inhalation experiments were conducted to determine 24- hour LC50 values for adult Sprague -Dawley rats of both sexes exposed to vapors of methyl mercaptan and other reduced -S compounds for 4 - hour. • The American Conference of Government Industrial Hygienists states that the acute toxicity of methyl mercaptan is "similar to, but less than, that of hydrogen sulfide or of the same magnitude". 14 Low Concentrations of Hydrogen Sulphide Alter Monoamine Levels in the Developing B. Skrajny, R. Hannah, S. Roth 1992 This study evaluated the levels of serotonin and norepinephrine in the developing rat cerebellum and frontal cortex following chronic exposure to 20 and 75 ppm H2S during perinatal development. • Exposure to 75 ppm H2S during development of rat central nervous system results in increased serotonin and norepinephrine levels in both the cerebellum and the frontal cortex. • In humans, exposure to similar concentrations results in eye irritation within several minutes and respiratory tract irritation in 30 minutes. • Repeated exposures to H2S are usually necessary to produce • MN I NO- r NIP MN MI S M 11111111 MI s N I M N r- NM M r 1 MN MN a-- 1-- 1---- G i N 0000 Table h.11 Summary of Studies Regarding H2S Exposure I # TITLE AUTHOR DATE DESCRIPTION CONCLUSIONS Rat Central Nervous System neurological symptoms, such as mental depression, irritability, poor memory, and fatigue. 15 Respiratory Effects of Chronic Hydrogen Sulfide Exposure David Richardson 1995 A cross-sectional study investigated whether the exposure of sewer workers to hydrogen sulfide (H2S) was associated with reduced lung function. • This study found evidence that chronic low level exposure to H2S may be associated with reduced lung function 16 Effects of repeated Exposures of Hydrogen Sulphide on Rat Hippocampal EEG B. Skrajny, R. Reiffenstein , R. Sainsbury, S. Roth 1996 The effects of low levels of H2S on electroencephalographic (EEG) activity in the hippocampus and neocortex were invetigated on the freely moving rat (Sprague -Dawley type). Rats were exposed to H2S (25, 50, 75, or 100 ppm) for 3 h/day; data was collected during the final 10 minutes of each exposure period. • The effects 'were found to be highly significant at all concentrations within subjects. • Neocortical EEG and LIA (Large Amplitude Irregular Activity) were unaffected. • The results demonstrated that repeated exposure to low levels of H2S can produce cumulative changes in hippocampal function and suggests selectivity of action of this toxicant. 17 Brain Damage Caused by Hydrogen Sulfide: A Follow -Up Study of Six Patients B. Tvedt, K. Skyberg, 0. Aaserud, A. Hobbesland , T. Mathiesen 1991 This study provides a description of six patients who lost consciousness due to H2S poisoning. • The symptoms varied from anosmia in the patient with the shortest but highest exposure to delayed neurological deterioration in the patient with the longest exposure. • The two patients with the most serious symptoms developed pulmonary edema, which may have prolonged the hypoxia. • The five patients who had been unconscious in H2S atmosphere from 5 to 20 minutes showed persisting impairment during subsequent neurological and neuropsychological re-examination. • Memory and motor function were most affected. 18 Sulfide Toxicity: Mechanical Ventilation and Hypotension Determine Survival Rate R. Baldelli, F. Green, R. Auer 1993 This study sought to determine whether sulfide can directly kill central nervous system neurons. Ventilated and unventilated rats were studied to allow administration of higher doses of sulfide and to facilitate • It was concluded that very -high doses of sulfide did not produce cerebral necrosis by a direct histrtoxic effect. N • 0 0 Table 2.11 Summary of Studies Regarding H2S Exposure # TITLE AUTHOR DATE DESCRIPTION CONCLUSIONS and Brain Necrosis physiological monitoring. j Occupational Exposure to hydrogen Sulfide in the Sour Gas Industry: Some Unresolved Issues Tee Guidotti 1994 This study provides a description of the unresolved issues regarding the H2S exposure and potential health concerns. • The acute effects of exposure to H2S are well recognized, but accurate exposure -response data are limited to acutely lethal effects, even in animal studies • Odor followed by olfactory paralysis and keroto-njunctivitis are the characteristic effects of H2S at lower concentrations. • Pulmonary edema is also a well-recognized acute effect of H2S toxicity. Human studies of sublethal exposure with satisfactory exposure assessment are almost nonexistent. • There are indications, poorly documented at present, of other chronic health problems associated'with H2S exposure including neurotoxicity, cardiac arrhythmia, and chronic eye irritation, but not cancer. 10 Chronic Exposure to Low Concentrations of Hydrogen Sulfide Produces Abnormal Growth in Developing Cerebellar Purkinje Cells R. Hannah and S. Roth 1990 In this study, the dendritic fields of developing cerebellar Purkinje cells were analyzed to determine the effects of chronic exposure to low concentrations of H2S during development. • Treatment with two concentrations (20 to 50 ppm) of H2S produced severe alterations in the architecture and growth characteristics of the Purkinje cell dendritic fields. • These findings suggest that developing neurons exposed to low concentrations of H2S are at risk of severe deficits. 1,1 i A Critical Review of the Literature on Hydrogen Sulfide an R. Beauchamp, J. Bus, J. Popp, C. Boreiko, D. Andejelkovi ch am r 1984 This study provides a detailed description on hydrogen sulfide toxicity. E 1111 M— • Hydrogen sulfide has been demonstrated to be toxic to a wide variety of animal species. The lethal concentrations have been adequately determined in laboratory experiments although actual concentrations are unknown in accidental human cases of toxic exposures. • The carcinogenic, teratogenic, and reproductive effects of H2S gas have not been studied. A long-term chronic study of sodium sulfide, which may have physiological effects similar to those of H2S, produced results. • H2S gas is highly toxic and can be rapidly fatal. It is both an irritant and asphyxiant. • It affects the nervous system and may cause paralysis of the respiratory center which usually results in death. — ---.. _tet 11111111_11111► Hermosa Beach Project Intted Risk Analysis Hermosa Beach Project InSd Risk Analysis 3.1 • Final Report CHAPTER 3 HAZARD AND FREQUENCY ANALYSIS 3.1 General Description of Hazard and Frequency Analysis The first substantial step in risk analysis is the definition of hazard scenarios. What can go wrong? Typical hazard scenarios include the release of a flammable gas due to the rupture of a vessel, a traffic accident involving the uncontrolled impact of a tanker truck against or by another vehicle, or a spill of gasoline or crude oil at a loading terminal due to the accidental severance of a loading hose. Many of these hazard scenarios can be characterizes by the initial conditions of the accident including the impact energy or amount of fluid released and the duration of the release. In the characterization of hazard scenarios, the first significant step in the risk analysis, is a semi -quantitative step involving the qualitative characterization of the hazard scenario or initiating accident and a quantitative characterization of its most important parameters such as impact energy, amount of fluid released, and duration. When will it happen? How often? The next step of the risk analysis, the frequency analysis, involves an estimation of the likelihood of occurrence of each of the different types of hazard scenarios identified. In risk analysis, it is customary to characterize frequencies of occurrence either on an annual basis, or on an incident basis. An example of an annual frequency of occurrence is 10 major spills per 100 years. An example of an event frequency of occurrence is that in 10% of tanker traffic accidents, a spill of the cargo fluid occurs. These frequencies of occurrence are generally based on empirical data available to the risk analyst and, generally, to the public. Empirical data sources on accident or accidental release frequencies include industry sources, public sources [21, 50], and results of other risk analyses in the public domain [4, 7]. When the frequency for the type of event being studied is not directly available from the data, it can be obtained utilizing analytical techniques such as fault tree analysis [2, 8]. In fault tree analysis, the frequency of occurrence of an event under study can be derived by considering the probabilistic relationships of more basic events that lead to its occurrence. Fortunately, for the current analysis, most of the frequencies required for the risk analysis are obtainable from publicly accessible empirical data. Naturally, the frequencies publicly available have to be adapted to the specific conditions and configurations of facilities under study. For example, although representative failure frequencies for all of the components of the production process facility are available, it is necessary to combine these frequencies to obtain an estimate of the likelihood of a failure of any part of the process facility. This process is described and documented subsequently. 27/8/98 BERCI-IA GROUP Hermosa Beach Project Incl!rated Risk Analysis 3.2 Final Report 3.2 Release Sizes The range of release sizes possible in an accidental release from the pipeline or process facility spans a full spectrum of release sizes from a small puncture to a full pipe bore severance or vessel rupture. In order to adequately characterize the spectrum of release sizes, the following representative flammable fluid accidental release orifice sizes summarized in Table 3.1 have been selected: • Leak -'/a" diameter orifice • Hole - 1" diameter orifice • Rupture - 6" diameter orifice In addition, in the case of a full pipeline rupture, the release can be predominately from one of the ruptured segments, if the other is relatively short, or from both segments in the instance that the rupture occurs near the center of the pipeline segment. In this work, it has been postulated that if the middle third of the segment fails, a double rupture scenario is modelled. When the outer third on either end fails, only single rupture behavior for this segment is modelled. 3.3 Gas Composition The typical gas composition for the process gas in the current project was obtained from chromatograph analysis of results and which have been simplified to give the typical gas composition shown in Table 3.2. In addition, of course, a component of hydrogen sulphide (H2S) of the maximum permissible level of 40 ppm or 0.004% (4 - 1,000's of a percent) were included in the modelling. 3.4 Hazard Scenario Nomenclature Because there was a large number of hazard scenarios, each having a relatively lengthy generic description, a code has been developed to characterize each hazard scenario uniquely. The code is best explained through illustration for a typical hazard scenario such as HB -T -P -H -N where: • The first two letters identify this project as Hermosa Beach • The second letter, in this case T, identifies phase of the project, Test Phase. In other characterizations, P stands for Production Phase, and E stands for existing facilities • The next letter, in this case H, characterizes the size of the release, in this case a hole. L, R, and DR stand for leak, rupture, and double rupture, respectively. • A final letter, which does not begin to appear in the scenarios until the consequence analysis part of the risk analysis process begins (Chapter 4), characterizes the conditions of the release, in this case N, signifying night. The other two principal conditions are D, for day, and W, for worst case. Astir 27/8/98 BERCIIA GROUP I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 1 I I I Hermosa Beach Project luted Risk Analysis 3.3 • Final Report Table 3.1 Release Size Characterization SCENARIO TYPE MOLE FRACTION (%) DESCRIPTION Leak • 1/4" diameter opening Hole • 1" diameter opening Rupture • • 6" diameter opening, or Guillotine type failure of pipeline occurring within the first and last sections along the length of the pipeline Double Rupture • Guillotine type failure of pipeline occurring within the middle section along the length of the pipeline ASPEN Table 3.2 Typical Gas Composition COMPONENT MOLE FRACTION (%) Oxygen 0.01 Carbon Dioxide 4.14 Nitrogen 0.01 Methane 93.61 Ethane 1.86 Propane 0.09 i - Butane 0.10 n - Butane 0.07 i - Pentane 0.04 n - Pentane 0.00 Hexane 0.09 TOTAL 100.00 208 BERCIIA GROUP Hermosa Beach Project Int�ated Risk Analysis 3.4 Final Report 3.5 Test Phase Hazard and Frequency Analysis The test phase consists of four principal physical components capable of posing hazards to the public: • Well drilling and production operations • Oil and gas processing • Oil storage • Oil trucking Table 3.3 shows the hazard scenarios selected to represent the range of hazards posed by these four components. The frequency of well blowouts has been estimated through the analysis of data provided by the Department of Conservation of California [19]. Through the analysis of relevant data, it has been concluded that drilling well blowouts may occur at the rate of 3.3 x 104 per well drilled, giving the resultant rate for 3 wells of 9.9 x 10-4. As these 3 wells are proposed to be drilled in the one year of operation of the test phase, this frequency for blowouts associated with 3 drilled wells is also the annual frequency for the blowout scenario. For the test phase process release, because at this level, the entire process segment was considered to be interconnected but isolatable with emergency shutdown valves (ESDV) at the inlet and outlet, all of the equipment and piping have been included with potential to contribute fluids to the occurrence of an accidental release. Table 3.4 summarizes the equipment and inventory for the test phase, obtained from the piping and instrumentation diagrams [39]. Failure frequencies based on published data [21, 25] for the equipment types as well as the unit frequencies associated with the wells, are summarized in Table 3.5. Equipment for both the test phase and the production phase has been included in the summary of frequencies in order to avoid repetition of the table in the production phase frequency computation description. Table 3.6 summarizes the frequencies for equipment failures associated with the test phase as well as the resultant frequencies for each of the four principal scenarios. The final scenario, HB -T -P -E is associated with a release due to the pressure relief system which results in venting to the flare system. The failure frequency for atmospheric storage vessels, the temporary oil storage tanks onsite is also included in Table 3.5. Finally, an estimate of the accident frequencies associated with trucks has been generated based on published date [20, 31, 49], giving a casualty related tanker road accident frequency of 9.0 x 10'8/truck-mile, and an onsite loading major spill accident frequency of 4.0 x 10"5 per trip. Table 3.7 summarizes the scenarios and their characteristics as well as appropriate frequencies of occurrence for the entire test phase. 3.6 Production Phase Hazard and Frequency Analysis The principal components of the production phase of the project are as follows: 27/8/98 BERCf1A GROUP 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Hermosa Beach Project I>ed Risk Analysis 3.5 •� Final Report Table 3.3 Test Phase Hazard Scenarios SCENARIO DESCRIPTION HB -T -W -D -BO Well blowout while drilling -3 wells HB -T -P -L Leak within process unit with inlet and outlet ESDV HB -T -P -H Hole within process unit with inlet and outlet ESDV HB -T -P -R Rupture within process unit with inlet and outlet ESDV HB -T -P -E Emergency release using emergency vent stack HB -T -TL -A Tanker truck loading accident HB -T -TR -A Tanker truck fatality road accident within /z mile of site HB -T -S -H Oil storage tank failure 20/8/98 BERCIIA GROUP Hermosa Beach Project lifted Risk Analysis 3.6 • Final Report Table 3.4 Test Phase Major Equipment Inventory EQUIPMENT FLAMMABLE HYDROCARBON DESCRIPTION COMPONENT CODE NUMBER a) Pressure Columns (vertical vessels) C 6 Gas / Oil b) Pressure Drums (horizontal vessels) D 1 Gas / Oil c) Heaters H 0 d) Process Piping NPS 4 (average) (Include Valves & Flanges) PP 800 ft Gas / Oil e) Pumps (centrifugal) Pc 4 Oil f) Pumps (reciprocating) Pr 0 g) Compressors (vane) Kc • 1 Gas h) Compressors (recip.) Kr 0 i) Emergency Vent Stack EVS 1 Gas j) Thermal Oxidizer TO 1 Gas k) Heat Exchangers E 0 1) Air -fin Coolers AC 0 m) Wells (oil) W 3 Gas / Oil n) Portable Tanks T 7 Oil o) Tanker Truck TT 1 Oil p) Drilling Rigs Rd 1 Gas / Oil q) Service Rigs Rs 1 Gas / Oil 20/8/98 BERG' GROUP 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Hermosa Beach Project In ed Risk Analysis 3.7 1111 Final Report Table 3.5 Summary of Equipment Failure Frequencies ITEM RELEASE TYPE FREQUENCY UNITS Well drilling Blowout 3.3 x 104 per well Producing well Blowout 4.0 x 10'5 per well -year Pressure Column (vertical vessel) Leak 8.9 x 10'5 per unit -year Hole 1.3 x 104 per unit -year Rupture 1.5 x 10'5 per unit -year Pressure Drum (horizontal vessel) Leak 8.9 x 10'5 per unit -year Hole 1.3 x 104 per unit -year Rupture 1.5 x 10'5 per unit -year Heater Leak 8.7 x 104 per unit -year Hole 2.2 x 10'4 per unit -year Rupture 1.0 x 104 per unit -year Process Piping Leak 3.5 x 10'6 per ft -year Hole 8.6 x 10'' per ft -year Rupture 4.0 x 104 per ft -year Valve Leak 6.1 x 104 per unit -year Hole 1.5 x 104 per unit -year Rupture 1.1 x 104 per unit -year. Flange Leak 3.7 x 104 per unit -year Hole 9.8 x 10'5 per unit -year Rupture 3.3 x 10'5 per unit -year Pump (centrifugal) Leak 2.5 x 10'2 per unit -year Hole 1.3 x 10'' per unit -year Rupture 1.1 x 10-4 per unit -year Compressor (centrifugal) Leak 1.7 x 10'2 per unit -year Hole 8.4 x 10-4 per unit -year Rupture 1.0 x 104 per unit -year Compressor (reciprocating) Leak 6.1 x 104 per unit -year Hole 3.3 x 10'2 per unit -year Rupture 1.3 x 10'2 per unit -year 20/8/98 (table continued) BERCI-IA GROUP Hermosa Beach Project 1nated Risk Analysis 3.8 • Final Report Table 3.5 (continued) Summary of Equipment Failure Frequencies ITEM RELEASE TYPE UNITS Emergency Vent Stack _ Release 1 per unit -year Thermal Oxidizer Leak 8.7 x 10'5 per unit -year Hole 2.2 x le per unit -year Rupture 1.0 x 10'5 per unit -year Heat Exchanger (shell side) Leak 5.8 x 10'3 per unit -year Hole 6.8 x 10.3 per unit -year Rupture 6.8 x l0'3 per unit -year Air -Fin Cooler Leak 3.5 x 10'3 per unit -year Hole 8.6 x 104 per unit -year Rupture 4.0 x 104 per unit -year Tank Leak 1.5 x 10'2 per unit -year Hole 9.6 x 10'5 per unit -year Rupture 6.0 x 10"6 per unit -year Portable Tank Leak 3.0 x 10'2 per unit -year Hole 1.9 x 104 per unit -year Rupture 1.2 x 10'5 per unit -year Tanker Truck Leak 3.5 x 10'3 per unit -year Hole 1.2 x 10'3 per unit -year Rupture 1.2 x 10"3 per unit -year Gas Pipeline Leak 1.0 x 10'3 per unit -year Hole 2.9 x 104 per unit -year Rupture 6.8 x 10" 5 per unit -year Double Rupture 2.9 x 10"5 per unit -year Oil Pipeline Leak 7.2 x 10"3 per unit -year Hole 2.5 x 10'3 per unit -year Rupture 1.9 x 104 per unit -year 20/8/98 BFRCU1A GROUP 1 1 I M— — I MI E E M r N all r i OM MI M MI MI Table 3.6 Test Phase Failure Frequency Estimates for Process Equipment CASE PRESSURE VESSELS PROCESS PIPING (ft) VALVES / FLANGES(CENTR.) PUMPS COMPR. (CENTR.) EMERG. VENT STACK THERMAL OXIDIZER RESULTANT HB -T -P -L (7) 6.2 x 104 (800) 2.8 x 10 1.4 x 10 (4) 1.0 x 10"' (1) 1.7 x 10.2 (1) 4.5 x 10"5 1.2 x 10 HB -T -P -H (7) 9.1 x 104 (800) 6.9 x 104 3.6 x 10 (4) 5.2 x 10 (1) 8.4.x 104 (1) 5.3 x 10 1.1 x 10-2 HB -T -P -R (7) 1.1 x 104 (800) 3.2 x 10-4 1.9 x 10"3 (4) 4.0 x 104 (1) 1.0 x 104 (1) 5.3 x 10.5 2.9 x 10-3 HB -T -P -E (1) 1 1.0 x 10° 1 0000 el Table 3.6 Test Phase Failure Frequency Estimates for Process Equipment s re — 11111 E 6111 11111 N 6111 MI 1111 M i i N MN NB f 1161— M E r UM i- NS i 6 i r-! Mr - e-- MI F Table 3.7 Test Phase Hazard Scenarios and Frequencies SCENARIO DESCRIPTION CONTENTS P/T (psia/°F) MAX RATE (Ib/min) DURATION (min) FREQUENCY (N/yr) HB -T -W -D -BO Well blowout while drilling -3 wells Gas 65/85 10.8 N/A 9.9 x 10"' HB -T -P -L Leak within process unit with inlet and outlet ESDV Gas -4080 ft3 65/85 2.1 581 1.2 x 10.1 HB -T -P -H Hole within process unit with inlet and outlet ESDV Gas -4080 ft3 65/85 33 36 1.1 x 104 HB -T -P -R Rupture within process unit with inlet and outlet ESDV Gas -4080 ft3 65/85 1181 1 2.9 x 10"3 HB -T -P -E Emergency release using emergency vent stack Gas -4080 ft3 65/85 131 9 1 HB -T -TL -A Tanker truck loading accident Crude oil atm 10.0 n/a 5.0 x 10"-- HB -T -TR -A Tanker truck public fatality road accident within' mile of site Crude oil atm - n/a 1.4 x 104 HB -T -S -H Oil storage tank failure Crude oil atm - n/a 2.1 x 10.' w 0 • v z Hermosa Beach Projectated Risk Analysis 3.11 Final Report • Well drilling and production operations • Oil and gas process equipment • Oil storage • Gas pipeline • Oil pipeline Table 3.8 summarizes the hazard scenarios associated with each of the principal components described above. The frequency of drilling well blowouts is 3.3 x 10-4 per well drilled, giving the resultant rate for 27 wells of 8.9 x 10'3. That of well blowouts while producing is 4.0 x 1(15 per well -year, giving the resultant rate for 30 wells of 1.2 x 10"3 per year. The characterization of hazard scenarios is done in a manner similar to that for the test phase. Table 3.9 gives a summary of the principal equipment items, pipelines, and wells associated with the production phase. Based on the unit frequencies described for the test phase, and identified in Table 3.5, a summary of the failure frequencies for process equipment for the production phase shown in Table 3.10. Table 3.11 shows a summary of the hazard scenarios, their characteristics, and associated frequencies for all components and scenarios for the production phase. 3.7 Existing Facilities While the existing facilities store a number of hazardous substances on site, the only substance stored with potential offsite effects is the propane. In addition, a substantial amount of vehicle traffic is associated with the existing facilities, and these have been characterized as an additional scenario with the potential for casualties to the public resulting from traffic accidents. Specifically, hazards associated with 50 vehicle round trips within 1/2 mile of the site have been included. The test phase hazard scenarios, their characteristics, and their frequencies are summarized in Table 3.12. 28/8/98 BERCI-IA GROUP 111110 Hermosa Beach Project 1)!!!!rated Risk Analysis 3.12 Final Report I I 1 1 ,ASPEN Table 3.8 Production Phase Hazard Scenarios SCENARIO DESCRIPTION HB -P -W -D -BO Well blowout while drilling 27 wells - at 10 wells per year HB -P -W -P -BO Well blowout during production - 30 wells HB -P -P -L Leak within process unit with inlet and outlet blocked -in HB -P -P -H Hole within process unit with inlet and outlet blocked -in HB -P -P -R Rupture within process unit with inlet and outlet blocked -in HB -P -PG -L Leak of gas pipeline HB -P -PG -H Hole in gas pipeline HB -P -PG -R Rupture of gas pipeline HB -P -PG -DR Double rupture of gas pipeline HB -P -S -L Storage tank failure HB -P -PO -L Leak of oil pipeline HB -P -PO -H Hole in oil pipeline HB -P -PO -R Rupture of oil pipeline 26/8/98 BERCIIA GROUP Hermosa Beach Project Int( )ted Risk Analysis 3.13 Final Report Table 3.9 Production Phase Major Equipment Inventory ASPEN 20/8/98 BFRCIIA GROUP t 1 1 EQUIPMENT FLAMMABLE HYDROCARBON COMPONENT CODE NUMBER DESCRIPTION CODE 1) PIPELINES a) NPS 6 gas pipeline GP 2500 ft Process Gas PG b) NPS 6 oil pipeline OP 2500 ft Process Oil PO 2) FACILITY SITE a) Pressure Columns (vertical vessels) C 10 Raw Gas / Oil / Process Gas / NGL RG / OIL / PG / NGL b) Pressure Drums (horizontal vessels) " D 4 Raw Gas / Oil / Process Gas RG / OIL / PG / NGL c) Heaters H • 3 Raw Gas / Oil / Process Gas RG / OIL / PG d) Process Piping NPS 4 (average) (Include Valves & Flanges) PP 1200 ft Raw Gas /Oil / Process Gas / NGL RG / OIL / PG / NGL e) Pumps (centrifugal) Pc 8 Oil OIL f) Pumps (reciprocating) Pr 0 g) Compressors (vane) Kc 1 Gas GAS h) Compressors (recip.) Kr 1 Process Gas PG i) Thermal Oxidizer TO 1 Gas GAS j) Heat Exchangers E 1 Process Gas PG k) Air -Fin Coolers AC 3 Process Gas PG 1) Wells (production) W 30 Gas / Oil GAS / OIL m) Tanks T 3 Oil OIL n) Drilling Rigs o) Service Rigs Rd Rs 1 1 Gas / Oil Gas / Oil GAS / OIL GAS / OIL ASPEN 20/8/98 BFRCIIA GROUP t 1 1 11111 111111 111111 M M all i EN ---- i- ! s all Table 3.10 Production Phase Failure Frequency Estimates for Process Equipment CASE PRESSURE VESSELS IIEATER PROCESS PIPING (fl) VALVES/ FLANGES PUMPS (CENTR.) COMPR. (CENTR.) COMPR. (ItECIP.) THERM. OXID. HEAT EXCII. AIR FIN COOLERS RESULT. HO -P -P -L (14)1.2x10'3 (3)2.6x10'3 (1200)4.2x10'3 3.9x10'2 (8)2.Ox104 (1)1.7x10'2 (1)6.1x10'' (1)8.7x10'` (1)5.8x10'3 (3)1.0x10'2 8.9x10.1 HB -P -P -H (14) 1.8 x 104 (3) 6.6 x 104 (1200)1.0 x 104 9.9 x 104 (8) 1.0 x 10"2 (1) 8.4 x 104 (1) 3.3 x 10'2 (1) 2.2 x 10'3 (1) 6.8 x 10'3 (3) 2.6 x 104 6.5 x 104 lilt -P -P -R (14)2.1x104 (3)3.Ox104 (1200)4.8x10'' 5.7x10'3 (8)8.8x10' (1)1.0x104 (I) 1.3x10'2 (1)I.Ox104 (1)6.8x10'3 (3)1.2x10'3 2.9x10"2 EIKPF °en Hermosa Beach Project. ted Risk Analysis • 0000 eAen Table 3.11 Production Phase Hazard Scenarios and Frequencies SCENARIO DESCRIPTION CONTENTS P/T (psia/°F) MAX RATE (Ib/min) DURATION (min) FREQUENCY (N/yr) HB -P -W -D -BO Well blowout while drilling - 27 wells over three years Gas 65/85 10.8 N/A 5.0 x l0' HB -P -W -P -BO Well blowout during production - 30 wells Gas 65/85 10.8 N/A 1.47 x 10'- HB -P -P -L Leak within process unit with inlet and outlet blocked -in Gas 65/85 2.7 360 8.9 x 10'1 HB -P -P -H Hole within process unit with inlet and outlet blocked -in Gas 65/85 44 167 6.5 x 104 HB -P -P -R Rupture within process unit with inlet and outlet blocked -in Gas 65/85 1570 4.6 2.9 x 10'2 IIB -P -PG -L Leak of gas pipeline Gas 120/62 3.9 60 5.0 x 104 HB -P -PG -H Hole in gas pipeline Gas 120/62 62 3.2 1.5 x 104 HB -P -PG -R Rupture of gas pipeline Gas 120/62 914 0.2 3.4 x 10'5 HB -P -PG -DR Double rupture of gas pipeline Gas 120/62 • 1828 0.1 1.5 x 10'5 HB -P -S -L Storage tank failure Gas atm - - 4.5 x 10'2 HB -P -PO -L Leak of oil pipeline Gas - - - 3.6 x 10'' HD -P -PO -H Hole in oil pipeline Gas - - - 1.3 x 10'' HB -P -PO -R Rupture of oil pipeline Gas - - - 1.0 x 104 Hermosa Beach Project Int ted Risk Analysis 1111 1111 1111 MI 1111 NB i M! 11111 s— --! MI— S 11111 N MN NM OM 1111 I E I S 11111 1111 IIMI 11111 MI 1111 S NM 1 UM na 1 03 tii 0175 OM Cs ei Table 3.12 Existing Facilities Hazard Scenarios and Frequencies SCENARIO DESCRIPTION CONTENTS P/T (psia/°F) MAX RATE (lb/min) DURATION (min) FREQUENCY (N/yr) HB -X -L Leak of propane vessel Propane 200/65 6.6 5.0 1.0 x 104 HB -X -H Hole in propane vessel Propane 200/65 105 1.6 1.5 x 104 HB -X -R Rupture of propane vessel Propane 200/65 946 0.02 4.0 x 104 HB -X -T Vehicle public fatality road accident within 1/2 mile of site - _ - - 1.0 x 10' Hermosa Beach Project 1 ted Risk Analysis w `a MN ER! a- E M M I S UM E= E N- OM i E 1 1 Hermosa Beach Project feted Risk Analysis 4.1 III P9804 - Final Report CHAPTER 4 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS 4.1 General Description of Consequence and Risk Analysis What happens after the initial accidental release? What consequences evolve? Fire, explosions, toxic clouds? What are their relative chances of occurrence? These questions are answered through consequence analysis. The primary components of consequence analysis are source and dispersion, fire and explosion, and effect or damage models. Source and dispersion models provide quantitative information on release rates and vapour cloud concentrations or spill characteristics and geometries. The ground level concentrations of toxic components of a gas cloud are used as basis for toxic hazard evaluation. Fire and explosion models convert the geometric and concentration data into hazard potentials such as thermal radiation and explosion overpressure levels. Effect or damage criteria are applied to incident -specific results to estimate casualty levels for workers or the public. Additional accuracy can be added by including consideration of mitigating factors such as sheltering, evacuation, protective gear, which reduce the magnitude of potential effects for the incidents considered. A combination of the results of consequence analysis with frequencies of releases and their probable behavior within the situational context (e.g. probability of ignition in an urban setting) together with appropriate lethality criteria and population distributions leads to the quantification of risks. Various measures of risk may be utilized, ranging from annual risk to specific individuals (ISR) to total project risk spectra characterizing fatality or injury expectations over the full life of the project. 4.1.1 Consequence Event Overview A schematic of the evolution of consequences associated with potential hazard scenarios for a flammable, toxic hydrocarbon release is presented in Figure 4.1. As may be seen, the hazard scenarios begin with the release of a flammable hydrocarbon which can be a gas, liquid, or a mixture of both. Liquid releases have been differentiated into high vapour pressure NGLs and low vapour pressure condensates because each class of liquid hydrocarbon behaves differently when released to the atmosphere. Following the release, the hazard scenario schematic shows releases which do not ignite but can result in toxic or environmental hazards. Finally, if the flammable hydrocarbon ignites, different types of fires or explosions can occur. ,LtSIDEN 27/8/98 BERCIIA GROUP FLAMMABLE HYDROCARBON RELEASE LIQUID Natural Gas Liquids (from Vapour Pressure, e.g. NGL, Prop, Butane) Condensate (Low Vapour Pressure, e.g. Gasoline, Crude Oil) TOXIC HAZARD NO IGNITION NO IGNITION IGNITION • JET • FLASH • POOL • BLEVE FIRES Thermal Radiation Contact (Immediate Ignition) (Delayed Ignition) (Condensate or Cold Butane)or Butane Bullet) (Fireball from large Propane 1. UVCE (Delayed Ignition) 2. BLEVE (Overpressure) 3. CVCE (Major Explosion) 4. Physical Explosion Figure 4.1 MN I M r NM OM w I= ,--11101,,PriMenliiii N MI RIB r uodad l mJf.1 - f,096d M i M 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 t 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Hermosa Beach Project In�ted Risk Analysis 4.3 IIIP9804 - Final Report 4.1.2 Analysis of Consequence Evolution Using Event Trees Event trees are networks which illustrate and characterize the evolution of consequences from a given event. They are the opposite of fault trees, which illustrate and characterize the convergence of events leading to a given resultant. A typical event tree showing possible outcomes of a flammable hydrocarbon release is shown in Figure 4.2. As may be seen, the trunk of the event tree on the left side gives the initiating event, the occurrence of an accidental release, and its probability of occurrence for representative release sizes. The numbers are hypothetical. Following this initial event, moving toward the right, a series of bifurcations show alternative consequences together with their relative probability of occurrence given as a fraction. On the far right side is given the Ratio of Occurrence (ROO) for each of the possible outcomes. The ratio of occurrence was obtained by sequentially multiplying the conditional probabilities of occurrence along the path leading to the outcome under consideration. Clearly, these ratios should add to unity. Multiplication of the ROO for any outcome by the frequency of the initiating event gives the frequency of that outcome. Thus, for example, the frequency of occurrence of a jet fire from a rupture- (R) is given as 10 /year x .12 or 1.2 x 104/year or approximately once in 10,000 years. 4.1.3 Damage Criteria Quantitative measures of acute damage criteria were given in Chapter 2. As a summary, the following effect levels are used here: • Flash fire flame boundary • Jet fire thermal isopleths of 2, 4, and 8 kW/ft2 • Explosion overpressure levels of 0.3, 1.0, and 3.0 psi • Acute toxic H2S GLC of 100 ppm for 30 min. (IDLH-new) 4.1.4 Consequence Modelling Process Modelling of source, dispersion, and fire and explosion characteristics of the releases described in the previous chapter was accomplished utilizing a multi- purpose hazard and consequence analysis computer program called TRACE [44]. TRACE is a Windows 95/NT based multipurpose chemical release hazard and consequence evaluation model. Because of its state -of -art visual basic features in a Windows environment with full graphics capability the model is efficient and highly productive in the hands of a knowledgeable, modeller. Its repertoire includes the following capabilities: • Estimating the discharge rate and duration of a gas or liquid release from a vessel or pipeline 2718198 BERCt1A GROUP 199 L H R Hazard Probability pr (releases/yr) 1 Ignition Ignition H 010 1 R 0.60 IINSIMattomf :425001110 1.00E-04: L H R No Ignition glagagOina 0; A• 0.40 .. R L H R Timing Immediate 0)20 0.20 Delayed LEGEND L Leak ' '',, ti • = H Hole 1 , . i . (1 c hole) �� R Rupture : ' '(one end discharging) Figure 4.2 Typical Event Tree L H R (Consequence Jet Fire QQ 1t00r 1.00 Flash Fire Ratio of Occurrence Jet Fire H R Dispersion StatiroatiV ;1,00; 1:00 Dispersion 1111111 _ MN NW NEI I_ _ — MN SIN — MI 1lillll1 all — NMI _ 11111* Hermosa Beach Project lilted Risk Analysis 4.5 III P9804 - Final Report • Estimates the size of any liquid pools that may form on the ground or within the offshore facility • The rate at which a liquid pool will evaporate or boil and the duration of these phenomena until the point in time that the pool is depleted • The size of the downwind hazard zone within the facility topology or on the sea for given wind and atmospheric parameters • The thermal radiation hazards resulting from an ignition of a flammable or combustible pool of liquid • The size of the downwind area that may be subjected to flammable, explosive, or toxic concentrations of gases or vapours in air due to the release of a gas or vapour • The maximum weight of potentially explosive gas or vapour in air that occurs during a release incident. • The consequences of an explosion arising from the internal overpressurization of a sealed or inadequately vented tank due to external heating or internal reaction • The consequences of an explosion arising from ignition of a true explosive material in the solid or liquid state. • Explosion modelling by both TNO multi -energy and Baker Strehlow Methodologies • Full dispersion modelling capability including inertia, buoyancy, and multicomponent gas or fluid mixtures • Isopleths for selected damage criteria for toxic, thermal, or overpressure effects • Risk evaluation for specified population distributions 4.1.5 Consequence Model Results The modelling tools utilized for the assessment of the immediate consequences of flammable hydrocarbon releases were used to quantify the following principal hazard parameters: • Downwind distances and widths of multicomponent gas cloud ground level concentrations (GLC), as well as associated vertical and horizontal sections. • Downwind distance and width of various upper and lower flammability limits and associated thermal radiation levels upon ignitions • Radii of a range of overpressure levels (1 to 3 psi) associated with uncontained vapour cloud explosions • Length and width of jet fires and associated thermal radiation levels • Diameters of fireballs and associated ranges of harmful thermal radiation levels 27/8/98 BERCI-IA GROUP 410 Hermosa Beach Project Ited Risk Analysis 4.6 0 P9804 - Final Report 4.2 Selection of Representative Atmospheric Conditions The dispersion behavior of a gas release is dependent on atmospheric conditions prevailing during the release. Specifically, the geometry cif the vapour cloud concentration depends on the wind direction and velocity and the prevailing atmospheric stability class. Atmospheric stability classes are categorized on a scale of 1 to 7, or the letters A to G, ranging from the most unstable for 1 or A to the most stable for 7 or G. In consonance with this, wind direction and intensity data are reported for each of the stability classes as well as in summaries for the unstable (A, B, C) and stable (E, F, G) classes. For the present study, three representative conditions were considered and the consequence analysis was carried out accordingly. These representative conditions are as follows: • Unstable (Classes A, B, and C) with a mean wind speed of 3 m/s • Stable (Classes E, F, and G) with a mean wind speed of 2 m/s • Worst case (Class G) with a mean wind speed determined through sensitivity analysis for each characteristic release size For the purposes of the present study, the atmospheric worst case was deemed to be the atmospheric condition conducive to the highest ground level concentration over the largest distance from the sources for each of the characteristic release sizes. This worst case condition was assessed by studying the dispersion patterns for each of the characteristic release sizes for a range of wind velocities between 0 and 1 m/s for the most stable atmospheric class (Class G). Table 4.1 summarizes the results of these sensitivity studies for each of the characteristic release scenarios. The worst case condition for each case is highlighted. It can be seen that for the leak and hole releases, the worst case wind velocity is 0.05 m/s, or almost still air. While, for the rupture conditions, a higher wind velocity of 0.25 m/s was identified as that associated with the worst case or largest ground level concentration footprint conditions. As indicated above, the table only gives the salient results of the sensitivity analysis. Figure 4.3 shows examples of the graphic output from the TRACE program showing the full vertical profile and horizontal plan of dispersion isopleth for the worst case Hole conditions at 25.36 minutes. The dispersion isopleth modelled here is that from a horizontal, ground level jet release of a multicomponent gas mixture characteristic of the process gas from the Hermosa Beach Oil Project. For subsequent steps in the risk analysis, it is also necessary to estimate the probability of occurrence associated with the worst case condition as well as the representative stable and unstable conditions. Figure 4.4 shows the cumulative probability distribution function for wind intensity between 0 and 2 m/s, estimated by plotting the wind intensity data for Redondo Beach for the Class G most stable conditions. From this CDF, it follows that the probability of wind speeds less than 0.1 m/s is approximately 10%, and that of wind speeds between 0.1 and 0.2 m/s is also approximately 10%. 27/8/98 BERCHA GROUP 1 A a 1 1 1 t 1 1 1 Hermosa Beach Project Inited Risk Analysis 4.7 • P9804 - Final Report Table 4.1 Summary of Meteorology Sensitivity Study CASE STAB. CLASS WIND v (m/s)FOOTPRINT TIME OF MAX (min) SIZE (ft) 50000 ppm LENGTH WIDTH Rupture HB -P -P -R -W G 2.5 1.08 120 13 2.0 1.25 14 14 1.0 1.08 220 25 0.5 2.17 260 30 0.25 4.34 280 50 0.10 4.34 170 60 0.05 5.43 140 75 Hole HB -P -P -H -W . G 2.5 23.43 110 1.7 2.0 39.30 110 2.5 1.0 • 23.43 120 3.0 0.5 23.45 95 5 0.25 23.53 70 7 0.10 16.24 110 12 0.05 25.36 160 16 Leak HB -P -P -H -W G SIZE (ft) 10,000 ppml L W 3.0 5.0 0 0 2.0 5.0 30 1.6 0.25 5.0 50 4.6 0.05 10.0 100 10 A GLC of 50,000 ppm does not occur for the leak. ASPEN 27/8/98 BERCf1A GROUP 4111 Hermosa Beach Project Kited Risk Analysis 4.8 P9804 - Final Report Asurs 50 40 30 20 10 0 - 10 -20 - 30 - 40 -• 500 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 Distance (ft) HBPPHW 25.36 min 10000.0 (ppm) 1 50000 (PP m) m) 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 40 30 F a, 20 a) 2 10 0 10000.0 (ppm) Distance (ft) HBPPHW 25.36 min Figure 4.3 Examples of TRACE Program Output 27/8/98 0 0 BFI2CIIA GROUP 1 1 1 1 a 1 1 1 t 1 1 r 1 1 1 50000.0 - 150000.0 (ppm) (ppm) i 0 50 100 150 11. 200 T111 250 .111 300 1111 3E Distance (ft) HBPPHW 25.36 min Figure 4.3 Examples of TRACE Program Output 27/8/98 0 0 BFI2CIIA GROUP 1 1 1 1 a 1 1 1 t 1 1 r 1 1 1 — OM NM I -. A M j M is -. we sok um MO M i 100 90 - 80 - 70 - 60 - 50 - 40 - 30 - 20 10 A 1► Worst Case for Rupture A 10 Worst Case for Leak and Hole 0 .10 .25 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3.5 Figure 4.4 Wind Velocity CDF for Class G Stability 4 4.5 5 Hermosa Beach Project In1L. ted Risk Analysis uodad jou& -17O96d III Hermosa Beach Project Iced Risk Analysis 4.10 P9804 - Final Report In the probability analysis discussed in Chapter 5, the worst case was accordingly taken to occur 10% of the time while the balance of the time was equally distributed between stable (night) and unstable (day) conditions. 4.3 Effects of Topography and Buoyancy The risk assessment described in this report was largely carried out on the basis of the most conservative release type, which gives the highest and most extended ground level concentrations. This release type is a jet or blowdown release in a horizontal direction at ground level. In fact, the majority of the releases associated with the process facilities are likely to be somewhat elevated above ground level, generally up to several feet, since the process piping and equipment are usually installed on supports to maintain them above the grade. When a horizontal jet release of a gas lighter than air (such as the current multicomponent mixture which is approximately ' the density of air) occurs from an elevated source above the ground, the effects of buoyancy are much more pronounced than for the case of ground level releases. Typical elevated releases for the process phase were modelled and compared to ground level releases for the leak, hole, and rupture, respectively, as shown in Figure 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7. By considering that these releases could occur in the easterly direction, the direction of a gradual rise in the terrain, the effects of topography can be graphically viewed by comparing the release geometry to the topographic cross-section superimposed on each of the release vertical profiles. As can be seen, the release rise for the elevated source is steep enough that topography is unlikely to result in an accentuation of the ground level concentrations. For the ground level horizontal releases, similarly, the vertical concentration isopleths are high and steep enough as they approach the ground that the variation in topography experienced on the maximum gradient side (east) are also unlikely to significantly alter the results. 4.4 Test Phase Consequence Analysis 4.4.1 Test Phase Consequence Evolution Event Trees Figure 4.8 shows the consequence evolution event tree associated with releases from the test phase process component and wells. As may be seen, the event tree gives the initial release frequency for leaks, holes, and ruptures, and as described in Section 4.1.2, gives the evolution of consequences moving from left to right, ultimately providing the Ratio of Occurrence (ROO) of each of the possible outcomes of the release. These values of ROO are utilized subsequently in the risk analysis described in Chapter 5 to obtain the next measures of risk associated with each of the release scenarios. Asrts 27/8/98 BERCIIA GROUP 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 r1 1 1 1 r t 1 1 f t i 1 r i 1 Hermosa Beach Project Integrated Risk • Analysis 4.11 P9804 - Final Report 40 30 He igh t 20 (ft) 10 0 0 20 40 60 80 Distance (ft) Leak Elevated 40 30 He igh t 20 (ft) 10 1000.0 (ppm) 1000.0 (ppm) .11.w.' li1jJn 10000.0 (ppm) I I /— //Z. .iiiider/ W. 1000.0 (ppm) 20 40 60 80 Distance (ft) Leak Ground Level Figure 4.5 Elevated and Ground Level Release Profiles for Leak 27/8/98 I3"'IA GROUP .AJJ.v llhpI) 10000.0 (ppm) 20 40 60 80 Distance (ft) Leak Ground Level Figure 4.5 Elevated and Ground Level Release Profiles for Leak 27/8/98 I3"'IA GROUP Hermosa Beach Project Integrated Risk Analysis 4.12 • P9804 - Final Report 30 0 50 40 30 rn = 20 10 1000.0 (ppm) Distance (ft) Hole Elevated 1000.0 (ppm) 1 1 0 0 100 200 300 Distance (ft) Hole Ground Level Figure 4.6 Elevated and Ground Level Release Profiles for Hole 27/8/98 BERCFA GROUP 1 t 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 uuu.0 10000.0 (ppm) (ppm) F VALLEY• • ) 20 40 60 80 10012014016018 Distance (ft) Hole Elevated 1000.0 (ppm) 1 1 0 0 100 200 300 Distance (ft) Hole Ground Level Figure 4.6 Elevated and Ground Level Release Profiles for Hole 27/8/98 BERCFA GROUP 1 t 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 r 1 1 r 1 1 1 t 1 1 1 1 1 1 Hermosa Beach Project Intted •Risk Anal • 8 �s/s 4.13 P9804 - Final Report ASPEN 20 15 50 0 20 150 50 0 1000.0 (ppm) f - ,uuu.0 10000.0 uuuu. 10000.0 u ppm) (ppm) j _ /i ARDMORE - } W - c> x < w x < kiimi_ 200 400 600 0 200 400 600 800 1n( Distance (ft) Rupture Elevated 1000.0 (ppm) gam _ ,uuu.0 10000.0 ppm) (ppm) SITE VALLEY PATH ARDMORE kiimi_ 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 Distance (ft) Rupture Ground Level LJ 0 0 0 Figure 4.7 Elevated and Ground Level Release Profiles for Rupture 27/8/98 BECCIIA GROUP Probability of failure per year, Pr Ignition Timing Consequence Ratio of Occurrence ROO L H R ER Ignition ,Q Q 0`50 • 0.30 ". ;.0.05 .. ;i> titailetS `IE;02:r ,ice Mw 40 y tr �.. iari"F9siE7! til 2.9E-03 Non Ignition Lttiqs H .1i4;? 0:50 R 0.70 Immediate L H R .. DR L H R ER 0.60 MVO* Jet Fire WOO Flash Fire L H` R ER. 00 ,X4.4440,10016 0.18 0.00. tifita09itin 94r:0.36441.. 0.75 0.75::• 0.40 .0.95 .., L H R ER Explosion ixo 01,50.25 0.09 • 0.04 gtomcklm 0.25. Dispersion 0.03 0.01" Oi90 LEGEND: ER 0.95, Leak014§, le" 1,+Q Hole44iat. M',t`cas±r1".,hole HAr. Rupture .. Emergency Release 6" rupture pipe to vent stack 4r1, 0:50 0.70 0.95 Figure 4.8 Event Tree - Process - Test Phase Hermosa Beach Project In7!0 ted Risk Analysis • b a z — — — —sms — a aop eso MI" am — am Ill on ! — — Hermosa Beach Project 1 ted Risk Analysis 4.15 . P9804 - Final Report 4.4.2 Consequence Model Results As indicated earlier, the consequence model is a multi-purpose physical modelling tool capable of estimating time -dependent liquid or gaseous (or both) releases into the environment. The model provides both tabular and graphic outputs as illustrated in Figure 4.9, 4.10, and 4.11, and Table 4.2. The salient results of the modelling of the key release scenario outcomes for the test phase are summarized in Table 4.3. As may be seen, for each of the scenarios and designated atmospheric conditions, the isopleths for flash fires, jet fires, and explosion overpressures are given. In addition, a weighted average value of these distances is also given primarily to provide perspective on the average expectation associated with each scenario. The precise distances and associated probabilities, however, are used in the actual calculations to be described in Chapter 5. The consequence modelling results, from left to right, can be characterized as follows for Table 4.3: • N, is the scenario number • The scenario code description as described in Section 3.4 • The release type specification in terms of release orifice • Process volume, pressure, and temperature in the release segment • The duration of the release from the time it occurs until the segment reaches atmospheric pressure • The maximum release rate which occurs at the initiation of the release • The meteorology and its relative probability in percent associated with each of the scenarios modelled • The maximum thermal isopleth distance for flash fires, which occur in a downwind direction from the facility • The maximum isopleth distance for different thermal isopleths for jet fires which can occur in any direction, depending on the release orientation • The maximum explosion overpressure isopleth distance for 3 different overpressure levels from the epicenter which is located downwind of the release as the explosion occurs from the ignition of a vapour cloud which moves in the direction of the wind • The entries for the table were generally obtained directly from the isopleth plots, for example, the HB -P -P -H -D flash fire thermal radiation isopleth illustrated in Figure 4.12 4.5 Production Phase Consequence Model Results 4.5.1 Production Phase Consequence Evolution Event Trees Figure 4.13 shows the consequence evolution event tree for the production phase pipeline. The event tree for the production phase process facilities is the same as that in Figure 4.5 for the test phase process facilities. ASPEN 28/8/98 BERCf1A GROUP Hermosa Beach Project In Risk Analysis 4.16 il • P9804 - Final Report 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 Mass Test Phase Asurs 0.2 0.4 0.6 Time (min) Figure 4.9 Tank Mass Blowdown Graph 28/8/98 0.8 1.0 1.2 BERCIIA GROUP Hermosa Beach Project Incited Risk Analysis 4.17 P9804 - Final Report ASIDES! 1902.0 (Btu/(hr.ft"2)) 10 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 Distance (ft) HB PR L Jet Fire Day Figure 4.10 Thermal Radiation Isopleths for Jet Fire 28/8/98 BERCIIA GROUP Hermosa Beach Project Ini ated Risk Analysis 4.18 Study HB T H Release Day Description HB T H Release Day Notes Type your notes here Created On 5:45:54 PM Revised On 10:40:03 AM Scenario selected for this study HB T H Meteorology selected for this study Hermosa Beach Day Isopleth limits selected for this Hermosa Beach Methane Limits study Simulation time Let the program decide (Automatic) Model flash fire Yes Model vapor cloud explosion Yes Time of ignition 240.0 (s) Surface radiation intensity 53889.6 (Btu/(hr.ft^2)) P9804 - Final Report 1 1 Summary of source characteristics Scenario type Tank Release duration 3600.0 (min) Padding pressure 14.7 (psi) Type of release Transient Release stieam condition Gas Maximum release rate 32.8 (lb/min) Release duration 36.3 (min) Occurance of flash No Pool formation No Evaluate dispersion isopleths at 0.0 (ft) height Averaging time 0.2 (min) Meander time 0.2 (min) isopleth limit (ppm) Maximum isopleth distance (ft) Maximum isopleth half width (ft) 10000.0 213.3 1.6 50000.0 213.3 1.3 150000.0 213.3 1.0 Downwind distance (ft) Peak meander concentration (PPm) Dose (ppm -min) Exposure time (min) 0.0 999993.5 2907789.0 36.4 0.0 999993.5 2907789.0 36.4 0.0 999993.5 2907789.0 36.4 0.0 999993.5 2907789.0 36.4 0.0 999993.5 2907789.0 36.4 0.0 999993.5 2907789.0 36.4 0.0 999993.5 2907789.0 36.4 0.0 999993.5 2907789.0 36.4 ,ASPEN Figure 4.11 Typical TRACE Tabular Output 28/8/98 BERCf1A GROUP 1 1 1 A 1 1 1 1 1 1 Hermosa Beach Project Inted Risk Analysis 4.19 • P9804 - Final Report 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Table 4.2 Tabular Output for Explosion Overpressures Explosion - Centerline values Distance (ft) Overpressure (psi) Impulse (psi -min) 52.0 0.9 0.002 83.4 0.7 0.001 114.8 0.5 0.001 146.1 0.4 0.001 177.5 0.3 0.001 208.8 0.3 0.001 240.2 0.2 0.001 271.6 0.2 0.001 302.9 0.2 0.0005 334.3 0.2 0.0004 365.7 0.2 0.0004 397.0 0.1 0.0004 428.4 0.1 0.0003 459.8 0.1 0.0003 491.1 0.1 0.0003 522.5 . 0.1 0.0003 553.9 0.1 • 0.0003 585.2 0.1 0.0003 616.6 0.1 0.0002 648.0 0.1 0.0002 679.3 0.1 0.0002 710.7 0.1 0.0002 742.0 0.1 0.0002 773.4 0.1 0.0002 804.8 0.1 0.0002 836.1 0.1 0.0002 867.5 0.1 0.0002 898.9 0.1 0.0002 930.2 0.1 0.0002 961.6 0.1 0.0002 993.0 0.1 0.0002 1024.3 0.1 0.0001 1055.7 0.1 0.0001 1087.1 0.1 0.0001 1118.4 0.1 0.0001 1149.8 0.1 0.0001 1181.2 0.1 0.0001 1212.5 0.05 0.0001 1243.9 0.05 0.0001 1275.2 0.05 0.0001 1306.6 0.05 0.0001 1338.0 0.04 0.0001 1369.3 0.04 0.0001 1400.7 0.04 0.0001 1432.1 0.04 0.0001 1463.4 0.04 0.0001 1494.8 0.04 0.0001 1526.2 0.04 0.0001 1557.5 0.04 0.0001 28/8/98 BERCI-IA GROUP tat/ eA Table 4.3 Summary of Consequence Modelling Results N Scenario Release Type V (It'] T[p Release [mini Max Release Rate [Ib/minj Meteorology Max Isopleth Distance [11) Max Isopleth Distance (ftj Max Isopleth Distance [ft] Flash Firesi], Thermal [Btu / hr ft2 Radiation Jet Fire Thermal Radiation [Btu / hr 112 Explosion Overpressure [psi) Class % 1902.0 3962.5 7924.9 1902.0 3962.5 7924.9 0.3 1.0 3.0 1 HB -P -PG -L -D Leak 1/4' Dia 260 120 62 50.9 3.9 B 45 4.5 2.1 1 10.9 10.4 9.3 0 0 0 2 HB -P -PG -L -N F 45 5.5 2.6 1.3 11.7 11 9.7 0 0 0 3 HB -P -PG -L -W W 10 49.1 46.6 45.1 14.4 13.2 11.1 0 0 0 Average 9.4 6.8 5.5 11.6 11.0 9.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 4 HB -P -PG -H -D Hole 1' Dia 3.2 62.4 B 45 7.7 3.6 2.6 35.1 31.8 28.5 0 0 0 5 HB-P•PG-H-N F 45 39.9 27.1 , 23.1 37.9 34.5 31.2 0 0 0 6 HB -P -PG -H -W W 10 102.6 74.2 54.5 47.8 44.1 40.2 0 0 0 Average 31.7 21.2 17.0 37.6 34.2 30.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 7 HB -P -PG -R -D Rupture 3.83' Dia 0.2 914.1 B 45 132.5 75.1 45.1 116.1 103.9 94.8 100.8 0 0 8 HB -P -PG -R -N F 45 132.8 80 55.2 124.9 112.7 103.4 100.8 0 0 9 HB -P -PG -R -W W 10 132.8 80 65.2 124.9 112.7 103.4 100.8 0 0 Average 132.7 77.8 50.7 120.9 108.7 99.5 100.8 0.0 0.0 10 H6 -P -PG -D -D Double Rupture 5.41' Dia Eq.Hole 0.1 1827.7 8 45 132 74.6 44.6 162.1 144.6 131.9 100.8 0 0 11 HB -P -PG -D -N F 45 127.6 75.6 52.4 174.4 156.7 144.1 100.8 0 0 12 HB -P -PG -D -W W 10 127.6 75.6 52.4 174.4 156.7 144.1 100.8 0 0 Average 129.6 75.2 48.9 168.9 151.3 138.6 100.8 0.0 0.0 13 HB -T -W -D -BO -D Blowout n/a 64.7 85 n/a 10.8 B 45 12.5 6 3 41 37 30 0 0 0 14 HB-T-WD-BO-NWell F 45 19 18 18 42 38 31 0 0 0 15 HB-T-W-D-BO•W W 10 122.2 116.5 113 48.6 42.9 32.1 0 0 0 Average 26.4 22.5 20.8 42.2 38.0 30.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 16 HB -T -P -L -D Leak i/4' Dia 4080 64.7 85 581.6 2.1 B 45 4.5 2.1 1 15 13.5 10.2 0 0 0 17 HB -T -P -L -N F 45 5.5 2.8 1.3 15.5 13.5 10 0 0 0 18 HB -T -P -L -W W 10 43.2 41 39.7 17.2 14.2 10 0 0 0 Average 8.8 6.3 5.0 15.4 13.6 10.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 Hermosa Beach Project 1rated Risk Analysis uodad !mild - 1,086d 11111 111111 11111 INN MI 11111 SIM SIP 11118111NI NW 1111'111111 1111 all 0* rod C = OP - MI M in d SS R I NM N 1111 MO NI M 411111 all IIIIII Table 4.3 Summary of Consequence Modelling Results (continued) N Scenario Release Type V [ft ] T[� Release [mini Max Release Rate [Ib/min] Meteorology Max Isopleth Distance [II) Max Isopleth Distance [It) Max Isopleth Distance [It] Flash Firesi). Thermal [Btu / hr 112 Radiation Jet Fire Thermal Radiation [Btu / hr Its Explosion Overpressure [psi) Class % 1902.0 3962.5 7924.9 1902.0 3962.5 7924.9 0.3 1.0 3.0 19 HB -T -P -H -D Hole 1' Dia 4080 64.7 85 36.3 32.8 8 45 47 38 38 31 29 26.5 0 0 0 20 HB -T -P -H -N F 45 68 65 65 33 31 28 0 0 0 21 HB -T -P -H -W W 10 121.7 97.2 81 40.8 38.3 33.6 0 0 0 Average 63.9 56.1 54.5 32.9 30.8 27.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 22 HB -T -P -R -D Rupture 6" Dia 1 1181 B 45 160 92 51 142 127 117 120 0 0 23 HB -T -P -R -N F 45 218 142 100 152 138 126 120 0 0 24 HB -T -P -R -W W 10 231 149.8 113.7 189.7 ' 173.9 161 120 0 0 Average 193.2 120.3 79.3 151.3 136.6 125.5 120.0 0.0 0.0 25 HB-T•P-E-D PSV 2' Dia 4080 64.7 85 9.1 131.2 B 45 50 32 23 54 49 44 0 0 0 26 HB -T -P -E -N F 45 62 43 38 58 53 48 0 0 0 27 HB -T -P -E -W W 10 180.1 136.6 106.7 72.9 67.9 61.8 0 0 0 Average 68.4 47.4 38.1 57.7 52.7 47.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 28 HB -P -P -L -D Leak360 1/4' Dia 16200 64.7 85 2.7 B 45 5 2.4 1 15 • 13.8 11 0 0 0 29 HB-P-P-L•N F 45 6.2 3 1.5 15.5 14 11 0 0 0 30 HB-P•P-L•W W 10 23.8 16.7 16.6 17.4 14.9 11 0 0 0 Average 7.4 4.1 2.8 15.5 14.0 11.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 31 HB-P-P-H•D Hole 1' Dia 167.2 43.6 B 45 13 6 3 46 44 38 0 0 0 32 HB-P-P-H•N F 45 16 7.5 3.5 49 45 38 0 0 0 33 HB•P-P-H-W W 10 129.1 102.7 81.1 56.2 50.9 40.6 0 0 0 Average 26.0 16.3 11.0 48.4 45.1 38.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 34 HB -P -P -R -D Rupturo 6' Dia 4 6 1571 B 45 150 90 55 160 145 130 120 0 0 35 HB•P-P-R•N F 45 200 155 155 170 156 141 120 0 0 36 HB -P -P -R -W W 10 317.5 224.3 159.7 208.9 192.2 176.9 120 0 0 Average 189.3 132.7 110.5 169.4 154.7 139.6 120.0 0.0 0.0 Hermosa Beach Project In ted Risk Analysis tlodad'Du& - 6086d Hermosa Beach Project fated Risk Analysis 4.22 • P9804 - Final Report Asurs 30 20 10 0 -10 - 20 1902.0 (Btu/(hr.ft' 2)) - 30 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 Distance (ft) HB PR H Jet Fire Day Figure 4.12 Isopleth Plot for HB -P -P -H -W 28/8/98 I3FRCIIA GROUP tti X11 eA 11111111 MIN all d— O Mk M r M i— 1— w OM= NM Probability of failure per year, Pr Ignition Timing Consequence Ratio of Occurrence ROO Ignition L estiolotse H4 R ER ;a g0 50P, ._" 0.30 0.30 3.4E-05 �h; �,�Fn�• :1:5E Non Ignition L Qi$ HAlt 050;; R 0.70 Immediate L H R ER 111219119114 Jet Fire zoltoientaz 0.60 H R ER gat 080, L H Flash Fire R ER 0.75 0.75 0.40 H R ER Explosion x;00 '47,44 0.10.'p) 0.18 0.18 0.09 0.09 SMIQUAft 4'w0.0.41t% 0.25 0.25' Dispersion 0.03 0.03 LEGEND: ER 0.70 Leak 0 251iFiole ari M Hole 4;7:„- Rupture a; Rupture 6" rupture Emergency Release ;''2' pipe;to vent stack. vela0159010 €ae€'+'0 50 0.70 0.70 Figure 4.13 Event Tree - Gas Pipeline - Using Point Source Method Hermosa Beach Project In ted Risk Analysis uodad Inuld- 17086d { Hermosa Beach Project Ir aced Risk Analysis 4.24 P9804 - Final Report 4.5.2 Production Phase Consequence Model Results Table 4.3 summarizes the salient results from the consequence modelling for the production phase. It is in the same format and protocol as the table described in the test phase. 4.6 Existing Facilities The event tree for the existing facilities consequence evolution is the same as that used for the test and production phase process facilities. The consequence model results for the existing facilities consequence modelling are given in Table 4.4. 4.7 Low-level H2S Ground Level Concentrations No acute damage H2S ground level concentrations were found to occur because the maximum source concentration modelled was 40 ppm, while the minimum acute damage criterion concentration is 100 ppm. However, low-level H2S .concentrations for leak, hole, and rupture releases were modelled in accordance with the mandate to study these in the present investigation. Table 4.5 summarizes the ground -level concentrations associated with representative stable atmospheric conditions and worst-case conditions for ground -level releases of the multi-component 40 ppm H2S gas mixture. Figures 4.14, 4.15, and 4.16 illustrate the H2S concentrations as a function of distance from the source associated with these low-level releases. ASPEN 27/8/98 BFRC1IA GROUP NM N i M N I S N all i I MN— E all I l S IS Table 4.4 Summary of Consequence Modelling Results for Existing Facilities N Scenario Release TypeT V fit) p [psi) �F] Release [min) Max Release Rate [lb/min] Meteorology Max Isopleth Distance [ft) Max Isopleth Distance [ft) Max Isopleth Distance [ft] Flash Fire, Thermal Radiation [Btu / hr ft2] Jet Fire, Thermal Radiation [Btu / hr ft) Explosion Overpressure [psi] Class 1997.1 3962.5 7924.9 1997.1 3962.5 7924.9 0.3 1.0 3.0 1 HB -X -L Leak 1/4' Dia 67 200 65 5 6.6 F 5 3 1 18 17 15 68 0 0 1 HB -X -H Hole 1" Dia 1.6 105 F 127 96 77 65 59 55 68 0 0 2 HB -X -R Rupture 3' Dia 0.02 946 F 127 96 • 77 175 158 145 68 0 0 • modal inuy - b086d Table 4.5 Summary of H2S Low Level GLC Scenario Release Type V [ft) p [psi] T �� Release [min] Max Release Rate [Ib/min] Down -wind Distance to GLC ft. [ ] 1 ppb 10 ppb 100 ppb HB-P-P-L-LL1/4" Leak Dia 16200 64.7 85 360 2.7 420 130 50 HB-P-P-H-LL1 Hole •Dia 16200 64.7 85 167.2 43.6 1850 530 170 HB -P -P -R -LL Rupture 6" Dia 16200 64.7 85 4.6 1571 2650 2300 600 Hermosa Beach Project ated Risk Analysis uodad luny - P086d 111111 — 111111 — — 11111 r — 81111 all — — — 11111 — — M r — 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Hermosa Beach Project Integ ated Risk Analysis 4.27 • P9804 - Final Report 40 30 20 10 0 -10 - 20 -30 - 40• 0 1 (ppb) S 10 (ppb) 100 (ppb) 3 0 100 200 300 400 Distance (ft) H2S Leak 4 min 1 (ppb) 0 500 Distance (ft) H2S Leak 4 min 0 Figure 4.14 H2S Concentration Plan and Profile for Process Leak 27/8/98 BMCI -1A GROUP ry INFWu1 100 (ppb) Alk- • 0 100 200 300 400 ,, 5o Distance (ft) H2S Leak 4 min 0 Figure 4.14 H2S Concentration Plan and Profile for Process Leak 27/8/98 BMCI -1A GROUP Hermosa Beach Project Integrated Risk Analysis 4.28 • P9804 - Final Report 200 100 0 -100 -200 120 100 80 a, 60 a, SIE 40 20 1 (ppb) - I" '11-'1-'14/ 100 (ppb) ,,,, 0 500 1,11 1000 VIII 1500 ,, 20 Distance (ft) H2S Hole 4 min 1 (ppb) 10 (ppb) 100 (ppb) 0 0 0 0 500 1000 1500 2000 Distance (ft) H2S Hole 4 min Figure 4.15 H2S Concentration Plan and Profile for Process Hole 27/8/98 BEQcnA GROUP t 1 1 1 1 1 1 Hermosa Beach Project Integrated Risk Analysis 4.29 P9804 - Final Report ort Y P 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 (ppb) 0 600 400 200 0 - 200 - 400 - 600 1 (ppb) _ , 10 10 ppb) (ppb) 0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 30 Distance (ft) H2S Rupture 4 min 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 300 200 rn = 100 0 0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 Distance (ft) H2S Rupture 4 min Figure 4.16 H2S Concentration Plan and Profile for Process Rupture 27/8/98 I3""A GROUP MIN NIB NM NM 11111 MI IN MI MI 11111 11111 NS 11111 1111 1111 • 1 Hermosa Beach Project IIated Risk Analysis 5.1 1 Final Report CHAPTER 5 UNMITIGATED RISK 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5.1 Risk Assessment Process 5.1.1 Summary of Risk Assessment Process The combination of the results of the consequence analysis with the frequencies of releases and their probable behavior as assessed utilizing event trees, together with appropriate lethality criteria and population distributions permits the quantification of risks. The principal steps in the quantification of risk may be summarized as follows: • Individual risk assessment • Definition of risk contours for facilities • Definition of risk transects for pipelines • Estimation of outside individual specific risk factors • Evaluation of individual specific risk • Evaluation of societal risk 5.1.2 Individual Risk Assessment Individual risk (IR) for a given location is defined as the probability that a normal adult individual will be killed if that individual remains outdoors continuously (24 hours a day, 365 days per year) at that location for one year. Individual risk, thus defined forms an upper bound to other measures of individual risk such as individual specific risk (ISR) or average individual risk (AIR). Any other measure of individual risk is likely to be lower due to the introduction of mitigating factors such as reduction in time spent at the location, sheltering through indoor time, use of protective gear, or evasive action. The upper bound individual risk quantified herein, however, has the advantage that it is a clearly defined quantity which can be used as a basis for computation of any other measure of specific individual risk without major factoring or manipulation. Computation of IR was conducted for two different types of sources; namely, point sources and linear sources. Linear sources were represented by the pipelines, while point sources were considered to be associated with the process facilities and wells. For point sources, the individual risk may be computed as follows: ASPEN Ip = PR ' PS ' PF ' PD zsis/9s (5.1) BERCf1A GROUP Hermosa Beach Project)r 'rated Risk Analysis 5.2 Final Report where IRP = IR for point source PR = probability of release Ps = conditional probability of scenario occurrence (ROO from event trees) PF = probability of fatality PD = probability of hazard occurring in direction D For linear sources, such as pipelines, on the other hand, the individual risks may be computed by, IRL=PR•PS•PF•PD •LI where, LI = 2 (H2 X2) 1/2 where, (5.2) (5.3) IRL = individual risk for a linear source PR = linear failure rate per km year Ps = conditional probability of scenario occurrence (ROO) PF = probability of fatality PD = probability of hazard in direction D LI = interaction length of pipeline H = extent of hazard footprint from location of release at pipeline X = distance to receptor, perpendicular to pipeline centreline The above formulas were embedded in spreadsheets to generate base data for plotting individual risk transects and contours. Table 5.1 shows the basis of the computation for individual risk contours associated with a typical risk point source exemplified by the process facilities. As may be seen, the computation provides individual risk at different distances, which can then be utilized to generate risk transects in each of the eight compass directions, as shown in Figure 5.1. Generally, for the case of point sources, risk transects are computed along several directions (8 compass directions) as shown in Figure 5.1 and then combined to generate a plan view of iso -risk contours around a facility, as illustrated in Figure 5.2. A similar spreadsheet approach, except embedding Equation 5.2 in a spreadsheet, can be used for the computation of individual risk from linear sources. One of the associated computational spreadsheets is illustrated in Table 5.2. This allows for Asurs 24/8/98 BERCI1A GROUP N--- -_ i M- i- IN M S I MI M IIIIII Table 5.1 Example of IR Calculation for Point Source Scenario FLASH FIRE JET FIRE EXPLOSION Release type Leak Hole Rupture Leak Hole Rupture Leak Hole Rupture Releases (/year) 8.90E-01 6.50E-02 2.90E-02 8.90E-01 6.50E-02 2.90E-02 8.90E-01 6.50E-02 2.90E-02 P of Scen. occ. 0.09 0.36 0.09 0.01 0.10 0.18 0.00 0.04 0.03 p (/year) 8.01 E-02 2.34E-02 2.61 E-03 8.90E-03 6.50E-03 5.22E-03 0.00E+00 2.60E-03 8.70E-04 Pf 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.10 0.10 Directional Probability N 0.060 0.125 0.125 NE 0.260 0.125 0.125 E 0.220 0.125 0.125 SE 0.060 0.125 0.125 S 0.070 0.125 0.125 SW 0.070 0.125 0.125 W 0.220 0.125 0.125 NW 0.040 0.125 0.125 Haz dist. W (ft) 1 3 55 8 22 50 0 0 0 Haz dist. L (ft) 6 16 200 14 45 155 0 0 0 Individual Risk at L IRN 2.40E-03 7.02E-04 7.83E-05 5.56E-05 4.06E-05 3.26E-05 0.00E+00 3.25E-05 1.09E-05 IRNE 1.04E-02 3.04E-03 3.39E-04 5.56E-05 4.06E-05 3.26E-05 0.00E+00 3.25E-05 1.09E-05 IRE 8.81E-03 2.57E-03 2.87E-04 5.56E-05 4.06E-05 3.26E-05 0.00E+00 3.25E-05 1.09E-05 IRSE 2.40E-03 7.02E-04 7.83E-05 5.56E-05 4.06E-05 3.26E-05 0.00E+00 3.25E-05 1.09E-05 IRS 2.80E-03 8.19E-04 9.14E-05 5.56E-05 4.06E-05 3.26E-05 0.00E+00 3.25E-05 1.09E-05 IRsw 2.80E-03 8.19E-04 9.14E-05 5.56E-05 4.06E-05 3.26E-05 0.00E+00 3.25E-05 1.09E-05 IRW 8.81E03 2.57E-03 2.87E-04 5.56E-05 4.06E-05 3.26E-05 0.00E+00 3.25E-05 1.09E-05 IRNW 1.60E-03 4.68E-04 5.22E-05 5.56E-05 4.06E-05 3.26E-05 0.00E+00 3.25E-05 1.09E-05 • Irod e°A Table 5.1 Example of IR Calculation for Point Source Scenario Release type Releases (/year) P of Scen. occ. p (/year) Pf Directional Probability 1 FLASH FIRE Leak I Hole I Rupture 8.90E-01 6.50E-02 1 2.90E-02 N 0.09 0.36 1 0.09 8.01 E-02 2.34E-02 12.61 E-03 0.50 0.50 0.50 NE E SE S 0.060 0.260 0.220 JET FIRE Leak I Hole I EXPLOSION Rupture Leak I Hole I Rupture 8.90E-01 6.50E-02 2.90E-02 8.90E-01 6.50E-02 2.90E-02 0.01 0.10 0.18 0.00 0.04 0.03 8.90E-03 6.50E-03 5.22E-03 0.00E+00 2.60E-03 8.70E-04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.060 0.125 SW W NW Haz dist. W (ft) Haz dist. L (ft) IRN IR NE IRE 1 0.070 0.070 0.220 0.040 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 6 3 55 8 22 50 0 2.40E-03 IRsE IRs IRsw IRw IRNW 1.04E-02 8.81 E-03 2.40E-03 2.80E-03 2.80E-03 8.81 E-03 1.60E-03 16 7.02E-04 3.04E-03 2.57E-03 200 7.83E-05 14 5.56E-05 45 4.06E-05 155 3.26E-05 3.39 E-04 5.56E-05 4.06E-05 3.26E-05 7.02 E-04 8.19E-04 8.19E-04 2.57E-03 2.87E-04 5.56E-05 4.06E-05 3.26E-05 7.83E-05 5.56E-05 4.06E-05 3.26E-05 9.14E-05 5.56E-05 4.06E-05 3.26E-05 9.14E-05 5.56E-05 4.06E-05 3.26E-05 2.87E-04 5.56E-05 4.06E-05 3.26E-05 4.68 E-04 5.22E-05 5.56E-05 4.06E-05 3.26E-05 0 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0 0 0 0 3.25E-05 1.09E-05 3.25E-05 1.09E-05 3.25E-05 1.09E-05 3.25E-05 1.09E-05 3.25E-05 1.09E-05 3.25E-05 1.09E-05 3.25E-05 1.09E-05 3.25E-05 1.09E-05 - - NIB NMI - - - - INN - - - - 11111 IMP - - MN - Individual Risk Transects' NIS 1 1 N111 IN MN In N NB 11111 411111 M e - MO M Ill rod /91 C= 15, cc 1.00E-01 1.00E-02 1.00E-03 1.00E-04 1.00E-05 1.00E-06 0 • 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160• Distance from Source (ft) 180 200 220 240 260 —+— N --St--- NE E -SE -- S —O— SW ---3 -- W NW Figure 5.1 Example of Individual Risk Transects for Point Source tri C� SCALE 1m) 1 1 50 0 uN11mCATEO 1S11.14 100 200 • Flan, N • Figure 5.2 1111 IM r r r r aufxnedi of rids isk istoumo r r in r r r r 1 M-- i- all N n- 1 all r 1 NB r 1 RN r Al 00 00 Table 5.2 Example of IR Calculation for Linear Source SCENARIO RELEASE TYPE pr VW- yr) Ps pr x P, (/mi - yr) pr H (ft) INDIVIDUAL ANNUAL RISK AT DISTANCE "x' (ft) (not including 'DIRECTIONAL P') DIRECTIONAL P 0 5 10 20 50 75 100 150 200 Pp P1. Pu Po GAS RELEASE Leak 1.05E-03 - - - - . - - - - - Hole 2.90E-04 - - - - - - - - - Rupture 9.66E-05 - - - - - - • - Double Rupture 9.66E-05 - - - - - - - - - JET FIRE Leak 0.10 1.05E-04 0.05 10 1.98E-08 1.72E-08 0.00E+00 - - - - - • 0.20 0.20 0.30 0.30 Hole 0.10 2.90E-05 0.05 30 1.65E-08 1.62E-08 1.55E-08 1.23E-08 - - - - - 0.20 0.20 0.30 0.30 Rupture 0.18 1.74E-05 0.05 99 3.26E-08 3.26E-08 3.24E-08 3.19E-08 2.81E-08 2.13E-08 • - - 0.20 0.20 0.30 0.30 Double Rupture 0.18 1.74E-05 0.05 138 4.54E-08 4.54E-08 4.53E-08 4.50E-08 4.24E-08 3.81E-08 3.13E-08 - - 0.20 0.20 0.30 0.30 FLASH FIRE Leak 0.40 4.18E-04 0.50 1 7.92E-08 - - - - - - - 0.42 0.29 0.21 0.08 Hole 0.36 1.04E-04 0.50 13 2.57E-07 2.37E-07 1.64E-07 - - - • - - - 0.42 0.29 0.21 0.08 Rupture 0.09 8.69E-06 0.50 50 8.23E-08 8.19E-08 8.07E-08 7.55E-08 0.00E+00 - - - - 0.42 0.29 0.21 0.08 Double Rupture 0.09 8.69E-06 0.50 49 8.07E-08 8.03E-08 7.90E-08 7.37E-08 - - - - - 0.42 0.29 0.21 0.08 EXPLOSION Leak 0.00 0.00E+00 0.10 0 - - - - - - -- 0.42 0.29 0.21 0.08 Hole 0.04 1.16E-05 0.10 0 - - - - - - - - - 0.42 0.29 0.21 0.08 Rupture 0.03 2.90E-06 0.10 0 - - - - - - - - - 0.42 0.29 0.21 0.08 Double Rupture 0.03 2.90E-06 0.10 0 - • - - - - - 0.42 0.29 0.21 0.08 DISPERSION Leak 0.50 5.23E-04 0.00 0 • - - - - - - - - 0.42 0.29 0.21 0.08 Hole 0.50 1.45E-04 0.00 0 - - - - - - - - - 0.42 0.29 0.21 0.08 Rupture 0.30 2.90E-05 0.00 0 - - - - • - - - - 0.42 0.29 0.21 0.08 Double Rupture 0.30 2.90E-05 0.00 0 - - - - - • - - - 0.42 0.29 0.21 0.08 TOTALS 6.14E-07 5.11E-07 4.17E-07 2.38E-07 7.05E-08 5.94E-08 3.13E-08 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 cos • co Hermosa Beach Project ated Risk Analysis 5.7 • Final Report calculation of individual risk at various distances for each of the consequence sub - scenarios defined in the event tree associated with the pipeline. For the linear sources, the appropriate representation of risk is a risk transect, showing the variation in IR with the distance on either side of the pipeline, as illustrated in Figure 5.3. In the balance of this chapter, and in the chapter on resultant risk, the resultant risk contours and transects are shown for each facility type. 5.1.3 Societal Risk Calculations The societal or group risk results are represented as risk spectra. As indicated earlier, a risk spectrum is a graph of the frequency of occurrence and the number of individuals involved in the occurrence, with the frequency given on the vertical axis and the number of individuals on the horizontal axis. Specifically, the graph represents the probability than N or more (or at least N) individuals will become casualties in any given situation. The data for the construction of the risk spectrum is obtained by combining the iso -risk contours (risk isopleths) with actual population distributions together with their appropriate dwell time and outdoor exposure factors (combined as the OISR factors defined earlier). Essentially, to construct a risk spectrum each of the octants (for eight wind directions) is analyzed to assess the number of individuals exposed within each successive contour, commencing with the outermost or lowest probability contour. These data are then sorted according to groups associated with the same number of individuals, their frequencies are added to give a summary frequency for each group of equal number and the probabilities are accumulated beginning with the greatest number of people, N. Again, only the resultant risk spectra appropriate to each facility group and component are given in the balance of this chapter. 5.1.4 Unmitigated and Mitigated Risks For the subject project, very specific risk mitigation measures have been proposed to reduce risks. These specific risk mitigation measures are the concrete block and sound attenuation walls which will be present during the test and production phase. In order to show the efficacy of these risk mitigation measures, it is important to assess the risks without considering the effects of the mitigation measures. The results of such a risk assessment are terms the unmitigated risks. In effect, however, the unmitigated risk does have the more generic risk mitigation measures described in the next chapter and considered to be industry standard. Thus, in the context of the present project, unmitigated risk means the risks without considering the effect of the perimeter walls; mitigated risks are those which give consideration to the perimeter wall effects explicitly. 24/8/98 B"Qcr1A GROUP 11111 NMI IN 11111 111111 111111 11111 SE NMI NM 111111 INN 11111 NB oo um OP INDIVIDUAL RISK PER ANNUM 1.00E'O5 GAS PIPELINE - RIGHT SIDE ^-' ----- ^- --' [-s- IR |-m-ISR 1.00E-)7- 1]]OE-00 1{]OE'OQ 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 DISTANCE FROM PIPELINE (ft) Figure 5.3 Example of Risk Transect for Linear Source Hermosa Beach Projectrated Risk Analysis 5.9 r Final Report Unmitigated and mitigated risks, however, include consideration of generic, industry standard mitigation for similar facilities. 5.2 Test Phase - Unmitigated Risks 5.2.1 Individual Risk Assessment The risk isopleths or iso -risk contours for individuals for the three atmospheric conditions considered for the test phase are shown in Figures 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6. Figure 5.4 shows the individual risk contours for the unstable atmospheric condition considered to be representative of daytime conditions while Figure 5.5 shows that representative of nighttime conditions. Figure 5.6, a somewhat larger footprint, is associated with the worst case conditions which have been distributed between both day and night conditions. It is emphasized that the risk contours are representative of the upper bound individual risk, not the individual specific risk. Generally, when the actual exposure of individuals is considered, by multiplying the probabilities by the OISR factor, the risk contour result is reduced by roughly an order of magnitude or to 10% of the value given. It is not feasible to plot the individual specific risk contours because the OISR factor characterizing the population exposure varies from location to location rather than being constant throughout the neighborhood of the project. The above risk contours include consideration of the well drilling activity and the process activity, and the temporary storage. Trucking is only included in the group risk assessment described in the next section. 5.2.2 Societal Risk Assessment The risk spectrum for the test phase, giving individual lines for each of the principal components (wells, process, trucking) as well as their integrated total as shown in Figure 5.7. The risk spectrum is shown with the risk thresholds as a background in order to provide a convenient comparison between the unmitigated risk spectrum and the public risk thresholds described earlier. 5.3 Production Phase Unmitigated Risks 5.3.1 Individual Risk Assessment Figure 5.8, 5.9, and 5.10 show the iso -risk contours giving annual individual risks for the daytime, nighttime, and worst case atmospheric conditions, respectively. These contours include the effects of the well drilling and production wells, process facility, and onsite storage. Figures 5.11 and 5.12 show the individual risk transects associated with the pipeline operations. Asuts 24/8/98 BERCIIA GROUP E S E N—!-- i N M I i i N— E all E z \\\ RESIDENTIAL AREA RESIDENTIAL AREA RESIDENTIAL AREA 1 RESIDENTIAL AREA 2P 2P 2P 2P 2P 2P 2P 2P Ardmore GREEN SPACE pARK Plant North 5P CYPre55 5P 5P 5P SMALL BUSINESS 5P 5P 5P 5P TEST PHASE DAY Figure 5.4 IR Contours for Test Phase - Day 0 50 100 2:20 Hermosa Beach Project In0ed Risk Analysis ?n COCO RESIDENTIAL AREA RESIDENTIAL 2P 2P 2P 2P� 2P RESIDENTIAL AREA RESIDENTIAL AREA Valley Drive Day 2P Night OP 0E-4 OE -6 GREEN SPACE BUSINESS 309 �00.. 0. PARKING Plant North 59 Cypress 5P 59 59 59 SP SW LL BUSINESS 5P 59 TEST PHASE NIGHT 0 50 100 200 F t 1 Figure 5.5 OM SIN 11111 Cor s fcjst P - i IMO ow min um no aOo A - cob 0 0 a VI • *21 A a E i i 11 I M— i M M MN i i 1 i i M MI r CeCA RESIDENTIAL AREA RESIDES AL AREA DENTIAL AREA RESIDENTIAL AREA 1 GREEN SPACE siNESS 30P Plant North CypreSS 5P 5P 5P 5P SMAL` BUSINESS 5P TEST PHASE WORST CASE 5P 5P 5P 0 50 '00 200 Figure 5.6 IRContours for Test Phase - Worst Hermosa Beach Project bated Risk Analysis 5.13 r Final Report 1.E-02 1.E•03 ai 1.E-04 cti 112 tL 2 `0 Z 1.E-05 0 0 U C RS r U Q 1.E-06 1.E-07 1.E-08 1 I 1 1 ! 1 i i 1 i t 11 it —e— Process Day —0— P ro cess Night —e—Trucking —tr— Integrated 1. t 1 1 I 1�11 III! 1 III it 11 I 1 1 1 1 1! I 1 i 1 I I.\ 111! i 1 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 i I I I 1 I •1I1 r 1 \I 1! 111 II 1 1 1 1 I I t i I I I I I I I I I I Ill ! I I I !, 111 1 1'1 1 1 11: , I 11 1 1, I • ■ Intolerable l Grey Insignifican II 1 10 100 Number of Fatalities (N) 1000 Figure 5.7 Public Risk Spectrum - Test Phase - Process and Trucking - Unmitigated 24/8/98 BFR GROUP N i- i- r M N-! i -- i MS i r -- e z 00 00 6.14 °eA ex* RESIDENTIAL AREA RESIDENTIAL AREA RESIDENTIAL AREA 2P \ 2P \ 2P\ 2P \ 2P \ 2P \ 2P 2P Ardmore Av. GREEN SPACE Valley Driv 5P 5? 5? gUS'NESS D 5P 5 LL PRODUCTION PHASE DAY Figure 5.8 IR Contours for Production Phase - Day ODOD IMN 5e5 RESIDENTIAL AREA RESIDENTIAL AREA RESIDENTIAL AREA RESIDENTIAL AREA 2P 2P 2P 2P 2P 2P 2P\ 2P 10E-6 GREEN SPACE Nor -co 59 \ �� 59 59 59 SMALL BUSINESS 50 100 PRODUCTION PHASE NIGHT Hermosa Beach Project bated Risk Analysis Figure 5.9 en ! _ on MN on me Cursjroion e Alit OM _ — ! w Ell ill MI I N E I r- OM NM 1111 MI 1--- G r A N pri z 1 RESIDENTIAL AREA 4. '4. r 2 2P 2P 2P 441 -� ` M 2P41fri t itt2P 'ES DEN?IAL AR_A �dnore - 3P Day 2P Night OP Valley Drive Properly Line 0a fl ‘), OE -4 OE - GREEN SPACE E- 20P `.a us1NESs pARK 30P 0 O.' PARK Plant North 5' BUS1 3p 5P Lon° 0 50 100 200 ft 1—► F—I l I 2P PRODUCTION PHASE WORST Figure 5.10 IR Contours for Production Phase - Worst Hermosa Beach Project Inte d Risk Analysis ON GAS PIPELINE - LEFT SIDE -4.-IA ISR 4 200 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 DISTANCE FROM PIPELINE (ft) Figure 5.11 Gas Pipeline - Left Transect 40 20 0 1.00E-05 1.00E-06 1.00E-07 1.00E-08 1.00E-09 1.00E-10 INDIVIDUAL RISK PER ANNUM 11111 OM VIII En NB UN MI Ell =I 11111 1E111 NE SIN NO In MIN NM MI 11111 En NMI 11M1 11111 1111 INN ON En 11111 In 11111 MO 1111 INDIVIDUAL RISK PER ANNUM 1.00E-05 1.00E-06 GAS PIPELINE - RIGHT SIDE -U-IA _ _ _ ___.____._ _ —i&—ISR 1.00E-07 - 1.00E-08 1.00E-09 1.00E-10 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 DISTANCE FROM PIPELINE (ft) Figure 5.12 Gas Pipeline - Right Transect Hermosa Beach Project 0ated Risk Analysis 5.19 r Final Report 5.3.2 Societal Risk Assessment Figure 5.13 shows the group or societal risk spectrum associated with the production facilities, including the risk profiles for each component as well as the integrated risk profile for the unmitigated production phase risks. 5.4 Existing Facilities 5.4.1 Individual Risk Assessment Figure 5.14 shows the individual risk contours for the existing facilities. These risk contours are based on the hazardous substances stored onsite and are dominated by the above grade propane hazard. 5.4.2 Group Risk Assessment Figure 5.15 shows the risk spectrum associated with the existing facilities, including both hazardous materials onsite and traffic activities within 1/2 mile of the existing site. Individual risk profiles for each of these components are shown as well as the integrated risk profile. Asurs 24/8/98 VA, ERCIIA GROUP t a 1 1 s 1 1 t lkHermosa Beach Project Intee d Risk Analysis 5.20 Final Report Annual Chance or N or More Fatalities 1.E-02 1.E-03 1.E-04 1.E-05 1.E-06 1.E-07 1.E-08 1 10 100 Number of Fatalities (N) 1000 Figure 5.13 Public Risk Spectrum - Production Phase - Process and Gas Pipeline - Unmitigated Asurs 24/8/98 BIERCIIA GROUP 1 I i i I Ili 1 I I I c ,II I I I I I i! I I I i l —B— Process Day 1 I 1 ! I i X 1 1 —e— Process Night I I l illi ! i I —e—Gas Pipeline I L —e-- Integrated 1.. 1 i I I I , I I i I I I I I I 1 I! 111 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 I ! I I WI 11 ! I I I I I I .1I i t !I ! I I I .I iIs\ I I I!i1 I r !. IIII ! I ! I• II I 1 1 1 I II °: l I I! IIi 1 1 I ,1 II I I l II ••• I I I Intolerable 1 ,I! � I Insignificant :• GREY I i I. ! I 1 I 1 1 I 1 I. 1 10 100 Number of Fatalities (N) 1000 Figure 5.13 Public Risk Spectrum - Production Phase - Process and Gas Pipeline - Unmitigated Asurs 24/8/98 BIERCIIA GROUP coco get 3 RESIDENTIAL AREA DAY OISR = (0.45)(0.1) = 0045 NIGHT OISR = (0.45)(0.25: = 0.11 RESIDENTIAL AREA RESIDENTIAL AREA 2P 1 2P 1 2P \ 2P \ 2P\ 2P\ 2P 2P Ardmore Av. Day 2P Night OP 2P 2P 2p 2P 2P 2P DAY OISR = (0.45)(1) = 0.45 NIGHT ❑ISR = (0.45)(0)=0 2P RESIDENTIAL AREA GREEN SPACE 3P *Note: For Small Business DAY ❑ISR=(0.45)(1.5/12)(6/7)=0.048 CYpre55 SP 5? NIGHT ❑ISR=(0.45)(0)=0 5? 5P 5? SMAS` BUSINESS* 5? 5? 5? EXISTING PHASE Figure 5.14 IR contours for Existing Facilities 0 50 100 200 ft Hermosa Beach Project .ated Risk Analysis Hermosa Beach Project IntSd Risk Analysis 5.22 Final Report Annual Chance or N or More Fatalities 1.E-02 1.E-03 1.E-04 1.E-05 1.E-06 1 • I 1 1 I 1 it 1 1 ,I 1 l 1, -6—Propane Vessel —e—Trucking —B— Integrated 1 1 1 1 I!I1 : 1 1 I 11 1 1 I I ! 1111 I I I I ; I 1 11'1 1 1 1 I 1 I I 1 1 1 1 11111 1 1 1 1 1 !11 1.E-07 - 1.E-08 I Insignificant Grey 1 1 Intolerable 10 100 Number of Fatalities (N) 1 1000 ASPEN Figure 5.15 Public Risk Spectrum - Existing Facilities 24/8/98 BERCI-IA GROUP NM NM ' IMO me oat Pic am osi amb. imp aPs ew es an um • • Hermosa Beach Project Innted Risk Analysis 6.1 . P9804 - Final Report CHAPTER 6 RISK MITIGATION 6.1 Approaches to Risk Mitigation for this Project Risk mitigation measures are considered under two categories in this study. These are generic risk mitigation measures and specific risk mitigation measures. Generic risk mitigation measures are industry standard measures which have been considered to be incorporated in the facilities under consideration. Specific risk mitigation measures are those that have been explicitly omitted in the unmitigated risk analysis in order to emphasize their importance in the mitigated or resultant risk analysis described later. Thus, in the balance of this chapter, risk mitigation measures are broadly subdivided into generic risk mitigation measures and specific risk mitigation measures. 6.2 General Approach to Risk Mitigation for Industrial Projects The objective of risk mitigation or safety measures is to reduce risks from a system while still permitting it to operate in a productive and cost-effective manner. Risk mitigation can be addressed on two principal levels; namely, at the source and at the effect level. That is, we can reduce the frequency and volume of hydrocarbon releases or we can reduce the probability and magnitude of adverse consequences. Examples of pipeline source (or hazard) risk reduction include control of use and access to the right- of-way (R.O.W.) to help prevent third party damage; use of pipe with greater wall thickness to reduce corrosive and mechanical defect ruptures; or installation of a better system of line isolation valves to reduce accidental release volumes. Examples of consequence risk mitigation measures include pipeline route selection to minimize public exposure to accidental releases, enactment of land use zoning ordinances to restrict development in areas exposed to high consequence potential, and preparation and availability of appropriate emergency response measures to reduce accident effects. Both these levels of safety enhancement can be further classified under the general headings of strategic or tactical. Strategic measures are ones designed to avoid accidents. Tactical measures are ones designed to minimize the adverse effect of an accident if it does take place. Thus, R.O.W. control, extra engineering and construction measures, and zoning regulations would be considered as strategic, while measures such as pipeline segment isolation, automatic shutdown, or emergency response, are tactical measures. Figure 6.1 summarizes the principal levels and types of risk mitigation measures in block diagram form, under the general categories introduced above and utilized in the balance of the discussion in this chapter. Further, the types of risk mitigation measures are identified in the balance of this chapter by letter combinations, "F" for Failure, "C" for Consequence, "S" for Strategic, and "T" for Tactical. For example, a Failure -Tactical measure would be referred to as "F -T". 24/8/98 BERCI1A GROUP N 0000 INDUSTRIAL FACILITY RISK MITIGATION FAILURE (F) MITIGATION STRATEGIC (S) TACTICAL (T) Regulatory Regulatory Land Use Land Use Training and Education Training and Education Site Management Site Management Facility Operations Facility Operations • Engineering • Engineering • Construction • Construction • Operation • Operation CONSEQUENCE (C) MITIGATION STRATEGIC (S) Regulatory Land Use Training and Education Site Management Pipeline Operations • Engineering • Construction • Operation Figure 6.1 Schematic of Risk Mitigation Measures TACTICAL (T) Regulatory Land Use Training and Education Emergency Response Site Management Pipeline Operations • Engineering • Construction • Operation • uoda?I jvu',. - fO 6d lait wit IA oils a*, law iNg Om Ms ma Mr irelp Is Ow AN OM gm inn sim Hermosa Beach Project Int ed Risk Analysis 6.3 . P9804 - Final Report 6.3 Risk Mitigation Process Once the unmitigated risks from a particular system have been evaluated, the analysis conducted can be used as a basis for the development and selection of optimal risk mitigation measures. First, principal causes of rupture and major consequence factors are identified. For example, the leading cause of pipeline rupture is third party damage. Consequences are intrinsically dependent on proximity and density of population. Clearly, candidates for mitigation measures of rupture and consequences are reduction of third party damage and avoidance of high population density areas, respectively. Practical ways of achieving these mitigation measures are then developed. For example, third -party damage to pipelines can be reduced by R.O.W. signs, public education, mandatory excavation permits and proof of compliance, restrictive R.O.W. access, and excavation warning measures. Similarly, densely populated areas can be avoided by proper route selection for new pipelines. The effect on the risk of incorporation of each of the measures, individually, as well as in feasible combinations, is then conducted utilizing methods of risk analysis. Among the principal hazards for hydrocarbon processing facilities are flammable gas clouds which result in jet fires, if ignited immediately and possible explosions and flash fires if ignited some time after the initial release. For the immediate ignition case, a fire wall between the source and the offsite population can reduce or eliminate jet fire effects. Similarly, the likelihood of delayed ignition of a light gas cloud gas be reduced by deflecting the cloud from ignition sources, again by a wall between the release source and offsite ignition sources. 6.4 Facilities Risk Mitigation 6.4.1 Generic Facilities Risk Mitigation Measures The general classification of risk mitigation measures given in Figure 6.1 applies to facilities in the Test and Production Phase. Thus, mitigation measures can be broadly classified into initial and consequence mitigation measures of a strategic or tactical nature. Table 6.1 summarizes risk mitigation measures for both failure and consequence risk mitigation, designating the type of measure in accordance with F,C,S,T system introduced earlier. The proposed action by MacPherson Oil Company (MOC) for each measure is given in the right column. Regulatory measures, pertaining to control of territory and members of the public outside the plant boundary, include emergency response plans for the surrounding area, local agency personnel training, and general public awareness. Land use, again relating to control of territory by the City outside the plant boundary includes restrictions of future development in the near vicinity of the plant, certain buffer zones and setbacks, and control of access to the site vicinity. ASPEN zais/9s 'VOL) GROUP 19 z coco Table 6.1 Hydrocarbon Processing Facilities Risk Mitigation Measures MEASURE F/C S/T DESCRIPTION RESPONSE BY MOC Regulatory C F/C C S S S Emergency response plan requirements Worker training Public awareness Emergency Response Plan for facility on file with the City. All operator personnel will he trained in risk management and facilities operations. Fire safety, public notification, warning and evacuation plan required by CUP. Land Use C C F S S S Site location away from existing and future developments Require buffer zone and setbacks Control of site access Site location selected by City of Hermosa Beach. Site location selected by City of Hermosa Beach. Project located at intersection of two streets in an industrial zone. Perimeter chain-link/masonry walls all four sides. Site operated 24 -hours, access permitted only to operational personnel or trained visitors. Training F/C C F/C S/P T T Personnel training in operations, emergency response, contingency plans Area public awareness and evacuation training Use of experienced personnel and thorough screening and training for new personnel All operator personnel will be trained in risk management, emergency response procedures, contingency plans and facilities operations. Fire safety, public notification, warning and evacuation plan required by CUP. Evacuation training to be determined by the City. Only experienced and thoroughly trained operation personnel will be employed at the site. Site Management F F/C S C Site security entry / egress control Night time security personnel and devices Perimeter chain-link/masonry walls all four sides. Site operated 24 -hours, access permitted only to operational personnel or trained visitors. Site operated 24 -hours, operation personnel trained in site security. • ,iodad l7UY - f086,1 mot am am sow Ams 411, 41, AkIV 4ma MO as AM 0000 111.11 gis gm poi 4111111 Olt PM alit 1 11111a MIL VOW 11111111 $1111 NM Mil MI ,. Table 6.1 (cont.) Hydrocarbon Processing Facilities Risk Mitigation Measures MEASURE F/C S/T DESCRIPTION RESPONSE BY MOC F/C S Surroundings surveillance and monitoring Site operated 24 -hours. Emergency response C C C C C T T T T T Emergency response plan / team / facilities Detection / alarm systems (gas/fire/overpressure) Area public awareness Fire fighting equipment as required Coordination of local emergency capabilities including police, fire, hospital Emergency Response Plan on file with the City. Emergency response team consisting of MOC personnel and Clean Coastal Waters (or equivalent agency) available 24 -hours. Detection and alarm systems installed to provide notification to operating personnel of gas release, fire, overpressure and other malfunctions of system. Fire safety, public notification, warning and evacuation plan required by CUP. A Fire Protection Plan is on file with the City delineating. the fire protection facilities to installed at site. Emergency Response Plan on file with the City provides procedures for coordination of local emergency capabilities with City Fire Department. Operations • Engineering C C F/C C C C S S T T T T Facilities layout to minimize hazards Site location to avoid exposure ESD valves to isolate critical sections Emergency power and control double backup Leak detection and monitoring Automatic shutdown Facilities have been designed to minimize hazards and for ease of operations. Site location selected by the City of Hcrmosa Beach. ESD valves will be located to isolate critical sections of process and to minimize hazard. Emergency power is not required. Facilities will safely shutdown when loss of electrical power occurs. Facility site manned 24 -hours, production facilities will be inspected on a regular basis throughout the day. Facility provided with a gas, hydrogen sulfide and flame detection system. Critical process equipment are provided with alarm and automatic shutdown of equipment and in some • Uoda?I !vu!d - fr086d 0000er Table 6.1 (cont.) Hydrocarbon Processing Facilities Risk Mitigation Measures MEASURE F/C S/f DESCRIPTION RESPONSE BY MOC cases automatic shutdown of facilities. F/C S State of art engineering Facilities engineered and designed to latest codes and standards. Facility design reviewed by independent engineering company. See HAZOP. C T Drainage/ venting systems release Facility is equipped with vent and bleed system. The facility is provided with an emergency vent system for emergency releases. C T Connect to flare system for overpressure depressurization All pressure vessels connected to emergency vent system with vent stack to safely permit depressurization of vessels. C T Overpressure PSV All tanks and pressure vessels provided with pressure relief valves to protect tanks and pressure vessels from overpressure. C S HAZOP ongoing procedures HAZOP study will be updated to reflect any proposed changes to processing facilities. C T Design for fire / explosion protection of critical facilities as required • An approved Fire Protection Plan is provided. Explosion protection will be provided and mitigated as per this risk assessment. • Operation F/C S Safe operating procedure philosophy A safe operating procedure philosophy will be maintained throughout the life of the project. C T Alarm systems known to all personnel All personnel will be thoroughly trained in operations procedures including alarm systems. C T Emergency response plans and facilities Emergency response plans and equipment will be in place before startup of facilities. F S Regular inspection and maintenance The operational procedures manual includes a documented inspection and maintenance program for a production facilities. F S Event -driven (e.g., overpressure) inspection and maintenance The facilities will be inspected and evaluated after any major upset or event. • Lzodad lour y - b086d all ND NM lip. Ulla Mil lie OW OM INS Sat aM, sour IMP 1111111 Olt R.? MO MO Hermosa Beach Project Intted Risk Analysis 6.7 III P9804 - Final Report The site management program involves more stringent measures as the plant site is under direct control of MOC. Thus, site security, entry and rigorous control, nighttime security personnel and equipment, fencing, posting, and general access control as well as surveillance and monitoring of the site and its surroundings on a regular basis, are included in the site management. Immediate rectification of any threats to the facility both due to environmental causes such as subsidence or unanticipated ground water conditions, or third party intervention such as frequent recreation or usage of areas in close proximity should be rectified immediately. All aspects of emergency response are important consequence -tactical risk mitigation measures for facilities such as those under consideration. Thus, emergency response planning, team designation, and facilities and equipment, are essential. More specifically, within the process area, fire, gas, and overpressure detection and alarm systems with appropriate levels of redundant backup are important to mitigate the consequences of any possible failures or deviations from normal processes. Finally, engineering and operational risk mitigation measures again constitute the first, and most intrinsic mitigation measures within the process facility. Design of the facilities first, at a site location to avoid nearby exposure to the public, and second with the general layout to minimize hazards is essential. Location of potential release sources with respect to wind direction, flange orientation to avoid accidental release directed at vulnerable facilities. If layout alone will not satisfy safety requirements, erection of fire walls, explosion barriers, and other protective structures may be more feasible. Within the process network itself, emergency shutdown (ESD) capabilities for critical sections to isolate them and to reduce the volumes of accidental releases, are important. All ESD requires emergency power and backup. Leak detection systems, fire detection and automatic suppression, monitoring, and drainage for spills and venting systems for gas releases, all constitute state-of-the-art engineering provisions for safe process operation. Operating procedures themselves, starting with a safety based operating philosophy, with appropriate personnel, training programs, backed by reliable detection and alarm systems are important for a safe facility. Regular inspection and maintenance, provision for unscheduled inspections in case of potentially damaging events, and thorough and meaningful process deviation and incident reporting round out a safe operating plant for the facility. 6.4.2 Test Phase Facility Specific Risk Mitigation Specific risk mitigation measures included in the unmitigated risk analysis for the Test Phase facilities may be summarized as follows: • Layout Asurs 27/8/98 BERCIIA GROUP Hermosa Beach Projecterated Risk Analysis 6.8 • P9804 - Final Report • Facilities will be installed in a non -congested layout minimizing the potential for the containment of vapors to create hazardous explosion conditions • ESD valves to isolate inventory at least in the following sections: • Well manifold outlet • Process facility outlet to incinerator • Process facility outlet to storage • Blowdown capability including each isolatable segment blowdown directly to flare • Gas and fire detection at critical locations to facilitate rapid emergency response to minimize consequences of accidental releases of process fluids • Drainage capability, draining away from facilities and control center in areas where flammable liquids are present • Drainage away from truck loading area with sufficient capacity to drain loading spills up to 200 bbl • Dykes of with a capacity for total storage tank contents • Engineering • Formal risk analyses (HAZOP) carried out to identify hazards and implementation of risk mitigation measures thus derived throughout the design, engineering, and construction phases • Conservative design for stable operations, including adequate safety factors • Recovery from upsets done by operating team with a successful operating record • Operations • Backup equipment systems for all critical elements, particularly for emergency response instrumentation including H2S detection and shutdown • Use of experienced operators only, working to approved management and operating system • Extensive screening and thorough training of all new personnel and appropriate supervision particularly for critical operations supervision • Strategic gas, fire, leak, overpressure detection with appropriate alarm on the 24 hour basis with other operator controlled automatic emergency response including shut -down , depressurization, venting. • Fire -fighting capability, particularly in truck loading, control centre, and storage areas • Extensive and state -of -art operating plan including inspection, maintenance, unscheduled inspections, drills, and other aspects of state -of -art operating plan. • Best current engineering practice reducing corrosion potential including design, inspection and active protection such as cathodic protection. Specific additional risk mitigation measures which are included in the mitigated risk event are the following: 28/8/98 BERCIIA GROUP r 1 i i r Hermosa Beach Project Intliked Risk Analysis 6.9 . P9804 - Final Report • Fire/explosion proofing of control centre • Fire resistant 30' high perimeter sound attenuation wall. 6.4.3 Production Phase Facility Specific Risk Mitigation Measures Specific risk mitigation measures included in the current unmitigated risk may summarized as follows: • Layout • Facilities to be installed in a non -congested layout minimizing the potential for containment of explosive vapors • Isolation including ESD valves capable of isolating inventory at least in the following locations: • Production well manifold • Inlet to the plant • Outlet from plant • Blowdown capability involving connection of pressure relief valves to the flare stack • Location of redundant gas, fire, overpressure detectors and automatic alarm systems at appropriate location throughout the process area • Isolation through remotely activated valves, hydrocarbon and fire detectors, blowdown directly to flare, level transmitters, and standard PSV design for overpressure. • Engineering • Formal HAZOP carried out to identify hazards and implementation of risk mitigation measures throughout the design, engineering, and construction phases • Modern design for stable operations, recovery from upsets by an experienced engineering team with a successful record • Operations • Backup equipment systems installed for critical elements including H25 detection and shutdown • Experienced operators normally on duty working to proven management system in accordance a state -of -art operating plan for all aspects of operations • Extensive screening of all new personnel and supervision of all new personnel with experienced personnel during all critical operations • Fire fighting capability directed primarily at staffed area such as administrative and control buildings • State of art operating plan including inspection, procedures, maintenance, event -related inspection and maintenance, drills, pressure tests, etc. Risk mitigation measures included in the mitigated risk assessment include the following: ASPEN 28/8/98 BERCIIA GROUP Hermosa Beach Project Orated Risk Analysis 6.10 • P9804 - Final Report • Installation 12' high concrete block perimeter wall the 'duration of the Production Phase 6.5 Pipeline Risk Mitigation 6.5.1 Generic Pipeline Failure Risk Mitigation Measures Pipeline rupture probability can be reduced in a variety of ways, ranging from relatively subtle provisions such as changes in design codes, development guidelines, or educational programs, to very direct measures such as restricting access to pipeline right-of-ways or increasing pipeline wall thickness. The range of pipeline failure risk mitigation measures applicable to pipelines, is summarized under its principal classifications in Table 6.2 together with associated provisions by MOC. A one call system should be participated in by all operators, development referral prior to approval should be required, and certain land use controls should be developed. The one call system is essentially one whereby a single phone number will provide information on pipeline locations for numerous different operators as well as receive information on intended excavations. Land use controls are exercised primarily by the City. An application referral system requiring approval of an application by all parties, including relevant pipeline operators, facilitates risk mitigation. Future planning and zoning must consider both development and existing and potential pipeline facilities. Finally, setbacks to avoid right-of-way encroachments which could lead to third -party damage of pipelines should be utilized. Training and education are probably among the most cost-effective mitigation measures. Cost of additional training for operating personnel is quickly recovered if only one major pipeline accident caused by operator error can be avoided as a result of that training. Likewise, specialized emergency training within the context of specific systems and their surroundings is important. Public awareness programs can be conducted effectively and inexpensively through the regular mail -out of a brochure describing the pipeline facility, potential consequences of accidents, and ways in which the public can help avoid such accidents. In addition, such brochures can contain guidelines for emergency response by the public, referred to in the next section. However, the material must be presented in a manner that will not provoke unnecessary fear or panic which could impair understanding of the concepts and procedures. The public too has a responsibility, particularly when information sessions with voluntary attendance are made available in communities by operators or the City. A properly coordinated right-of-way management program instituted by the operator can add significant risk mitigation at relatively low cost. Easement agreements to determine encroachments should be reviewed periodically, R.O.W.s inspected for encroachments, any encroachments found should be Asurs 28/8/98 BERCHA GROUP OW Ma OW OM 11111 OM aim els MN Ige 11111 aft 111111 1111111, II. MI 00 00 Table 6.2 Pipeline Failure Risk Mitigation Measures MEASURE STRATEGIC (S) TACTICAL (T) DESCRIPTION e RESPONSE BY MOC t Regulatory - S SIT S S S Design and construction codes and standards Public awareness program requirements Accident reporting One call system mandatory Proof of communication for R.O.W. excavation permit Pipeline to be designed and constructed in accordance with ANSI B 31.4 & 31.8 Pipeline Standards, City & State Codes. City Conditional Use Permit requires notification of area residents w/in 300' of construction. Relocation of public transit stops along pipeline route. Emergency service providers to be informed of construction activities. City of Hermosa Beach Fire Department to be notified of all construction accidents. City of Hermosa Beach Fire Department. City of Hermosa Beach issues excavation permit. Land Use S S S S Design and develop to maximum setback Application referral system Future planning consider both development and ' pipeline facilities Setbacks to avoid R.O.W. third -party damage City requires pipelines to be installed in City R.O.W. Not applicable. Pipeline route approved by City and considered during project issuance of Conditional Use permit. City requires pipelines to be installed in City R.O.W. Training & Education SIT Sri' Train operator personnel in risk mitigation and pipeline operation Inform public of safety measures regularly All operator personnel will be trained in risk management and pipeline operations including compliance with the Crude Oil Pipeline Spill Contingency & Emergency Response Plan and Gas Pipeline Emergency Response Plan. Permanent signs with operators telephone number to be installed along pipeline route. A notification process as required by the CUP will be in place to warn public of any safety requirements. • , odad 10U1d - 17086d onon eeswA Table 6.2 (cont.) Pipeline Failure Risk Mitigation Measures • uodad Mvui i - P086d 11110 MO a/IM Wit 411111 \t Ala NW OW SIM 11111 MI UM Ulf MI STRATEGIC (S) TACTICAL (T) DESCRIPTION RESPONSE BY MOC MEASURE S Review easement agreements All easement agreements to be in place prior to installation of the pipeline. i R.O.W. Management S Prevent or remove encroachments Pipeline located in City R.O.W. that contains other underground facilities. City controls further installation of under underground facilities. S Restrict third party access Access controlled by City of Hermosa Beach. City requires excavation permit to access R.O.W. T Have good access for emergency vehicles Pipeline located in City street R.O.W. S Post signs on R.O.W. See response under Training & Education above. T/S Surveillance and monitoring Pipeline route to be visually inspected on a weekly basis. Crude oil pipeline to be installed with SCADA system and all pipelines in R.O.W. to have high and low pressure and manual emergency shut -down systems. S One call system participation City of Hermosa Beach Fire Department. Pipeline Operations S/T Low stress design Pipeline operating pressures are low. • Engineering S Detailed stress analysis and flexibility analysis Pipelines to be designed to ANSI B 31.4 & B 31.8 S High quality external coating Pipe to have X -Tru -Cote exterior coating or equivalent. All welded joints to be primed and taped. S High material specifications Material specifications will meet code requirements. T ESD and check valves optimal spacing ESD panel located at shipping and receiving site locations. Pipeline is 2500 -ft in length. Automated block/check valves combination to he installed at Herondo Storm Drain crossing and at any fault location. Fail -closed block valves to be used. Block valves to be installed at intersection with EPTC facilities. • uodad Mvui i - P086d 11110 MO a/IM Wit 411111 \t Ala NW OW SIM 11111 MI UM Ulf MI Mit Om MI r. 1M1 We 10111 1161 1 ilirt — r, or OM 0 IN Table 6.2 (cont.) Pipeline Failure Risk Mitigation Measures MEASURE r STRATEGIC (S) TACTICAL (T) DESCRIPTION RESPONSE BY MOC T Automatic alarm and leak detection SCADA system to be installed on crude oil shipping pipeline. High and Low pressure alarm and shut- down to be installed on crude oil and gas shipping pipelines. S Greater burial depth Pipeline depth to be minimum of 2'-6" below surface of street R.O.W. S Excavation warning, e.g., dye, tape, alarm Brightly colored plastic ribbon to be installed 12 to I8 -inches above pipeline labelled with warning. ' Pipeline trench to be backfilled with cement -sand slurry. S Design for earthquake at fault intersections No known earthquake fault intersections along pipeline route. During construction, if fault intersection found, automated block/check valves combination to be installed at any fault location. Design is for seismic zone IV. • Construction S Controlled burial temperature Pipeline not located in freeze area. S Stress relieve welds . Welds will be stress relieved as required by code. S 100% weld inspection; high quality radiography 100% of all welds in street R.O.W. will be X-rayed by an independent inspection service. S Pipeline out of service during construction Pipeline will be out of service during maintenance S Weld procedure strict Pipeline welding to be in accordance with ANSI B- 31.4 & B 31.8 S Caliper pigs and magnetic logging Pipeline routinely tested with stale if the art pigging technology to identify areas where corrosion, pipeline thinning, dents, cracks and other defects have occurred. The pipelines will be "smart pigged" as required by the California Coastal Commission (CCC) permit. • , odad l !d - tO&6d ODOD 1:11t, Ce,ie Table 6.2 (cont.) Pipeline Failure Risk Mitigation Measures MEASURE STRATEGIC (S) TACTICAL (T) DESCRIPTION RESPONSE BY MOC S Corrosion inhibitors Corrosion inhibitor injection program to be in place for pipeline operation. S Smart Pigging • Smart pigging as required by CCC permit. S Elimination of free water Crude oil must be refinery quality containing less than 3% water. Produced gas to be dehydrated before shipping. S Improved training, maintenance Proper training and maintenance procedure will be in place for pipeline operations. S Control R.O.W. access by third -party See R.O.W. Management above. T Leak detection and alarm system See Pipeline Operations, Engineering above. T Emergency measures in place Implementation of Emergency Response Plans. A uodag 1 mold - Y086d mow ow, rim in ma Jae isv4111111 1111. 111WI allW 1111 4111 Hermosa Beach Project Inted Risk Analysis 6.15 . P9804 - Final Report removed, and an on-going surveillance and monitored program for the right-of- way should be conducted. Protection of right-of-ways can range from posting of warning and information signs to the erection of protective fencing and installation of pipeline shielding. Participation in a multi -operator one -call system, as mentioned earlier, is another cost-effective right-of-way management risk mitigation measure. The way in which the pipeline itself is designed, constructed, and operated has had a significant impact on its probability of failure. A large number of pipeline operation risk mitigation measures have been identified, analyzed, publicly debated and implemented in various projects such as the Chevron Point Arguello Field and the Gaviota Pipeline and Processing Facility in California, and, in Alberta, the Shell Canada Caroline Sour Gas Gathering System and Processing Plant. In the latter case, numerous risk reduction measures were instituted. These included ones to reduce the probability of pipeline failure and gas released by two orders of magnitude below the historical average for sour gas pipelines and, second, stringent consequence risk mitigation measures as discussed in the next section. The measures given in Table 6.2 under Pipeline Operations are a summary of strategic and tactical measures in each of the operation categories which can be implemented to reduce risk. A more detailed description of these measures based on specific industry experience is given in Table 6.3. In general, such measures should be considered when warranted by the particular circumstances, and MOC provisions are given as appropriate. 6.5.2 Generic Pipeline Failure Consequence Mitigation Measures Consequence risk mitigation measures are divided into the same categories as those pertaining to rupture risk mitigation. Consequence risk mitigation measures have the objective of reducing the adverse effects of a rupture if it does happen. They are directed at reducing the number of people exposed, at greater emergency response efficiency, at minimizing the amount of gas leaked, and at avoiding public exposure through proper planning. The principal consequence risk mitigation measures used or developed are summarized in Table 6.4 together with MOC comments and provisions. Principal regulatory measures relate primarily to the requirements for emergency response plans and coordination of emergency response agencies. The City of Hermosa Beach can strategically influence pipeline safety enhancement with appropriate land use control, separating commercial and residential development as much as possible from pipelines and pipeline right-of-ways. In particular, emergency facilities and high population density public facilities such as schools should be set back from pipelines at distances dictated by risk criteria. Availability of all relevant information to the emergency response team is essential for reducing accident consequences. Thus, the location of the emergency facilities, secondary hazard locations, right-of-way access routes, and demographic distributions are important data that should be maintained by both 24/8/98 BIERCHA GROUP Hermosa Beach Project 'hated Risk Analysis 6.16 • P9804 - Final Report Table 6.3 Operator Strategic Rupture Risk Mitigation Measures RUPTURE CATEGORY MEASURES AFFECTING REDUCTION IN RUPTURE RATE RESPONSE BY MOC A) Thermal Stress Detailed stress Low hoop stress design Controlled burial temperature Pipelines to be designed in accordance with ASTM B 31.4 & B 31.8. Pipelines have low operating pressure. Pipeline not located in freeze area. B) Corrosion No oxygen in pipelines Improved inhibitor performance and program • Low hoop stress design Elimination of free water in gas & liquid mainlines • Detection of damage through inspection High quality external protective coating Tank vapors are controlled to eliminate oxygen in the production system using a fuel gas blanket system. Corrosion inhibitor injection program to be in place for pipeline operations. Pipelines have low operating pressures. Crude oil must be refinery quality containing less than 3% water. Produced gas to be dehydrated before shipping. Pipeline route will be visually inspected on a weekly basis and smart pigged as required by the California Coastal Commission (CCC) permit. Access to pipelines controlled by City permit. Pipeline to have X -Tru -Cote exterior coating or equivalent. All welded joints to be primed and taped. C) Third -Party Damage High awareness of pipeline existence in area Improved marking and identification of pipeline Pipeline taken out of service prior to excavation Pipeline route and approval process through public hearing process. Area notification during pipeline installation. Emergency service providers notified of installation. Installation of permanent signs along pipeline route to notify public of pipeline location. Brightly colored plastic ribbon to be installed 12 to 18 inches above pipeline labeled without warning. Pipeline trench backfilled with cement -sand slurry. Installation of permanent signs along pipeline route to notify public of pipeline route. Pipeline to be taken out of service prior to excavation activities for repair or maintenance to pipeline. D) Weld Failure Strict adherence to welding procedures Better construction environment due to non -winter construction Pipelines constructed to ANSI B. 31.4 & B 31.8 Pipeline Standards, City and State Codes. Pipeline not located in freeze area, mild winters. Am: EN 24/8/98 BERCf1A GROUP t 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 A 1 1 1 1 1 1 t 1 1 1 t r 1 1 1 1 1 r 1 1 t 1 Hermosa Beach Project Inte ed Risk Analysis 6.17 IP P9804 - Final Report Table 6.3 (cont.) Operator Strategic Rupture Risk Mitigation Measures RUPTURE CATEGORY MEASURES AFFECTING REDUCTION IN RUPTURE RATE RESPONSE BY MOC Improved standard of field quality control Detailed stress and flexibility analysis Improved radiographic techniques (high quality film, x-ray) All welds in City R.O.W. to be visually inspected and radiographic inspected by independent inspection service. Design will comply with applicable codes. Welds in street R.O.W. will be 100% X-rayed. E) Operator Error Improved training, maintenance and operating procedures • The training, maintenance and operating procedures manual will detail all aspects of operating the pipeline system. F) Construction Defect Improved construction and inspection procedures • Use &calliper pigs and magnetic logging inspection tools for detection of defects prior to startup Detailed stress and flexibility Pipeline construction inspection to be conducted by independent construction inspection service that specializes in pipeline installation. Pipelines will be inspected with "smart pig" technology prior to startup to detect construction defects and to establish a base line inspection. Pipeline design & construction will comply with applicable codes. 24/8/98 BERCIIA GROUP 0000 en Table 6.4 Pipeline Failure Consequence Risk Mitigation Measures ai two OM Mt OW OM .1 OM eas Am ow Mt SNP 11111 ON OW Hermosa Beach Project fitted Risk Analysis Ps oo • uodad lnuld-17086d STRATEGIC/ TACTICAL DESCRIPTION RESPONSE BY MOC MEASURE Regulatory T T S T Requirement for emergency response plan Public and personnel education • Accident reporting Coordination of emergency response agencies Crude Oil Pipeline Spill Contingency and Emergency Response Plan The training, maintenance and operating procedures manual will detail all aspects of operating the pipeline systems. Pipelines to be buried in street R.O.W. with no access from public. Permanent signs with operators telephone number to be installed along pipeline route City of Hermosa Beach Fire Department will be notified of accidents related to pipeline systems in City R.O.W. ' Emergency Response Plans are coordinated with public agencies S S Land use control Setbacks for buildings and emergency facilities Pipeline location in street R.O.W. established by City Pipeline location in street R.O.W. established by City Land Use S S S Site development to minimize exposure Require adequate setback Future planning for both zoning and pipelines Pipeline location in street R.O.W. established by City Pipeline location in street R.O.W. established by City City of Hermosa Beach provides planning for zoning related to pipeline location Training & Education SIT S/T Operator personnel training in emergency procedures Information to public on emergency procedures emergency Operating s ed personneluse thewill be Emergencyed inonse P ns p P Permanent signs with operator telephone number to be installed along pipeline route. A notification process as required by the CUP will be in place to warn public of any safety requirements ai two OM Mt OW OM .1 OM eas Am ow Mt SNP 11111 ON OW Hermosa Beach Project fitted Risk Analysis Ps oo • uodad lnuld-17086d 0000 C= tro 1111111 411111 111111111 OW 11111 Mill 111111b NIB NW Sit 4111111 lilt Olt 11111111 111111 1111111 Table 6.4 (cont.) Pipeline Failure Consequence Risk Mitigation Measures MEASURE STRATEGIC/ TACTICAL DESCRIPTION RESPONSE BY MOC R.O.W. Management T T Maintain emergency access routes Surveillance and monitoring - early leak detection City street R.O.W. access available at all times Pipeline route to be visually inspected on a weekly basis. Crude oil pipeline to be installed with SCADA system and all pipelines in R.O.W. to have high and low pressure and manual emergency shutdown systems Emergency Response T T T T Emergency response plan Emergency response team and equipment Emergency training and drills • Public awareness of emergency response by evasion, evacuation, and tight shelter Emergency Response Plan on file with City of Hermosa Beach Emergency response team consisting of MOC personnel, Clean Coastal Waters (or equivalent agency) available 24-hrs Operating personnel to be trained and drilled in emergency procedures and use of the Emergency Response System Emergency Response Plans provide necessary awareness of emergency response Pipeline Operations • Engineering S T T T T Route selection to avoid exposed population Depressurisation to flare Failsafe isolation and block valves Plant isolation (LEV) valves Optimal isolation valve location & spacing City approved pipeline route Pipeline terminates in atmospheric tank, therefore depressurization to flare not required Automated block/check valve combination to be installed at Herondo Storm Drain crossing and at any fault location. Block valves to be installed at intersection with EPTC facilities. Fail -closed block valves to be used. Facility isolation (block) valves will be installed Isolation valves to be installed as required 0 • Vodaj jvur, j - 6086d N 0000 MEASURE STRATEGIC/ TACTICAL DESCRIPTION RESPONSE BY MOC T Control and leak detection SCADA system to be installed on crude oil shipping pipeline. High and low pressure alarm and shutdown to be installed on crude oil and gas shipping pipelines. Pipeline corrosion injection program to be in place with smart pigging as required by the California Coastal "Commission (CCC) permit • Operation T Emergency response plans in place . Emergency Response Plans on file with City. ERPs to be implemented upon completion of installation of new pipelines in City R.O.W. SIT Public awareness program Permanent signs with operator telephone number to be installed along pipeline route. A notification process as required by CUP will be in place to warn public of any safety requirements T Early warning system High and low pressure alarm system on shipping pipelines to alert operator of pressure changes in piping system prior to automatic shutdown T Emergency response team on call • Emergency response team consisting of MOC personnel, Clean Coastal Waters (or equivalent agency) available 24-hrs UM Olt Via MN al Mr en MN ENS im art ow Os so lara • uodad 1uu1d - 6086d Hermosa Beach Project Intgbed Risk Analysis 6.21 • P9804 - Final Report local governments and their emergency response agencies and operators in a readily accessible form. The level of awareness of the public is particularly important in an emergency response situation. • Thus, the information provided to the public by the operator in regard to evacuation plans, evasive tactics such as seeking shelter indoors, and other tactical actions may be very significant in reducing consequences in an emergency situation. Further, local governments and local emergency agencies such as fire and police departments and hospitals should obtain all pertinent information on the facilities and possible emergency situations from the operator. Special assistance may be required from more senior levels of government with the provision of specialized training or high technology equipment necessary for handling certain emergencies. The development and implementation of an emergency response capability is an essential element for successful tactical pipeline failure consequence reduction. Planning, establishment of a team and equipment, drills and training, and a high level of public awareness constitutes the basis for a successful emergency response capability.. Right-of-way management procedures include maintenance of emergency access routes to the right-of-way, and monitoring which could assist in minimizing the impact of a rupture by early detection and quick deployment of a repair crew. Optimal route selection is probably the most effective means to reduce consequence risk. Extensive effort should be made to minimize public exposure through often expensive re-routing to avoid multiple resident exposure within the zone of influence of the pipeline. Failsafe isolation valves, their location and spacing, fully redundant emergency power and control backup systems, and leak detection and monitoring equipment, are other engineering measures used to reduce consequence potential. Operational measures relate primarily to generating a capability for an effective and immediate response to an emergency. This involves both operator and emergency agency response as well as public readiness through appropriate awareness programs. 6.5.3 Specific Pipeline Risk Mitigation Measures Generic risk mitigation measures incorporated in the unmitigated risk analysis for the project oil and gas pipelines were as follows: • Emergency shutdown (ESD) valves at pipeline inlets and outlets • Periodic internal corrosion inspection and right-of-way surveillance (F -S) • Appropriate strength of pipe, or burial depth at any highway crossing (F -S) • Warning signs along easement and periodic right-of-way surveillance (F -S) 24/8/98 BMCIIA GROUP Hermosa Beach ProjectEbrated Risk Analysis 6.22 • P9804 - Final Report • Emergency preparedness for both MOC personnel and area resident (C -T) • pipeline leak detection system at control center (C -T) No additional specific risk mitigation measures have been considered in calculating resultant risks. 6.6 Trucking Risk Mitigation During the Test Phase, it is proposed that between 3 and 4 tanker trucks per day will load crude oil at the project site and transport it to a location outside Hermosa Beach. These tanker trucks will follow designated routes and follow a specified loading protocol at the test site. Table 6.5 lists generic strategic and tactical risk mitigation measures applicable to accident cause and consequence risk mitigation associated with tanker truck operations. In the unmitigated risk analysis, it is assumed that the generic provisions listed in Table 6.5 are applicable. ASII 24/8/98 BERCt1A GROUP 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Y 1 1 1 1 t Hermosa Beach Project Inteed Risk Analysis 6.23 III P9804 - Final Report Table 6.5 Trucking Risk Mitigation Measures F/C S/T DESCRIPTION —� C S Schedule truck trips to avoid peak population exposure times. C T Develop a coordinated Emergency Response Plan. F&C S Provide specialized driver training. F S Develop inspection by non-destructive testing. F S Monitor critical safety devices and systems. F&C S Use designated routes in urban areas. F S Company hiring policies to screen out unsafe drivers. F S Policy violation penalties. F S Zero tolerance drug and alcohol policy. F S Incentive programs for drivers and other personnel responsible for truck safety. F S Use of Vehicle Monitoring Systems (VMS) for monitoring drivers and vehicle performance. F T Use of VMS for tracking trucks. F S Use of simulators for driver training. C S Improved emergency response training for drivers. F S Utilization of approved fully protected and licensed carriers. Asurs 24/8/98 BFRCIIA GROUP r,► all SW — NO +I VW a► w OW s OS W WI `W ■ s as • Hermosa Beach Project Inted Risk Analysis 7.1 • P9804 - Final Report CHAPTER 7 MITIGATED RISKS 7.1 Approaches to Mitigated Risk Assessment In this chapter, the results of a reassessment of the risks considering specific risk mitigation measures recommended for incorporation in the project are presented. Where no additional specific risk mitigation measures have been utilized or deemed necessary, the unmitigated risks are presented as the resultant risks. 7.2 Test Phase Mitigated Risk No specific risk mitigations are required for the Test Phase due to its relatively short operational span of one year, and largely acceptable risks assessed. However, the presence of the sound attenuation wall has a risk mitigating effect, which should be considered. It is expected that the sound attenuation wall would effectively deflect a gas cloud well above the effects of offsite ignition sources. Accordingly, the effect of ignition probability reduction due to the sound attenuation wall can be modelled utilizing the consequence evolution event tree with reduced ignition probabilities as shown in Figure 7.1. In addition, because of the short duration (1 minute) of the only Test Phase jet fire that has a potential for offsite consequences, that associated with the rupture, it is likely that the sound attenuation wall would also prevent offsite effects of the jet fire. Inclusion of these mitigating effects in the individual risk isopleths is illustrated for each of the three representative atmospheric conditions in Figures 7.2, 7.3, and 7.4 for the Test Phase. The resultant risk spectrum for the principal Test Phase components and the total Test Phase including well blowouts, process releases, and trucking accidents, is shown in Figure 7.5. 7.3 Production Phase Mitigated Risks The specific risk mitigation recommended for the Production Phase is the 12' high reinforced concrete block wall around the perimeter of the facility, with solid gates that would prevent vapour cloud egress during the normal closed condition. Although a 30' sound attenuation wall is also proposed for initial operation of the facility during the drilling of wells, it is not representative of the 30 year projected operational configuration for the facility and therefore is not considered. The reinforced block perimeter wall will serve both to deflect the buoyant gas clouds above ignition sources and to screen out effects of jet fires from the process facility components. Figure 7.6 shows the event tree for the mitigated Production Phase configuration, showing reduced ignition probabilities for all release scenarios. The resultant individual risk contours around the facility for each of the representative atmospheric conditions are shown in Figures 7.7, 7.8, and 7.9. Further, the likelihood of integrity of the reinforced concrete block wall was assessed by comparing the predicted worst case explosion overpressure profile with the design Asurs 24/8/98 I3"'aqmcriA. GROUP 0000 tiod C= L Probability of failure per year, P, J 1 Ignition 1 Timing ) Consequences 1 Ratio of Occurrence Jet Fire L H R ER L H R ER L H Immediate tateMagli L H 00 Jet Fire taktOrnatik :.'019:N'? Ignition ' 10 .00:20;w : 0.30 0.05... L H R ER R ER L H 0.90 0.80 Delayed tait000ga 0,05. R ER 1.00 1.00 Flash Fire L -x^4.1„00 R ER Flash Fire 0.27 0.04 issiotooldfiti 0.75 0:75 R ER No Ignition 0:50:i ' 0.10 0.20 Explosion L H R ER L H R ER 0.02 0.01' oAdo Explosion Sn"r0,0:00t 0x:10' 0.25 0.25 Toxic MkQ:00 0.00 Toxic Dose 0.01 0.00 X000 �i:;k0:U0a�sE'F 0.00 0.00 0.70 0.95 LEGEND Leak gartatiosggtribioneatso Hole R Rupture 6' rupture ER Emergency Release Through NPS 2 pipe, out vent stack Dispersion L Agieli0010111 H R ER Dispersion 0.00 0.00 ;170%0:50`ic rs. 1.00 1.00 0.70 0.95 Figure 7.1 Event Tree - Test Phase - Process - Mitigated N uodam lVUld - 6096d — .ea O NMI UK III i OM MIR OM 111111 111111 111110 MI MO I OW WiLida11100200414tilit 2.90E-03 1.00E+00:;:x, .. . L H R ER L H Immediate tateMagli L H 00 Jet Fire taktOrnatik :.'019:N'? Ignition ' 10 .00:20;w : 0.30 0.05... L H R ER R ER L H 0.90 0.80 Delayed tait000ga 0,05. R ER 1.00 1.00 Flash Fire L -x^4.1„00 R ER Flash Fire 0.27 0.04 issiotooldfiti 0.75 0:75 R ER No Ignition 0:50:i ' 0.10 0.20 Explosion L H R ER L H R ER 0.02 0.01' oAdo Explosion Sn"r0,0:00t 0x:10' 0.25 0.25 Toxic MkQ:00 0.00 Toxic Dose 0.01 0.00 X000 �i:;k0:U0a�sE'F 0.00 0.00 0.70 0.95 LEGEND Leak gartatiosggtribioneatso Hole R Rupture 6' rupture ER Emergency Release Through NPS 2 pipe, out vent stack Dispersion L Agieli0010111 H R ER Dispersion 0.00 0.00 ;170%0:50`ic rs. 1.00 1.00 0.70 0.95 Figure 7.1 Event Tree - Test Phase - Process - Mitigated N uodam lVUld - 6096d — .ea O NMI UK III i OM MIR OM 111111 111111 111110 MI MO I OW MO - - - - MO Mil - - OM an or -a - - - MO SIM Oft 00 00 RESIDENTIAL AREA RESIDENTIAL AREA 2P 2P 2P 2P 2P 2P 2P 2P Ardmore Av. 2P 2P RESIDENTIAL AREA 2P 2P 2P 2P 2P RESIDENTIAL AREA GREEN SPACE PARK Plant North cypress 59 59 59 v. 59 59 gMALL BusINE$S 59 5P 59 TEST PHASE DAY MITIGATED 0 50 100 200 Ft Figure 7.2 IR Contours for Test Phase - Day - Mitigated b 0 r • jiodad 1ingd - fO 6d ODOD RESIDENTIAL AREA 11 RESIDENTIAL AREA 2P 2P 2P 2P 2P 2P 2P Day 2P t OP RESIDENTIAL AREA RESIDENTIAL AREA 2P 2P 2P 2P 10E-6 GREEN SPACE PARK 5P Cypress 5P 5P SP Plant North 12'r 5P 5P 5P SP SMALLBUSINESS TEST PHASE NIGHT MITIGATED 0 50 100 200 °t I---+ j-- J j odad ]vutd - P086d Figure Figure 7.3 IR Contoursfor Test Phase Night - Mitigated MO SW MI w SIB ale ON OP SIB OM 1111111 — rut ill OS WO NIP *IP MI OR IIII NS MIS IMO IN MN in on as es am 111111 MS INN ell 11/ Cypress AW 5? 5? CA 5P 5? 5P 5? L BUSINESS 0 5P SMALL \\\ RESIDENTIAL AREA RESIDENTIAL AREA RESIDENTIAL AKA RESIDENTIAL AREA GREEN SPACE BUSINESS 301' Plant North TEST PHASE WORST CASE MITIGATED 50 100 200 Ft Figure 7.4 IR Contours for Test Phase - Worst - Mitigated • ,Jodad 1vu!d - b086d Hermosa Beach ProjectSrated Risk Analysis 7.6 • P9804 - Final Report Annual Chance or N or More Fatalities 1.E-02 1.E-03 1.E-04 1.E-05 1.E-06 1.E-07 1.E-08 I —B— Process Day —e— Process Night —e—Trucking --A-- Integrated Ii I I I 1 t I 1 1 I I I I l i III I'I I Insignificant Grey Intolerable 1 10 100 Number of Fatalities (N) 1000 Figure 7.5 Public Risk Spectrum - Test Phase - Process and Trucking - Mitigated 24/8/98 KERMA GROUP AM MI SO MI In 1110 all NO IS 1411 MI 4111 10 11111 MI 11111 41111 oooo rod Ce5 Probability of failure per year, P, I Ignition I I Timing L H R. IConsequencel I Ratio of Occurrence Immediate_ L1fQ.Qi Hton:0.95:W Ignition R 0.90 L 460:041.0',;;;,), H R 0.30 No Ignition Delayed L 021010904 H 1:005. 't Jet Fire L araltOMIS H R 1.00 Jet Fire ikUltorele 0.27 Flash Fire L 801100.2462 ?trittiOf0.0 H r 0 90 Flash Fire ; 0.01r;;;t'ir R 0.75 0.02 L ;iQ;9th H R 0.70 R 0.10 Explosion f 1 L 0100att Explosion r 40:00` rtt Hr'i`�'1ah0;1 s',Y0.01 R 0.25 Toxic Ld H R 0.00 Toxic Dose 4:• .: 0:001i,,Ke LEGEND L Leak itgliallitgAVVONSVA50 i i i 6:50E=0241i .t"-i Rupture 6" rupture 2.90E-02 .',. as ; s, % ,:;• in IConsequencel I Ratio of Occurrence Immediate_ L1fQ.Qi Hton:0.95:W Ignition R 0.90 L 460:041.0',;;;,), H R 0.30 No Ignition Delayed L 021010904 H 1:005. 't Jet Fire L araltOMIS H R 1.00 Jet Fire ikUltorele 0.27 Flash Fire L 801100.2462 ?trittiOf0.0 H r 0 90 Flash Fire ; 0.01r;;;t'ir R 0.75 0.02 L ;iQ;9th H R 0.70 R 0.10 Explosion f 1 L 0100att Explosion r 40:00` rtt Hr'i`�'1ah0;1 s',Y0.01 R 0.25 Toxic Ld H R 0.00 Toxic Dose 4:• .: 0:001i,,Ke LEGEND L Leak itgliallitgAVVONSVA50 H Hole >-4 i , ;00.10' . ^;; R Rupture 6" rupture 0.00 Dispersion LWInti0Via siiia0MINA H Dispersion AV,f0.80 a+;; R 1.00 0.70 Figure 7.6 Event Tree - Production Phase - Process - Mitigated • uodad l !d - POS6d 00rode. 13, RESIDENTIAL AREA RESIDENTIAL AREA RES!CEN-IAL AREA GREEN SPACE CYPre5 5P 5P SP stAAL L BUSINESS 2P 200 r+ PRODUCTION PHASE DAY MITIGATED • uodad l old - 6086d Figure 7.7 IR Contours for Production Phase - Day - Mitigated I MI I QM 11111 MO OM OM NB NI MI NM OP M --- a dB O SW 11W1 SW SIN OW M NI WMI OS WO S SW O SIII — OW VIM GO GO rod °A RESIDENTIAL AREA RESIDENTIAL AREA RESIDENTIAL AREA 2P \ 2P\ 2P \ 2P\ 2P i 2P \ 2P 2P Ardmore Av. Day yht OP GREEN SPACE Valley rive 209 SMAu g�1SINE' 30 5P 5P 5P 5P SMALL BUSINESS PRODUCTION PHASE NIGHT MITIGATED 50 100 200 ft Figure 7.8 IR Contours for Production Phase - Night - Mitigated • uodad jvutd - tr086d RESIDENTIAL AREA IDENTI RES DCNTIAL AREA 2P Night OP lye GREEN SPACE SMALL BUSINE Plant North 5P BUSINESS 50 100 200 ft PRODUCTION PHASE WORST MITIGATED • uodad !nu!f - f7086d Figure 79 IR Contours for Production Phase - Worst - Mitigated l O I ON e — MI M IN V A i O 11111 - — MO No an Hermosa Beach Project Inted Risk Analysis 7.11 III P9804 - Final Report capacity of 0.5 psi of the wall. Figure 7.10 shows the overpressure profile variation with distance from the explosion epicentre. The resultant risk spectrum considering the mitigation measures described above for the production facility is shown in Figure 7.11, both for the principal components and the complete facility. 7.4 Existing Facilities Resultant Risks As no mitigation measures have been considered for the existing facilities risks, the resultant risks are the same as the unmitigated risks which are depicted graphically in the risk spectrum in Figure 7.12. 28/8/98 BERCIIA GPOUP PM 0.8 0.7 0.6 H 0.5 0. w co 0.4 w cc a cc w o 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 0 50 100 150 DISTANCE FROM EPICENTRE (ft) Figure 7.10 Explosion Overpressure Profile 200 250 :Jodad fvwd - f,086d MP OM 111111110 - 1111 lit i - S M - MB - O I- - -- I z 0 PI 0 0 !C O CC a a 4 J 3 IL 0 0 50 100 150 DISTANCE FROM EPICENTRE (ft) Figure 7.10 Explosion Overpressure Profile 200 250 :Jodad fvwd - f,086d MP OM 111111110 - 1111 lit i - S M - MB - O I- - -- 1 t 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Hermosa Beach Project Inted Risk Analysis 7.13 • P9804 - Final Report Annual Chance or N or More Fatalities 1.E 02 1.E-03 1.E-04 1.E-05 1.E-06 1.E-07 1.E-08 1 10 100 Number of Fatalities (N) 1000 Figure 7.11 Public Risk Spectrum - Production Phase - Process Gas Pipeline - Mitigated 24/8/98 BERCIIA GROUP --e—Process Day I —4— Process Night I ' 1 1 —e— Gas Pipeline —6—Integrated I ' 1 ! ! I^ I I ►. II ! 1. l! I I 1 1 1 1 1 1 I I I 1 ! l l l l I I 1 l I I III I i I I I I ( 1 I I. j Iii Ij I I ' ! i III � 1 1 1 IIII ! 1 II I I I1 l I 1 I! I I! 1) t i l I i I i I 1 1 i I 11 J I 1 1 1 1 I . d ! 11'1111t11l 1 1 �\ I 11 1 11 I I I j j ( ] 1 1 1. I I 1 1 1 11611 Intolerable Insignificant imam. . GREY I ! !II; , I I 1 1 , 1I I 1 1 I 1 1 11 i 1 I ! 11 _ I I ! !• 1 10 100 Number of Fatalities (N) 1000 Figure 7.11 Public Risk Spectrum - Production Phase - Process Gas Pipeline - Mitigated 24/8/98 BERCIIA GROUP Hermosa Beach Project 4Ikrated Risk Analysis 7.14 • P9804 - Final Report Annual Chance or N or More Fatalities 1.E-02 1.E-03 1.E-04 1.E-05 1.E-06 1.E-07 1.E-08 1 10 100 Number of Fatalities (N) 1000 ASPEN Figure 7.12 Public Risk Spectrum - Existing Facilities 24/8/98 BERCIIA GROUP 1 1 1 t 1 1 1 1 1 t 1 1 ` 1 i —6—Propane Vessel —e—Trucking ;III I 1 j I Ili ! l 1 1 i --0 ntegrated I ! 1 i I 1 I I I i l I I i III I I I I 1iI I ii.i 1 1 I I I I l 1 I I ill I I I I III I 1 i I I i I 1 I I i i I�' I i I I11� I ( 11111 I I 1' t i 11 1 l I I i;! ! i i li I I I \i I !!1 ! Iiii! I I I l Ili I11 I ii I I 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 11I ' II I, hI Intolerable 0 II II l i t II I I, I II Grey} I I I '! Insignificant) I ; { 1 ; 1 IIS , I I I i I I (I { i i i i ! I III 111, I i I I I I I!I I 'I I I, 1 I I 1 10 100 Number of Fatalities (N) 1000 ASPEN Figure 7.12 Public Risk Spectrum - Existing Facilities 24/8/98 BERCIIA GROUP 1 1 1 t 1 1 1 1 1 t 1 Hermosa Beach Project Inted Risk Analysis 8.1 • P9804 - Final Report CHAPTER 8 INTEGRATED RISK ANALYSIS 8.1 General Discussion of Integrated Risk Analysis Much of the risk integration among components for annual fatality risks has been carried out in the work described in the previous chapters. However, the accumulation of risks over the project life for the Production Phase remains to be described as well as the expansion of risks from fatalities to include a consideration of risks of serious injuries. However, to avoid any confusion among mitigated, unmitigated, and component partial risks, the resultant integrated risks for the following will be given: • Test Phase annual fatality mitigated risks • Production Phase annual fatality mitigated risks • Test Phase annual mitigated injury risks • Production Phase annual mitigated injury risks • Cumulative risks over project life including Test and Production Phase for incidents and public fatality and injury risks 8.2 Test and Production Phase Annual Public Fatality and Injury Risks Individual specific risk contours, on the (conservative) assumption of an average OISR factor of 10% are shown in Figure 8.1 for the Test Phase, and in Figure 8.2 for the Production Phase. The associated fatality mitigated risk spectra are shown in Figure 8.3 for both the Test and Production Phases as well as the Existing Facilities. Based on a probability of injury 10 times greater than that of a fatality, the injury mitigated risk spectra superimposed on the appropriate (Santa Barbara County) injury risk thresholds are shown in Figure 8.4 for the Test and Production Phases. 8.3 Cumulative Risk Over Project Life The Test Phase is proposed to take no more than 1 year, while the Production Phase may take up an additional 34 years. Although no projections were made available by the City of Hermosa Beach on changes in population density in the vicinity of the project, it has been assumed that the population density will not decrease. Accordingly, to the level of approximation used in this analysis, it can be assumed that the annual project risks of the Production Phase will remain constant over the 34 year life. It may be argued by the project proponents that as time goes on, they will become more efficient and reliable and ultimately safer in the conduct of the operation; the opposite argument also holds that as personnel become accustomed to the operation, with time they may grow careless. Also, a desirable residential and light commercial area such as Hermosa Beach seldom experiences a population density decline, but rather the opposite, an increase in Asursi 28/8/98 BERCHA GROUP 0000 RESIDENTIAL AREA RESIDENTIAL AREA P 1 2P \ 2P \ 2P Ardrior RESIDENTIAL AREA RESIDENTIAL AREA GREEN SPACE PARK 1OP SMALL 1)tl ' Plant North IPT CYPre'S Av 51' 5P 51' 5P 51' 5P 51' 5P SMALL 11uSUNCSS TEST PHASE OISR MITIGATED 0 50 100 ?00 I' i • iiodad 1vutd - 6086d Figure 8.1 Individual Specific Risk Contours - Test Phase — 11111 11110 11111 41111 11111 11111 11111 41111 11111 11111 11111 11111 11111 11110 11111 11111 11111 41111 all W O OW OW WO OM OW OM WO OW M I W WO OW I OM NO RESIDENTIAL AREA RESIDENTIAL AREA 1 2P 1 2P 1 2P \ 2P \ 2P ` 2P \ 2P 2P Z 1 Ardmore Av. 2P 2P RESIDENTIAL AREA 2P 2P 2P1 2P RESIDENTIAL AREA GREEN SPACE M 0) 0! 4. 4. Gy Av. 5P 5P 5P SMALL. BUSINESS Gr PRODUCTION PHASE OISR MITIGATED SP 0 50 100 POO ft Figure 8.2 Individual Specific Risk Contours - Production Phase • uoda j 1 vui,--17086d Hermosa Beach Project rated Risk Analysis 8.4 • P9804 - Final Report Annual Chance or N or More Fatalities 1.E 02 1.E-03 1.E-04 1.E-05 1.E•06 1.E•07 1.E-08 I � r I I Ili I I t 11 1 I V I I I I I I i 111111 I 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I I I l 1 1 ®-� -—Test Phase —e— Production Phase —�— Existing Facilities I I IIII I LII i I I t Grey : 1 Intolerable H Insignificant 10 100 Number of Fatalities (N) it I 1000 Figure 8.3 Public Risk Spectrum - Fatality 28/8/98 BERCIIA GROUP Hermosa Beach Project 1nteSd Risk Analysis 8.5 • P9804 - Final Report Annual Chance or N or More Injuries 1.E-02 1.E-03 1.E-04 1.E-05 1.E-06 1.E-07 I 1 I 1 1 I 1 I I I 1 1 1 IIi1I I I i I I I I I 1 IIII — e --Test Phase —B --Production Phase — A—Existing Facilities 1 III Intolerable 1 II x Grey -A 1 II 1.E-08 - Insignificant 1 10 100 Number of Injuries (N) 1000 Figure 8.4 Public Risk Spectrum - Injuries 2818/98 BERCIIA GROUP Hermosa Beach Project rated Risk Analysis 8.6 • P9804 - Final Report population density. Thus, the assumption that the risk will remain constant over the life of the project is a somewhat debatable one, but serves as a basis for identification of the project cumulative risk. Based on a 35 year project life, Table 8.1 summarizes the expected number of releases for the principal hazard scenarios which may be expected to occur, together with the associated number of consequence and ultimate risk events. The first column on the left of the table identifies the most significant hazard scenarios used as a basis for event simulation in this table, together with their description, frequency per year, and the total number of releases of each type over the project life of 35 years. Next, the evolution of consequences, together with the associated explicit hazards, are given. Thus, of the 31 leaks which may be expected over the project life, 28 are likely to be dispersed, while 3 can result in jet fires. The next column indicates whether or not there is an offsite effect associated with each of the consequence evolution events. Thus, for example, for the leak, gas dispersion reaches offsite but a resultant jet fire would not reach offsite due to the small release rate associated with leaks. On the other hand, all of the consequences evolving from the rupture do have offsite effects, but of relatively low probability. The final three columns at. the right-hand side of the table are based on the integrated risks and take into account not only the process release scenarios, but also the well blowouts, storage facilities, and pipelines. The risk intensity, or maximum offsite annual individual specific risk, is given in the next column. It may be noted from the ISR contours that the 10-5 contour doesn't quite reach offsite, but is very close; in this table, it has been considered to reach offsite. Finally, the cumulative expected fatality and injury frequencies for 35 years are given in the last two columns. As can be seen, the chance of a fatality over the project life is approximately 1 in 7000, while the chance of a serious injury over the project life is approximately 1 in 700. Clearly, the chances given pertain to members of the public only, and not to onsite workers. It is important to note that the final figures in Table 8.1 pertain to the integrated effects of the project, including all components over the 35 year period. As there do not exist acceptability criteria for 35 year project life periods, the acceptability for the risks cited for the life of the project should be judged on the basis of the City of Hermosa Beach intuitive and analytical risk acceptability. In order to assist in providing perspective on the risk levels cited , a table summarizing more customary day-to-day risks experienced by North American members of the public is presented as Table 8.2. It should be noted that both voluntary and involuntary risks are shown in this table. The voluntary risks pertain to activities which are undertaken for direct benefit to the individual and are not directly comparable to the involuntary risk levels that are likely to be associated with members of the public in the vicinity of the proposed project. Thus, the project risks which are given on an annual basis as well as a 35 year basis which pertain to involuntary risk reception are more appropriate to compare to those of the project. As may be seen, the Hermosa Beach Project poses risk levels to the residents which are comparable to some of the higher ones to which they are involuntarily exposed such as fires, poisoning, and electrocution. In the right-hand column of the table, are the expected casualties (fatalities and injuries) based on the 1 to ASPEN 28/8/98 BERCI-IA GROUP Hermosa Beach Project Intedd Risk Analysis 8.7 • P9804 - Final Report 10 fatality/injury likelihood for the project. Finally, the cumulative 35 year risk spectra for fatalities and injuries for the project are shown in Figures 8.5 and 8.6. ASPEN 28/8/98 BFRCI-IA GROUP GoGo Table 8.1 Expected Incidents Daring Life of Project PRINCIPAL HAZARD SCENARIOS DESCRIPTION FREQ. PER YEAR (EXPCTD) NO.OF RELEASES IN 35 YEARS EVENT NO.OF EVENTS IN 35 YEARS (NO. EXPECTED) OFFSITE EVENT EFFECT MAXIMUM FATALITY ISR (ANNUAL) CHANCE OF 1 OR MORE FATALITIES IN 35 YRS CHANCE OF 1 OR MORE INJURIES IN 35 YRS HB -P -P -L Leak from process unit 8.9 x 10•' (1) 31 Dispersion 28.0 (28) Y 10•s (1/100000) 1.4 x 10' (1/7000) 1.4 x 10'3 (1/700) Jet Fire 3.12 (3) N Flash Fire 0.0 (0) N Explosion 0.0 (0) N HB -P -P -H Hole from process unit 6.5 x 10.2 (1/15) 2.0 Dispersion 1.82 (2) Y Jet Fire 0.43 (1) Y Flash Fire 0.02 (0) Y Explosion 0.0 (0) N HB -P -P -R Process from process unit 2.9 x 10.2 (1/35) 1.0 Dispersion 0.71 (1) Y Jet Fire 0.27 (1) Y Flash Fire 0.02 (0) Y Explosion 0.01 (0) Y 90 oo • modad Muhl - 17086d I' OS f !r r- O-_-- r- N- N E i 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Hermosa Beach Project Intelid Risk Analysis 8.9 • P9804 - Final Report Table 8.2 Common Individual Risks of Casualty CAUSE' INDIVIDUAL RISK PER MILLION (per year) Motor Vehicle Accidents (total) V 240.0 Home Accidents V 110.0 Falls V 62.0 Motor Vehicle Pedestrian Collisions V 42.0 Drowning V 36.0 Fires I 28.0 Inhalation and Ingestion of Objects I 15.0 Firearms V 10.0 Hermosa Beach Oil Project I 8.0 Accidental Poisoning: •. • Gases and Vapors7.7 Solids and Liquids (Not drugs or medicaments) I 6.0 Electrocution I 5.3 Tornadoes I 0.6 Floods I 0.6 Lightning I 0.5 Tropical Cyclones and Hurricanes I 0.3 Bites and Stings by Venomous Animals and Insects I 0.2 V denotes "Voluntary"; I, "Involuntary" 28/8/98 BFRCI1A GROUP Hermosa Beach Project rated Risk Analysis 8.10 • P9804 - Final Report Figure 8.5 Public Risk Spectrum - Fatalities - Cumulative for 35 Years ASPEN 28/8/98 BERCI1A GROUP Hermosa Beach Project 1nteeed Risk Analysis 8.11 • P9804 - Final Report Figure 8.6 Public Risk Spectrum - Injuries - Cumulative for 35 Years Asurs 28/8/98 BEIRCIIIA GROUP MD NE IN s- - i r NS r- ON ND NM MB 0 I NI ON • • Hermosa Beach Project Integral Risk Analysis 9.1 • P9804 - Final Report CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 9.1 General Description of the Work Completed An integrated risk assessment of the proposed MacPherson Oil Company Hermosa Beach Oil Project has been conducted. This assessment was conducted in response to the City of Hermosa Beach generic request for an integrated risk assessment as well as to specific requirements requested as a result of a stakeholder meeting conducted with the presentation of preliminary results from the project. The scope of work consisted of the following principal tasks: • Data acquisition • Hazard scenario development • Frequency analysis • Consequence analysis • Unmitigated risk assessment • Risk mitigation • Mitigated risk assessment • Integrated risk assessment • Conclusions and recommendations The work spanned both the proposed Test Phase and the Production Phase of the project. Utilizing state -of -art techniques of risk analysis, including the Bercha Risk Software (BRISK) and a current multi-purpose consequence model (TRACE), both mitigated and unmitigated component and integrated Test and Production Phase risks for the project were determined. Results included annual individual and collective risks, as well as cumulated risks over the project life. Table 9.1 summarizes the salient results of the work, while a discussion of the principal assumptions and approximations and a systematic reporting of the conclusions for each phase follows in the balance of this summary. 9.2 Principal Assumptions and Approximations Made in the Work 9.2.1 Conservative Assumptions Made in the Work Certain significant conservative assumptions and approximations were made, resulting in the tendency to overestimate the risks associated with the project. The principal ones among these may be summarized as follows: Asurs • Test and Production Phase process release frequencies were based on the entire process facility releasing as one segment 28/8/98 BFRCIIA GROUP Hermosa Beach Projelbegrated Risk Analysis 9.2 • P9804 - Final Report • Leak and hole releases were assumed to blowdown until atmospheric pressure is reached within the segment (approximately 580 minutes for a leak) rather than be curtailed by shutdown • Modelling of ground level releases rather than elevated releases as a basis for hazard assessment • All releases in horizontal direction • Test Phase jet fires penetrate sound attenuation wall 9.2.2 Non -Conservative Assumptions Made in the Work Certain non -conservative assumptions to simplify and facilitate the work were made, which can result in an understatement of the risks. It is believed that these understatements are not significant, but these assumptions are nevertheless summarized, as follows: • Topography was not explicitly considered due to its unlikely significant influence on dispersion isopleths • Any outdoor receptors were considered at risk; indoor receptors were considered safe • Population distributions were considered as remaining constant over the 35 year project life • The wake effect of the perimeter wall, which could result in downward motion of the release due to turbulence, was ignored 9.2.3 Simplifying Assumptions and Approximation Certain other simplifying assumptions and approximations were made during the conduct of the work in order to make its completion practicable while still providing meaningful results. These simplifying assumptions and approximations may have the effect of either overestimating or underestimating the risk, but to a negligible degree within the context of the present work. Such simplifying assumptions and approximations may be summarized as follows: • Redondo Beach weather was considered representative of the Hermosa Beach site location • Subdivision of release sizes into leak, hole, rupture, and double rupture for pipeline • 20% extra volume allowance was added to allow for flow during the isolation of each segment • The injury likelihood was assessed as ten times more likely than the fatality likelihood • Mitigating effects of the Test Phase sound attenuation wall and Production Phase structural wall were modelled only in terms of their reduction of ignition of flammable vapour cloud ignition probabilities • Cumulative risk was based on the integrated Production Phase mitigated annual risk 28/8/98 I3''A GROUP Hermosa Beach Project InteSd Risk Analysis 9.3 I P9804 - Final Report 9.3 Test Phase Annual Risks The Test Phase risks extend over a period of one year, and both the mitigated and unmitigated risks are largely in the insignificant risk region. The maximum individual specific risk to the public associated with the Test Phase is chances of a fatality of 1 in one million per year. Figure 9.1 shows the Test Phase risk spectra for both the mitigated and unmitigated case. Reduction in the risks from the unmitigated level results from the following risk mitigation measures: • Installation of a 30 -foot high perimeter sound attenuation wall for the duration of the Test Phase 9.4 Production Phase Annual Risks Individual specific and collective risks for the Production Phase have been assessed. The maximum individual specific risk to the public from the Production Phase is approximately a 1 in 100,000 chance of fatality per year. Figure 9.1 shows the unmitigated risk and mitigated risk spectra for the Production Phase. As may be seen, the unmitigated risk spectrum extends into the unacceptable region. Although the basis for the risk estimates is quite conservative, the high level of unmitigated risk demonstrates that an industrial project in an urban setting can pose unacceptable risks if not appropriately mitigated. The mitigated risk spectrum for the Production Phase is largely in the grey area, indicating that all practicable means to reduce the risks should be utilized. The principal requirement to reduce the risks for the Production Phase from the unacceptable region to the grey region was as follows: • Installation of a 12 -foot high perimeter structural wall to remain in place for the entire life of the project In general, every effort should be made to further reduce risks associated with the Production Phase. Risk mitigation measures which have generally been proposed by MOC, but for which engineering details were not available during the course of this assessment, include the following: • Emergency shutdown valves within the process component to reduce the frequencies and volumes of releases associated with that component • Automatic gas detection, shutdown, isolation, and depressurization equipment for the process segment V.5 Integrated and Cumulative Risks The following hazardous events and associated ultimate risk events may be expected over the 35 year life of the project: Asurs 28/8/98 I3" ' A GROUP Hermosa Beach Projec grated Risk Analysis 9.4 • P9804 - Final Report • 31 leaks, 2 major releases, and 1 rupture within the process segment • Resulting offsite hazards including 2 jet fires, and a 4% likelihood of an offsite flash fire with potential for casualties • A 1 in 7000 chance of one of more fatalities and a 1 in 700 chance of 1 or more serious injuries of members of the public 9.6 Existing Facility Risks Figure 9.1 also shows the risk spectrum estimated for the existing use of the site as a City yard. As may be seen, the existing risk spectrum was somewhat lower than the Test Phase risk spectrum for fatalities in excess of 2, but is at a similar level for the Test Phase risk spectrum for at least 1 or 2 fatalities. This segment of both the Test Phase risk spectrum and the Existing Facilities risk spectrum is attributable primarily to vehicle traffic hazards. 9.7 Acceptability of Risks The acceptability of the annual individual and collective risks can be assessed utilizing standards adopted by other jurisdictions. The highest annual individual specific risks for the Test Phase and the Production Phase are a maximum of 1 in 100,000. This level is deemed acceptable for public, commercial, and residential medium -density land use. The annual collective risks from the Test Phase are primarily in the Insignificant region of the risk profile for both the mitigated and unmitigated case. Therefore, they may be deemed acceptable with respect to the risk thresholds indicated on the risk profile. The integrated annual collective risks for the Production Phase extend into the Intolerable (unacceptable) region for the unmitigated case, necessitating risk reduction to the acceptable region. Such a risk reduction can be achieved by specific risk mitigation measures, the perimeter walls, and further risk mitigation should be implemented including some of the provisions detailed above. Consideration of the perimeter wall risk mitigation effect results in collective risks in the acceptable Grey region. Every effort should be made to reduce the risks for the Production Phase to a level as low as reasonably practicable. The cumulative risks over the life of the project have also been estimated, but their acceptability must be assessed primarily in the light of the City of Hermosa Beach Council and residents' risk tolerance criteria. Naturally, although criteria for acceptability of the annual risks have been presented, the same City of Hermosa Beach sense of risk acceptability should be the overriding arbiter of what goes on within its jurisdiction in terms of annual risks. In general, it can be said that the proposed project by a safe and reputable operator contains industry standard safety and reliability provisions, which will make it as safe as any comparable modern operation. Yet, because of its setting in a medium -density urban, ,ASPEN 28/8/98 BERCI-IA GPOUP Hermosa Beach Project IntelIli Risk Analysis 9.5 • P9804 - Final Report commercial, and residential location, it poses risks. These risks have been quantified and presented, with an explanation of the approximations implicit in this quantification, and compared to standards and other measuring sticks that are available. The ultimate decision on the acceptability of the risks rests with the City of Hermosa Beach. Asurs 28/8/98 BERCf1A GROUP Table 9.1 Summary of Hermosa Beach Oil Project Mitigated Risks COMPONENT TYPE OF RISK MAXIMUM VALUE ACCEPTABILITY MITIGATION INCLUDED PROJECT Annual individual specific risk or fatality 1/100,000 per year Acceptable • Perimeter wall • Industry standard measures Annual group risk of 1 or more fatalities 1/50,000 per year Grey -Acceptable but mitigation recommended Cumulative (35 year) individual risk of fatality 1/3000 for project Up to City Cumulative (35 year) group risk of 1 or more fatalities 1/7000 for project Up to City Cumulative (35 year) group risk of 1 or more injuries 1/700 for project . Up to City TEST PHASE Annual individual specific risk of fatality 1/1,000,000 per year Acceptable • Perimeter wall • Industry standard measures Annual group risk of 1 or more fatalities 1/50,000 per year Acceptable Annual group risk of 10 or more fatalities 1/30,000,000 per year Acceptable Cumulative individual risk of fatality 1/1,000,000 for phase Acceptable Cumulative group risk of 1 or more fatalities 1/50000 for phase Acceptable Cumulative (35 year) group risk of 1 or more injuries 1/5000 for phase Up to City b os • uodaj Im1 , - bo86d - i N ON 1• NE 1• . 1• i EN i! INN i I UN I EN - IIIIIII all M w N-- — r E I, — OM M ON M i 111101 15 Table 9.1 (cont.) Summary of Hermosa Beach Oil Project Mitigated Risks COMPONENT TYPE OF RISK MAXIMUM VALUE ..INCLUDED ACCEPTABILITY MITIGATION PRODUCTION PHASE Annual individual specific risk of fatality 1/100,000 per year Acceptable • Perimeter wall • Industry standard measures Annual group risk of 1 or more fatalities 1/250,000 per year Acceptable Annual group risk of 10 or more fatalities 1/1000 , ,000 per year Grey-Acceptable but mitigation recommended Cumulative 35 year individual risk of fatality 1/3000 for project Up to City Cumulative 35 year group risk of one or more fatalities 1/7000 for project Up to City Cumulative 35 year group risk of one or more injuries 1/700 for project Up to City EXISTING FACILITY Annual individual specific risk of fatality 1/1,000,000 per year Acceptable • As is Annual group risk of 1 or more fatalities 1/50,000 Acceptable Annual group risk of 10 or more fatalities 0 Acceptable • • ioda?11 nut! - r086(1 Hermosa Beach Project ttegrated Risk Analysis 9.8 • P9804 - Final Report 1.E-02 • - atr • - Test Phase Unmitigated 1.E-03 --6—Test Phase Mitigated immm."' �iiiiil�� .1 .A 111111•111•1111111111 MI o - - Production Unmitigated�i IMEIN —0— Production Phase Mitigated 111111�� .111111 --0-- Existing Facilities 11111 =MI =MENEM _ ■■■.. M ■■■U .,,'_ III II- IIS 11111 1r i c IIIIIMIIIMMIAMMIIIIIIMIIIIIIIIMIIIIINIMIN■ 1.111IMMINI■■■■bi •' 1.I. Milli ti MIK 's--8!11111 , Iii!! -17 °. &A ■Illl\ It IIIIIIIMIMI alk '.IIOna 0 Intolerable -■LI, ` II 4 ■ n 'o-' 1 E-07 ilk d , __. M■■I \I t`, 1 Insign■ifica�nt Grey i,,1III. 111 , , 1.E-08 X1111111111. 1 10 100 1000 Number of Fatalities (N) Asuts Figure 9.1 Project Mitigated and Unmitigated Collective Risk Profiles 28/8/98 Nits GROUP 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Hermosa Beach Project 1ntesi Risk Analysis R.1 • P9804 - Final Report REFERENCES 1. ADL, "Torrance Oil Field Reservoir Information," Telefax to Bercha, May 26, 1998. 2. American Institute of Chemical Engineers, "Guidelines for Evaluating Characteristics of Vapor Cloud Explosions, Flash Fires, and BLEVE's", 1994. 3. American Institute of Chemical Engineers, "Guidelines for Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis," 1989. 4. Arthur D. 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